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A balancing act between financial sustainability 
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Abstract 
It is estimated that up to 4.5 trillion US dollars in global 
investment are needed every year to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Innovative 
financing approaches that aim to increase the 
involvement of private actors in development finance are 
therefore increasing in importance. One of these 
approaches is structured funds. They include different 
risk categories, in order to meet the needs of different 
investors. Official donors assume the highest risk 
category, thus reducing the risk for private investors. So 
far, only little is known about the development impact of 
this financing approach, which needs to balance its 
objectives of financial sustainability and development 
impact. Against this backdrop, this evaluation examines 
the alignment of this financing approach with the 
objectives of German development cooperation, its 
potential for mobilising private capital, its financial 
sustainability, and its effects on financial intermediaries 
(FIs) and the extent to which sub-borrowers are reached. 
For this purpose a theory-based approach was selected 
that integrates qualitative and quantitative methods of 
analysis. Based on its findings, the evaluation makes 
recommendations concerning financial sustainability, 
political management, donor coordination, mobilising 
private capital and managing development impact. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
It is estimated that up to 4.5 trillion US dollars in global investment are needed every year to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in developing countries (UNCDF, 2018). Even a substantial increase 
in official funding deployed and recognised as Official Development Assistance (ODA) by the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-
DAC) would not even come close to meeting this financial requirement. For example, an increase in ODA by 
the OECD-DAC donor countries to 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) in line with the so-called ‘0.7% 
target’ would mobilise an additional 175 billion US dollars, and thus only cover part of the financing gap 
(Move Humanity, 2018). 
Against this backdrop, the involvement of private actors in development cooperation is becoming 
increasingly important. Involving private actors offers opportunities not only for closing the financing gap, 
but also for sustainable economic development in developing countries. Nine out of ten jobs in developing 
countries are provided by the private sector (World Bank, 2013), and small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) make up the largest share of all enterprises in the formal sector in developing countries. On average, 
SMEs account for more than 30 per cent of private sector employment and for about 4 to 16 per cent of total 
employment (EUIFI, no date). At the same time, many small and medium-sized enterprises in developing 
countries still lack access to finance. The demand for financing among micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (MSMEs) is estimated at 8.9 trillion US dollars – the current credit supply, on the other hand, at 
only 3.7 trillion US dollars (IFC, 2017). This means that some 40 per cent of microenterprises and 44 per cent 
of SMEs in developing countries are credit constrained. 
In the Addis Ababa Action Agenda 2015, donor countries argued for greater use of innovative financing 
mechanisms to involve the private sector in development finance (UN, 2015). ODA should be used 
strategically to mobilise additional private financial resources for sustainable development, and to support 
investment that drives social, environmental and economic progress in partner countries. The financing 
mechanisms thus also target commercial private investors that have not yet invested in these areas and 
expect market-standard risk-return profiles (WEF and OECD, 2015).  
Structured funds, which are the focus of this evaluation, are one such financing approach. 
Box 1 Structure and decision-making in the funds 
In development cooperation, structured funds are a financing approach that aims to mobilise additional 
private capital to finance SDGs in developing countries. These funds usually combine budgetary resources 
of the German Federal Government, and capital market funds of the KfW Development Bank and/or other 
financial institutions, with investments from private investors. The official donors in the fund assume a 
large part of the investment risk, thus reducing the risk for private investors. 
The funds' capital (i.e. the liabilities side) is usually split between three tranches and notes1. The so-called 
waterfall structure distributes the risks and returns of a fund to the investors in a fixed order (tranches and 
notes in order of decreasing risk: junior, mezzanine, senior and notes). The riskier tranches then serve as a 
risk buffer for investors in less risky tranches. Official donors typically invest in the risky junior tranche, thus 
assuming a major part of the investment risk. The junior tranche is also called the first loss tranche, as it is 
the first to bear any losses incurred. 
The roles and responsibilities for decision-making in the funds are clearly distributed between the 
individual investors and the funds’ official bodies. The official bodies safeguard the strategy of a fund, 
including its development objectives. The Board of Directors is responsible for all overarching fund matters, 
1  Similar to an asset class that investors can invest in 
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while the Investment Committee decides on the fund's investments, based on proposals from the fund 
manager. 
The structured funds financing approach aims to support three main development objectives: 1) to promote 
the establishment of stable and inclusive financial systems by providing local financial institutions, the so-
called financial intermediaries (FIs), in the partner countries with funding and technical assistance (TA); 2) to 
reduce under-capitalisation in the partner countries, especially of MSMEs, as supported FIs issue a higher 
number of loans, thereby creating access to financing; 3) to shape and expand the portfolio of FIs in favour 
of sub-borrowers with particularly high financing needs.  
The number of structured funds involving German development cooperation has risen sharply since 2005. 
Most of the structured funds evaluated here were established between 2009 and 2012. Furthermore, 
Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) plans to ramp up its 
investment in structured funds with a focus on SMEs as part of the Emergency COVID-19 Support Programme, 
in order to bridge liquidity shortages and preserve jobs in partner countries. However, little is known about 
the impact of structured funds on development objectives. The financing approach faces a trade-off between 
its aim of financial sustainability and market conformity, and the aforementioned development objectives. 
This evaluation examines these conflicting priorities from various perspectives. 
Objectives of the evaluation 
In light of this question, the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) conducted an evaluation 
of the structured funds financing approach. This evaluation examines structured funds on several levels: the 
level of development objectives, the level of the financing approach and its structure, the level of the FIs and 
the level of the sub-borrowers. It also focuses in particular on the circumstances under which structured 
funds are additional to existing financing approaches in development cooperation (additionality criterion). 
It pursues the following aims: 
• Relate structured funds to the objectives of German development cooperation
• Analyse the implementation of development principles (division of labour, donor harmonisation,
strengthening of regional actors)
• Analyse the financial sustainability and efficiency of the funds
• Analyse the contribution made towards mobilising additional capital
• Analyse the characteristics of FIs and sub-borrowers that are reached and the impact of the funds.
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Methods 
The evaluation was based on a theory of change (ToC) developed specifically for structured funds. The ToC 
models the causal relationships and change processes that are assumed to occur when structured funds are 
used, based on social science theories. Applying the reconstructed ToC, the evaluation team identified the 
focal areas of the evaluation and formulated the evaluation questions. These can be clustered under the 
following three sets of questions: 
Set of questions No. Evaluation question 
Alignment with German 
development-policy objectives 
and development principles 
1 To what extent do the objectives of structured funds 
match the strategic objectives of the BMZ? 
To what extent are structured funds a suitable financing 
approach for achieving these objectives? 
2 To what extent do structured funds promote a division of 
labour, donor harmonisation and the strengthening of local 
actors? 
Mobilisation of additional 
capital/financial sustainability 
3 To what extent are structured funds effective and efficient 
in leveraging private capital and the capital of 
(development) financial institutions? 
4 To what extent do structured funds create sustainable 
financing structures? 
Effects on FIs and 
MSMEs/employment 
5 To what extent do grants spent on TA help achieve the 
structured funds' objectives? 
6 To what extent do structured funds affect the portfolio of 
FIs and their success in reaching new target groups? 
7 To what extent do structured funds affect MSME 
development, employment, income security and self-
employment? 
In answering the evaluation questions, the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria2 were considered and the 
additionality of the financing approach was also assessed at various levels (see Table 4 and Sections 4.3, 5.4 
and 6.3). 
To answer the evaluation questions, sources and methods were triangulated. The data sources include semi-
structured interviews, fund and BMZ documents, secondary data on financed financial intermediaries (FIs) 
and specialist literature. In total, 122 interviews were conducted with representatives of the BMZ, the KfW 
Development Bank, investors, the fund bodies, the fund managers, the FIs, the sub-borrowers and experts. 
Part of the data was collected using a survey among FIs as well as case studies in Tunisia, Cambodia, Nigeria 
and Serbia. The country cases were selected using a two-step indicator-based procedure. 
Following a mixed-method approach, the evaluation applies and integrates qualitative and quantitative 
methods of analysis. For all evaluation questions, a qualitative content analysis of the 122 interview protocols 
and approximately 500 fund and BMZ documents was used. Elements of process tracing were applied to 
assess the quality of this evidence. In addition, a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) examined the factors 
that encourage or hinder private investment in the funds to answer evaluation question 3. The answers to 
evaluation questions 5, 6 and 7 are based on a causal analysis and are limited to the funds operating in the 
2  The evaluation criteria were discussed and agreed on with the reference group prior to the reform of the DAC criteria in 2019 (which now also 
include the criterion of coherence). 
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field of MSME financing. For this purpose, a contribution analysis based on the ToC was carried out. To test 
the underlying assumptions and risks of the contribution analysis, the evaluation combined the qualitative 
analysis of semi-structured interviews with the quantitative analysis of secondary data on the FIs. In addition, 
a logistic regression analysed what factors influence the selection of countries and FIs to be financed. Finally, 
the evaluation analysed the effects of fund financing on the portfolio development and lending terms of the 
financed FIs using a quasi-experimental design (differences-in-differences approach). 
Findings 
The findings of the evaluation provide answers to three overarching questions: 
1. When is a structured fund appropriate for achieving development objectives? (appropriateness)
2. To what extent can the approach mobilise private capital? (mobilisation)
3. How do the funds affect FIs and to what extent do they reach sub-borrowers? (impact)
Appropriateness of the approach for achieving development objectives 
To understand how best to use structured funds in German development cooperation, DEval analysed under 
which circumstances this financing approach is appropriate for achieving development objectives, and in 
which cases other approaches may be preferable. Both the financial and the development perspectives were 
considered, which can conflict with each other. 
Financial sustainability 
The financial sustainability of the financing approach was assessed in the evaluation using a rating scale. This 
scale measures the financial sustainability of a fund through its ability to cover costs, its use of the official 
capital on a revolving basis and the efficiency of the risk-return structure (see Section 4.1 for a detailed 
description of the rating scale). When a fund is able to cover its costs and uses the official capital on a 
revolving basis, the evaluation team considers it to have achieved financial sustainability. Where an efficient 
risk-return structure is also in place, the evaluation team considers the financial sustainability requirement 
to have even been surpassed. 
The majority of the evaluated funds break even within a few years of their establishment, and use the official 
capital on a revolving basis. Most of the funds are therefore considered financially sustainable. To be able to 
cover all costs, a fund requires a sufficiently large size and opportunities for diversification. Financing volumes 
far below 100 million US dollars or overly severe restrictions on diversification usually have an adverse effect 
on the business development and therefore the financial sustainability of a fund. 
The use of country windows in the junior tranche of some funds, which provide for investments in certain 
countries, leads to partial efficiency losses. The way the country windows have been designed on the 
liabilities side of the funds so far has meant that the income and losses for the investments in the junior 
tranche are distributed by country of investment rather than across funds. This not only causes additional 
costs, thus reducing the efficiency of the funds, but also increases the complexity of the structure. This is why 
the financial sustainability requirement can be considered to have been surpassed in only a few cases. On 
the asset side, the country windows also restrict the funds' diversification options.  
In most cases, official capital in the examined funds is deposited in the junior tranche of the funds with 
unlimited duration. With few exceptions, for this capital there exists neither an exit strategy that defines the 
timing and nature of the exit, nor fixed mechanisms for regularly reviewing the continued need to use official 
capital in the fund. Thus in many cases it is not sufficiently clear what long-term options for exiting the funds 
are available to the official donors. 
The structure of the funds enables them to issue small-scale loans as well as local currency loans and to 
cooperate with private FIs: Most of the funds issue mainly small loans of less than 10 million US dollars. They 
also issue individual larger loans that address, among other things, the needs of large local FIs or project 
financing in the area of renewable energy. In addition, nearly all funds offer local currency financing to a 
certain extent. However, most financing continues to be in hard currency (US dollars, euros). Whether grants 
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are issued in local or hard currency depends on the risks that the funds can bear and the needs of the financed 
FIs. For example, larger, more formalised FIs often have no need for local currency financing.  
Development orientation 
The development orientation of the structured funds is highly consistent with the objectives of the 16 BMZ 
strategies for which a thematic or geographical link to the structured funds was identified3. The funds aim to 
create access to finance for sub-borrowers who have thus far had insufficient access to it, and to support the 
stability of the partner-country financial systems. They are thus designed to help implement the BMZ sector 
strategy for financial systems development in particular. However, there is relatively little interaction 
between the objectives and activities of the structured funds, and the bilateral portfolio/country division, 
with respect to private sector and financial systems development. So far the BMZ has thus made barely any 
proactive use of potential synergies between funds on the one hand, and the bilateral portfolio or country 
division on the other. Implementation of the BMZ 2030 reform process and the intended prioritisation of 
reform-minded partner countries and core areas (also within the framework of regional projects) mean that 
the BMZ will need to discuss the future orientation of new funds in line with these priorities. The coronavirus 
pandemic might also necessitate a change of direction in order to provide greater support to countries and 
sectors that are particularly hard hit. 
At the same time, the structure and regional setup of the funds allow them to meet financing needs in partner 
countries that are not covered by other approaches of bilateral Financial Cooperation (FC). As well as the 
possibility of offering small loan sizes and local currency financing, this also includes the financing of private 
FIs. In this way the funds make a development contribution to building stable and inclusive financial systems 
and to creating financing opportunities for groups with previously limited access to sources of finance. They 
can thereby demonstrate a high degree of additionality to other financing approaches. Moreover, their 
structure enables them to ensure continuity in times of crisis, such as the current coronavirus pandemic, by 
meeting financing needs in markets that are considered risky. 
Setting the strategic direction of a fund when it is created is crucial for its development orientation, as the 
BMZ's options for exercising political management become limited thereafter. Once a fund has been set up, 
strategic adjustments usually require complex coordination processes and a change in the issue document 
to ensure the agreement of all investors. There are three main points at which the BMZ is able to exercise 
political management: when the fund is being set up, when the Ministry decides on additional funding and 
when the Ministry comments on the reports. However, a lack of capacities at BMZ and the way the 
responsibilities for the funds are organised within the Ministry are preventing better management of the 
development impact. 
In operational decision-making for the funds an important role is played by the members of the official 
bodies, in particular a fund's Board of Directors and the Investment Committee. These bodies ensure 
compliance with a fund's strategy, including its development objectives, for instance by deciding on which 
FIs to select for support. The responsibilities of each of the bodies are clearly defined and demarcated. 
However, a few individuals are members of both the Board of Directors of a fund and the Board of Directors 
of an FI financed by the fund, which can lead to a conflict of interests in the selection of FIs to be supported. 
Although each of the funds has a defined process for managing such conflicts, the regulations governing 
exclusion from voting in risky cases are not uniform. 
Overall, the structured funds are thus a financially sustainable and largely efficient financing approach that 
pursues as development objectives the stability of the local financial markets and FIs as well as broad access 
to finance. The pursuit of one development objective – reaching the targeted sub-borrowers – has not been 
monitored to a sufficient degree thus far. 
3  See list of strategies in Annex 9.5. 
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Mobilisation 
In the period up to 2018, the evaluated structured funds mobilised more the 700 million US dollars in 
additional private capital. The BMZ financed the funds with approximately the same amount of budgetary 
resources. In principle, structured funds are therefore a suitable financing approach for mobilising private 
capital to achieve the funds' objectives. The waterfall structure of the funds enables them to involve investors 
with different risk-return profiles. Furthermore, when making investment decisions, more and more private 
investors are taking social and ecological aspects into consideration in addition to their expected returns. 
Such investors find the development objectives of the funds appealing. 
However, the funds are not yet fully exploiting their potential for mobilising private capital. In some cases, 
the funds reach a 'natural' limit to their capacity for mobilising private investment once the risk buffer is 
exhausted. In these cases it is not possible to increase the share of private investment without increasing the 
financing volume, i.e. the capital provided by the official donors and (Development) Finance Institutions 
((D)FIs). Furthermore, in a few funds there is no need to mobilise private capital since the required financing 
volume is provided entirely by official donors and (D)FIs. 
In some cases, the lack of an acquisition strategy to attract private investors and the complex structure make 
it difficult to mobilise private capital. A large number of different types of private investors with different 
investment motives, investment strategies and risk profiles invest in the funds. It is not evident that the 
mobilisation of private investors follows a clear strategy. Moreover the structure of the funds, which usually 
comprises various tranches and notes, increases the complexity of the financing approach and makes it less 
attractive for institutional investors. This is why there is a trend towards a less complex structure with only 
two tranches (junior and senior tranches) or towards only different note categories, to better serve the 
investment needs of private investors. 
Most of the private capital mobilised by the structured funds can be considered additional because private 
investors would not make comparable investments without the funds. The structured funds enable private 
investors to invest in regions where purely private microfinance funds have been mostly absent so far. 
However, financial sustainability and development objectives also need to be weighed against each other in 
the mobilisation of private capital. The mobilisation of private capital is lower in sectors and regions where 
the investment risk is higher and the financing needs of MSMEs are often not covered. For example, the funds 
mobilise less private capital in sub-Saharan Africa, a region of particular developmental relevance, where the 
investment climate is often difficult. On the other hand, funds investing in regions and sectors with lower risk 
were able to mobilise more private resources, thus ensuring the financial sustainability of the funds. 
Impact 
The analysis of the effects on the FIs and sub-borrowers of the four evaluated MSME funds demonstrates the 
trade-off between development impact and financial sustainability. The funds select financial intermediaries 
that address the targeted sub-borrowers through an existing business segment (in this case MSME financing). 
Among those, most selected FIs have a high degree of financial stability. Similarly, the funds invest in 
countries that are predominantly considered risky, but mostly belong to the middle income category. This 
selection of FIs and countries reduces the likelihood of losses, thus safeguarding the financial sustainability 
of the funds. At the same time, however, it limits the funds' additionality because these countries/FIs tend 
to also have other financing options. To a small extent, portfolio diversification also allows the funds to invest 
in riskier, least developed countries (LDCs) and riskier (for example smaller or younger) FIs. 
Regarding development objectives, the funds provide the financed FIs with reliable access to financing and 
promote the stability of the partner-country financial system. The funds reach the targeted sub-borrowers 
because an existing business segment for this target group is a criterion for selection of the FIs to be financed. 
The fund financing enables the financed FIs to increase their investment volume and expand their portfolios 
in absolute terms, so that more sub-borrowers can be reached. Beyond that, however, the FIs do not make 
it any easier for the envisaged target groups to access financing. Usually, for example, the FIs neither modify 
their lending terms for the envisaged target groups (with the exception of local currency financing), nor do 
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they increase the share of target-group-related business segments, e.g. for microenterprises, female sub-
borrowers or sub-borrowers without collateral, relative to their portfolio as a whole.4 
In accordance with the strategy of the funds, the FIs' lending terms are market-based in order to avoid any 
distortion of the market. Thus, they do not differ from the lending terms of FIs not financed by the funds. As 
a result, the funds reach very few sub-borrowers who previously had no access to official financial products. 
The TA provided by the funds is highly effective. The findings indicate that the interventions are highly 
demand-oriented and useful. Although other investors also offer TA, around 40 per cent of the interventions 
address the sector level, which other providers cover either to a lesser extent or not at all. DEval therefore 
assumes that the interventions are additional despite their low average financial volume. In the some cases 
the total lack or only minimal use made of all financing channels, particularly the contributions by the funds, 
limits the sustainability of the TA. 
Overall, the analysis of the structured funds’ effects on FIs and sub-borrowers shows that in the balancing 
act between financial sustainability and development impact, the funds pursue development objectives to 
the extent that they are able, given the imperative of financial sustainability. 
Conclusions 
The structured funds financing approach aims to achieve three main development objectives: 
1. to promote the development of stable and inclusive financial systems by financing FIs
2. to improve access to finance, especially for MSMEs, by enabling the supported FIs to grant a larger
number of loans
3. to shape and expand the portfolio of FIs in favour of sub-borrowers with particularly high financing needs.
To achieve these goals, structured funds should mobilise capital from private investors.
Impact (achievement of development goals) 
The present evaluation on structured funds shows that the financing approach contributes to the stability 
and financial sustainability of FIs in the field of MSME financing by providing long-term funding, partly in local 
currency. They facilitate access to capital for sub-borrowers by increasing the volume of lending and 
providing TA. However, improvements in lending terms or easier access for groups that previously had no 
access to financing were rare.  
The achievement of the funds' development objectives is influenced significantly by the selection of FIs to be 
supported. While the funds finance FIs that reach the targeted sub-borrowers, they prioritise those that are 
low risk. In the trade-off between financial sustainability and development impact, the funds thus focus on 
financial sustainability when it comes to reaching the target groups. This focus also influences the 
achievement of development objectives: Promoting predominantly financially stable FIs helps to build a 
stable financial system and improve access to financing. However, the third objective of increasing the FIs' 
orientation towards particularly vulnerable groups is made more difficult by the funds' focus on financial 
sustainability, as this would require the issue of riskier loans. 
4  This is not to be expected for microfinance institutions, since they are already focused almost exclusively on the microfinance business segment, 
for which there is barely any scope for expansion. Commercial banks, however, do have scope to expand the business segments for the target 
groups. 
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Mobilisation 
As of 2018, the examined structured funds had mobilised a total of more the 700 million US dollars in private 
capital in order to achieve the development objectives. The BMZ invested approximately the same figure in 
budgetary resources. The funds are thus a suitable financing approach for providing additional capital to 
achieve the above-mentioned objectives. However, less private capital is mobilised in regions and sectors 
where there is a higher investment risk, and where the financing needs of MSMEs are often not met. 
Appropriateness of the approach for achieving development objectives 
The stronger focus on financial sustainability distinguishes structured funds from other development finance 
approaches. Structured funds are a market-oriented financing approach that delivers loans on standard 
market terms. This has clear advantages for attracting private investors. On the other hand, as long as the 
premise of market conformity needs to be met this approach is unlikely to elicit a willingness to finance target 
groups that are more risky, even if they are highly relevant for achieving development objectives. For 
example, as described above, as part of the risk diversification strategy structured funds promote only a small 
number of riskier countries and FIs, and allow only limited control at the level of the sub-borrowers. The 
approach should therefore be seen as complementary to other approaches and instruments. To finance LDCs, 
and for interventions whose impact at target group level needs to be managed directly, other instruments 
can be considered. The traditional choice is grants. For financing that is to be provided on concessional terms 
that do not reflect market conditions, FC uses instruments such as development loans. In these loans, the 
official resources are used to reduce the costs for borrowers by offering more favourable terms, while in 
structured funds they are used as a risk buffer for private investment. 
Outlook 
The structured funds were established partly in response to the financial crisis in 2018, in an environment 
characterised by severe liquidity shortages and an urgent need for stable and inclusive financial systems. 
Between then and the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020, liquidity was available on the 
markets and microfinance institutions were already formalised in some of the regions examined in this 
evaluation. However, there is still a high demand for funding, especially in markets that tend to be less 
formalised and structurally weak. In many African countries in particular, there is still a very large financing 
gap for MSMEs that cannot be covered by purely private sector investment in the short to medium term. In 
addition to financing MSMEs, younger funds also address sectors such as education, the environment and 
climate change, and FIs are starting to include new financial products for these sectors in their portfolios as 
a result of the fund financing. In these sectors the financing approach can help to create markets. 
The coronavirus pandemic has already aggravated the existing liquidity bottlenecks. As early as March 2020 
private investors withdrew 83 billion US dollars from developing and emerging countries. Even in previously 
liquid regions and markets, financing gaps arose within the first two months of the outbreak of the pandemic. 
This affects MSMEs in particular, as they often have fewer reserves than large companies. 
Taking into account the recommendations listed below, structured funds are in principle suitable for meeting 
both financial and development needs. The recommendations indicate how the funds should be designed in 
order to make better use of their potential, particularly regarding development objectives. 
Recommendations 
Based on the findings and conclusions outlined above, the following recommendations of this DEval 
evaluation are addressed to the BMZ and the KfW Development Bank as its implementing organisation. DEval 
acknowledges that decisions at the fund companies require the agreement of all shareholders and cannot be 
made by the BMZ and KfW Development Bank alone. In these cases, however, the BMZ and/or KfW 
Development Bank should work towards implementing the respective recommendation. 
The following recommendations do not always apply to each one of the ten funds examined. This is the case 
for instance where a particular fund is already being implemented as proposed, or because the 
recommendation does not apply to the specific case of one of the ten funds. Instead, the recommendations 
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should be understood as guidelines for the general design of the financing approach, whether in the further 
development of existing funds or when setting up new funds. 
Financial sustainability 
Recommendation 1 
The BMZ and the KfW Development Bank should ensure the additionality and efficient functioning of the 
funds and, once the funds have been established, their financial sustainability. 
Implementation guidance for recommendation 1 
Financial sustainability, additionality and efficient functioning can be ensured by setting up and managing 
a fund in such a way that it 
• has a sufficiently high financing volume in the long term
• can invest in an appropriately large number of countries for diversification purposes
• does not have country windows on the liabilities side of the junior tranche for efficiency gains
• extends its loans in local currency according to the financial intermediaries' (FIs') needs and the risks
involved
• extends part of its loans in small ticket sizes to the FIs.
Recommendation 2 
The BMZ and the KfW Development Bank should define the long-term options for official donors to exit the 
funds as part of an exit strategy. 
Implementation guidance for recommendation 2 
The exit strategy should 
• define the timing and nature of the exit of the official donors, or
• define processes to review the relevance of the official capital for the funds at regular intervals.
Management of developmental impact 
Recommendation 3 
The BMZ should ensure more effective management of the development impact of the funds. 
Implementation guidance for recommendation 3 
More effective management of the development impact should 
• include long-term capacity building for structured funds within the BMZ to enable strategic
management, especially when the funds are set up and through reporting, and
• use synergies in the field of financial market development. To this end
o the responsibilities for the funds should lie within the BMZ division with a sectoral or regional focus
to account for the regional nature of the funds
o there should be increased exchange with the activities of the sector divisions and the bilateral
financial market development programmes (especially for larger funds), for example when country
programme strategies are designed.
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Recommendation 4  
The KfW Development Bank should work towards ensuring that in the event of conflicts of interest of 
mandate holders, who are represented both in the official bodies of funds and the boards of the financed 
FIs, abstention from relevant votes is stipulated in the regulations (in this case the Conflict of Interest 
Policy).  
Implementation guidance for recommendation 4  
In order to ensure a more effective pursuit of development objectives, the management of conflicts of 
interest should provide for  
• notifying the Board of Directors of the conflict of interest  
• abstention by persons who are represented both on the board of the fund and on the board of a 
financed FI, in cases where a vote could involve a conflict of interest, such as votes to fund that 
particular FI. 
Mobilisation of private capital 
Recommendation 5 
The KfW Development Bank should work towards ensuring that the structured funds develop mechanisms 
which will enable them to make better use of their potential to mobilise private capital in the future.  
Implementation guidance for recommendation 5 
The mechanisms should include a regular review of the risk buffer and risk appetite of private investors by 
the Board of Directors. Depending on the circumstances, there are three options for adjustment: 
• If the risk buffer is almost exhausted, the possibility of reducing the share of the risk buffer should be 
considered, taking into account the risk appetite of private investors. 
• If there is sufficient financing by official donors and (D)FIs, a reduction of the mezzanine tranche should 
be considered.  
• If private investors have a stronger risk appetite, the possibility of enabling private investment in riskier 
tranches should be considered. 
 
Recommendation 6  
The KfW Development Bank should work towards developing and regularly updating a clear acquisition 
strategy for each fund for private, particularly institutional, investors.  
Implementation guidance for recommendation 6 
To facilitate the mobilisation of private capital, an acquisition strategy should be developed based on the 
following two points:  
• identify selected target investor types 
• identify the requirements of these selected investor types. 
The fund managers should be responsible for designing the respective acquisition strategies. 
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Effects on target groups 
Recommendation 7 
The BMZ and KfW Development Bank should work towards using and monitoring the selection of FIs more 
effectively as the key point of leverage for ensuring development impact of the funds. 
Implementation guidance for recommendation 7 
When defining the eligibility or selection criteria for the institutions to be financed, an assessment should 
be made of the extent to which the risk profile allows for 
• earmarking a minimum percentage of the portfolio for investment in riskier, possibly younger FIs with
a high potential for reaching the target group
• sectors with high development potential to be addressed, especially where the funds help establish a
market (e.g. by financing FIs that issue financial products for the education, environment and climate
change sectors).
Recommendation 8 
The BMZ and the KfW Development Bank should work towards making lending to FIs conditional on the 
expansion of thematic areas that are key to development – in line with the BMZ 2030 strategy. 
Implementation guidance for recommendation 8 
To strengthen development impact at sub-borrower level, 
• financing should be made conditional upon the expansion of business segments, financial products or
sectors relevant to the target group
• appropriate indicators should be included in the reporting to measure and ensure that target groups
are reached
• the question should be addressed of whether further issues that are key to development policy, such 
as climate change, can be integrated into existing funds.
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GLOSSARY 
Term Definition/explanation 
Asset class A grouping of financial products of the same type with similar 
characteristics, for instance with respect to their liquidity, risk or 
expected return. In the context of this evaluation, the term thus 
refers to the various tranches of a (structured) fund. 
Assets/liabilities side of a fund The liabilities side of a fund refers to its total capital (divided into 
debt capital and equity) on the side of the fund's investors. The 
assets side is formed by all the assets in which the fund has 
invested.  
Blended finance Strategic use of official capital to mobilise additional private capital 
to finance sustainable development  
Country rating Indicator that rates a country's ability to repay. The ratings 
published by Moody's range from the top rating AAA to the bottom 
rating C.  
Ratings between AAA and Baa3 are considered investment grade. 
For ratings between Ba1 and C investment is considered speculative 
or non-investment grade. 
Country windows Refers to the provision that BMZ resources can only be invested in 
certain predefined countries.  
Credit line Refers to a permanent credit amount that can be used at any time 
up to a certain limit and within a certain period.  
Debt fund Debt funds issue primarily senior debt, in some cases subordinated 
debt or guarantees. Their liabilities side is often structured. 
Development additionality A positive development impact that can be attributed to the activity 
of the fund and would not occur without the financing. 
(Development) Finance 
Institutions – (D)FIs  
Specialised financial institutions that provide a number of different 
forms of financing for investment in the public and private sectors 
in developing countries. In many projects they also provide 
Technical Assistance.  
(D)FIs raise funds on the capital market that are guaranteed by the
callable capital of their proprietors (usually a government or several
governments). Through the liability of the member countries (D)FIs
receive loans at low market interest rates that they are able to pass
on to projects in partner countries with a small mark-up.
This report uses the term '(D)FIs' because some of the development
banks examined are not development finance institutions by
definition, but do closely resemble them due to their role and
function.
Equity funds Unlike debt funds, equity funds provide primarily equity (especially 
to smaller enterprises). 
Financial additionality An investment made by the private sector, prompted by the 
strategic use of official capital, which would not otherwise have 
taken place.  
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Financial intermediary Financial institution in the partner country that is refinanced by a 
fund and thus provides financial services for sub-borrowers. 
Financing volume The total capital available to a fund. 
First loss tranche Riskiest tranche, which is the first to bear the losses arising within 
the scope of its predefined volume. It is financed primarily by 
official donors and philanthropists (see also junior tranche). 
Grant Funding awarded for a certain period with no expectation of 
repayment or recompense. In structured funds, TA is usually 
financed through grants provided by official donors.  
Grant funds A financial product comprising grants. These include trust funds, 
facilities and multi-donor trust funds. 
Hard currency Currency that can be easily compared with and exchanged for other 
currencies. It is considered to be particularly stable in terms of its 
value. This evaluation uses the term to refer to the US dollar and 
the euro.  
Hedged transaction Financial transaction in local currency designed to hedge an 
outstanding local currency loan against exchange rate risks. 
Hedging is possible with various derivative financial instruments 
(swaps, futures and options). 
Investment fund Financial product comprising investments. Investment funds 
include equity funds, debt funds and special funds. 
Issue document The issue document is a kind of articles of association that is drawn 
up when a fund is established and defines the following points: 
guiding principles, structuring of the fund and risk buffer, 
investment guidelines, rules for dealing with conflicts of interest 
and administration of the fund. 
Junior tranche (C shares) Riskiest tranche, which is the first to bear the losses arising within 
the scope of its predefined volume. It is financed primarily by 
official donors (ODA) and philanthropists. 
Synonym for first loss tranche (see above). 
Leverage The ratio of capital used to actually mobilised additional capital. 
The KfW Development Bank uses the term to refer to the ratio of 
German Federal Government resources to all other resources 
invested in the fund. 
Local currency financing Fund financing provided in the local currency of the partner 
country. The fund usually assumes the exchange rate risk. 
Mezzanine tranche Second tranche that covers the losses arising within the scope of its 
predefined volume, once the capital in the first loss tranche (see 
above) is completely used up. It is mainly financed by development 
banks ((D)FIs). 
Net asset value Value of all a fund's assets minus its liabilities. The net asset value 
reflects a fund's fundamental value. 
Portfolio at Risk 30/90 (PAR30/90) Percentage of loans whose repayments are more than 30/90 days 
in arrears, measured in relation to the gross loan portfolio. 
Private investors In structured funds these are commercial and religious banks, 
financial institutions, pension funds and asset managers, churches, 
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insurance companies, sustainability banks, NGOs, foundations and 
universities. 
Revolving use of capital The revolving use of capital principle means that once paid into the 
fund, the official capital is maintained and can be used for 
continuous lending without requiring any further inflows from 
official donors. 
Risk buffer Risk buffers indicate the minimum percentage of the total volume 
of the fund that must be made up by the lower tranches which are 
subordinated to the tranche for private capital. 
(Senior) notes The most secure asset class of a fund, which takes precedence over 
the other tranches. Notes are the first to be repaid and the last to 
be included in the distribution of losses. 
Senior tranche Third tranche that covers the losses arising within the scope of its 
predefined volume, once the capital from the first loss tranche and 
the mezzanine tranche (see above) is completely used up. In 
structured funds the senior tranche is the most secure asset class 
after the notes, and should also appeal to private investors. 
Structured funds A blended finance approach that aims among other things to use 
official capital to mobilise additional financial resources. The 
waterfall structure of structured funds splits them into the three 
risk tranches junior, mezzanine and senior, plus notes. 
Subordinated debt In case of default, subordinated debt is not repaid until all senior 
debt has been paid out 
Tier of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) 
The tier system classifies MFIs into different groups depending on 
their institutional maturity. Tier 1 institutions are mature, 
financially stable and large MFIs that are highly transparent; tier 2 
institutions are small or medium-sized, slightly less mature MFIs; 
tier 3 institutions are start-up MFIs or small NGOs that are not yet 
financially sustainable.  
Total assets Sum total of all assets shown on the assets side (see above) of a 
balance sheet. Used in this evaluation as an approximate value for 
the size of the FIs and enterprises. 
Total Expense Ratio (TER) The total expense ratio is a measure of the total costs incurred for 
administration and operation of a fund.  
Total investment volume Sum total of all outstanding investments of a fund. 
Waterfall structure Structure that divides a fund into (usually) three tranches with 
different risk profiles. The tranches have differing degrees of 
seniority, which means that in case of gains (or losses) the tranches 
are served in a certain order. 
Yield/return The promised return (or targeted dividend) on a security is based 
on its risk. The higher the risk, the higher the return.  
The return describes the ratio of capital employed to the yield from 
the security acquired in the respective tranche. 
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In international development finance, the use of private capital for sustainable investment is becoming 
increasingly important. The amount of global investment required to achieve the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) in developing countries is estimated at up to 4.5 trillion US dollars per annum (UNCDF, 2018). 
Even a substantial increase in official funding deployed and recognised as Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) by the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) would not even come close to meeting this financial 
requirement. For example, an increase in ODA flows by the OECD-DAC donor countries in line with the target 
of 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) would mobilise an additional 175 billion US dollars, which could 
help to close the financing gap (Move Humanity, 2018). In actual fact, however, according to OECD data the 
organisation's member countries have not made any such increase: ODA spending has stagnated, private 
lending declined between 2010 and 2017, and foreign direct investment fell by around 30 per cent between 
2016 and 2017 (Basile and Dutra, 2019).5 At the same time, most global investment is not being used for 
sustainable investments, even though new instruments such as green bonds, funds, facilities and other 
sustainable investments are available. Only a small proportion of the capital being moved on global capital 
markets, which is estimated at around 350 trillion US dollars (Convergence, 2019a), is invested in explicitly 
sustainable investments or even in developing countries (Wolff, 2019; CRS data). 
Involving private sector actors offers opportunities not only to close the aforementioned financing gap, 
but also for sustainable economic development in developing countries. Banks and institutional investors 
manage large amounts of capital that could be used for development finance (Colla, 2016). In OECD countries 
alone, institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and investment funds manage 
assets worth at last 90 trillion US dollars (OECD, 2015). In 2017 the assets managed in Germany amounted to 
three trillion euros (BVI, 2018). Furthermore, the private sector has the potential to positively influence 
economic development by creating inclusive markets and value chains, expertise and innovation, and thus 
helping to create jobs and reduce poverty. According to a study published by International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), for instance, nine out of ten jobs in developing countries are provided by the private sector 
(World Bank, 2013). Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in particular account for the largest share of 
enterprises in the formal sector in developing countries. On average, they are responsible for more than 30 
per cent of employment in the private sector, i.e. for around 4 to 16 per cent of employment as a whole 
(EUIFI, no date).  
At the same time, SMEs in developing countries often still lack access to finance. The demand for finance 
among micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) is estimated at 8.9 trillion US dollars, while the 
current credit supply is thought to be just 3.7 trillion US dollars (IFC, 2017). This means that some 40 per cent 
of microenterprises and 44 per cent of SMEs in developing countries are credit constrained. In South Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa, a particularly large number of MSMEs lack access to sources of finance.  
The corona pandemic is exacerbating the existing liquidity bottlenecks. The measures to contain the virus 
have already led to a massive reduction of economic activity and to a slump in revenues for enterprises 
worldwide. Particularly hard hit are MSMEs, which often have fewer reserves than large enterprises. When 
MSMEs are unable to repay their loans as a result, this also affects the stability of the financial institutions. 
Furthermore, in times of crisis private investors tend rather to invest in sectors and regions that are 
considered particularly safe. In March 2020, private investors withdrew 83 billion US dollars from developing 
and emerging countries (Institute of International Finance, 2020).  
Innovative financing approaches for mobilising private resources and for cooperation with the private 
sector are increasingly being tested and used in development finance. In the Addis Ababa Action Agenda 
2015, donor countries argued for greater use of innovative financing mechanisms in development finance 
(UN, 2015). ODA should be used strategically to mobilise additional private financial resources for sustainable 
development, and to support investment that drives social, environmental and economic progress in partner 
countries. The financing mechanisms thus also target commercial private investors that have not yet invested 
5  Only remittances by labour migrants have increased. 
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in these areas and expect market-standard risk-return profiles. The use of concessional development finance 
to mobilise private capital is termed 'blended finance'. It is estimated that the blended finance market 
doubled to 50 billion US dollars between 2013 and 2018 (Blended Finance Taskforce, 2018), and that blended 
financed instruments are being used by more and more multilateral and bilateral donors (UNCDF, 2018). In 
sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, 216 blended finance transactions worth a total of 4.5 billion UD dollars were 
recorded by 2020 that were channelled into the region either partially or entirely. Compared to other regions 
the average size of these transactions is low, however (Convergence, 2020). At the same time, reducing 
poverty and protecting the climate and the environment require supra-regional and cross-donor financing 
approaches to improve access to financial services, such as SME finance and microfinance. The principles of 
the Paris Declaration, such as donor harmonisation and mutual accountability, can also be effectively 
implemented in such multi-donor and multi-country interventions (D590)6.  
Structured funds are such a financing approach. In the case of German investment, they usually combine 
budgetary resources of the German Federal Government with capital market funds of the KfW Development 
Bank and/or other financial institutions, and with investments of private donors. The funds offer different 
risk classes that align with the policy objectives of official donors and the investment objectives of private 
investors simultaneously. Official donors assume the highest level of risk in order to enable private investors 
to invest in regions and sectors with which they have previously been rather unfamiliar (D590). In this way, 
the funds aim for example to improve access to financing for SMEs across regions.  
Approximately since the adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, structured funds have become a 
stronger focus of interest in the (development) policy debate. Little is known about their development 
impact, however. The number of structured funds involving German development cooperation has risen 
sharply since 2005. Most of the structured funds looked at in this evaluation were established between 2009 
and 2012. These funds have received around 700 million euros in budgetary resources of the German Federal 
Government, plus some 400 million euros of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau's (KfW's) own funds. 
Furthermore, Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) plans to ramp 
up its investment in structured funds with a focus on SMEs as part of the Emergency COVID-19 Support 
Programme, in order to bridge liquidity shortages and preserve jobs in partner countries. Structured funds 
are also present in parliamentary debate. They were discussed for instance in 2017 and 2018 in two minor 
interpellations of the Alliance 90/The Greens parliamentary group – 'Global investment for sustainable 
development' and 'How the Development Investment Fund works'. In January 2019 the Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) parliamentary group submitted the minor interpellation 'Status of the development investment 
act'. By contrast, in the academic debate this financing approach is barely studied at all, and but for a few 
exceptions there are no impact evaluations of structured funds.7 This is also shown by the evidence gap map 
(EGM) prepared as part of this evaluation (see Section 2.1). Even the development finance institutions (DFIs) 
have so far done little research into the investment and potential of these funds. Furthermore, the 
opportunities, risks and unintended effects of structured funds remain largely unexplored. However, reports 
published by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media do point to unintended effects such as 
tendencies towards over-indebtedness among borrowers from a small number of financial intermediaries 
(FIs) supported by the funds. Generally speaking, the development impact of instruments for private-sector 
engagement is regarded with scepticism. This scepticism is usually brought about by the application of 
different standards, for instance in reporting, and a lack of transparency. 
6  To guarantee the confidentiality of the unpublished documents passed on to DEval, these are cited in the text using a ‘D’ plus a serial number, and 
are not included in the references. 
7  One exception is for instance the evaluation of the Currency Exchange Fund (TCX) (Carnegie Consults, 2017). There are also ex-post evaluations of 
the KfW Development Bank for instance on the European Fund for Southeast Europe (KfW, 2008, 2014) and the Microfinance Enhancement Facility 
(KfW, 2016). KfW Development Bank is currently preparing a number of other ex-post evaluations on structured funds. 
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Against this background the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) conducted an 
evaluation of the impact of structured funds. This evaluation examines the impact of structured funds on 
several levels: the level of development objectives, the level of the financing approach and its structure, the 
level of the FIs and the level of the sub-borrowers. It pursues the following aims: 
• Relate structured funds to the objectives of German development cooperation
• Analyse the operationalisation of development principles (division of labour, donor harmonisation,
strengthening of regional actors)
• Analyse the financial sustainability and efficiency of the funds
• Analyse the contribution made towards mobilising additional capital
• Analyse how the funds affect FIs as their direct target group, and to what extent sub-borrowers are
reached as their indirect target group.
The financing approach needs to strike a balance between its aim of financial sustainability and market 
conformity, and the aforementioned development objectives. This evaluation examines these conflicting 
priorities from various perspectives. 
The evaluation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 describes the object of the evaluation and the portfolio of 
evaluated funds. The underlying design of the evaluation and the integration of methods are explained in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 answers the overarching question of when the fund structure is appropriate – in terms 
of the financial sustainability and the development orientation of the funds. The Chapter relates structured 
funds to the objectives of German development cooperation. It also examines the implementation of 
development principles in the funds, and the funds' financial sustainability. Chapter 5 answers the question 
of how successfully structured funds can mobilise private capital, while Chapter 6 looks at how the funds 
affect the target groups. The target groups of the funds are the (local) FIs (the direct target group) that lend 
to the sub-borrowers (the indirect target group). Finally, Chapter 7 presents the conclusions and 
recommendations that result from the findings of the evaluation. 
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2.1 Object of the evaluation 
Structured funds belong to the 'blended finance' family of financing approaches. The OECD defines blended 
finance as 'the strategic use of development finance for the mobilisation of additional finance towards 
sustainable development in developing countries' (OECD, 2018a). Here, development finance encompasses 
not only ODA8 and other official flows (OOFs) such as (D)FIs' own finance, but also philanthropic finance. 
Multilateral development banks and (D)FIs use the term blended finance more specifically, by focusing on 
the use of concessional finance (DFI Working Group, 2018). According to this definition, finance provided 
solely from (D)FIs' own capital is therefore not included under the term blended-finance. It is the blending of 
concessional donors’ capital with private capital that makes structured funds a blended finance approach. 
Other blended finance approaches include guarantees, syndicated loans, direct investment in companies, 
credit lines and other forms of collective investment (OECD, 2018a).  
The systematic collection of evidence using an EGM demonstrates that evidence on structured funds is 
significantly under-represented. EGMs provide a visual and systematic overview of available studies, 
evaluations and systematic reviews in a sector or sub-sector, and show which areas already display a high 
density of rigorous evidence and in which areas further research is a pressing need. The distribution of 
evidence on blended finance is shown in a matrix, by finance instrument and effect (see Figure 1). The effects 
are clustered by financial additionality, development additionality, market development and sector effects. 
Overall the EGM shows a very low number of studies and evaluations on blended finance, only very few of 
which were of experimental or quasi-experimental design. The vast majority were conducted as programme 
evaluations. These evaluations primarily examined the financing approach of results-based incentives, 
whereas to date there is barely evidence on the supply of subordinated equity or debt capital – an approach 
that also includes structured funds. Since according to the database of Convergence (2019b) this approach 
was pursued in more than 60 per cent of blended finance transactions between 2016 and 2018, it is therefore 
significantly under-represented in the evidence.  
8  The DAC countries use ODA funding to implement development projects in countries of the Global South. 
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Figure 1 EGM of blended finance– Distribution of evidence by instrument and effect 
* More rigorous publications comprise systematic reviews or use quantitative methods (experimental, quasi-experimental or correlation designs).
Source: own depiction. 
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Along the spectrum of financing approaches, structured funds can fill the gap between (D)FI loans 
(including promotional loans by the KfW Development Bank) and commercial finance (see Figure 2). At one 
end of the spectrum of financing approaches are grants that are non-repayable, and therefore do not 
generate any costs for the borrowers. Such financing approaches are only deployed in poor, less developed 
countries, however. At the other end of the spectrum are commercial loans (provided for instance by 
commercial banks), which must be repaid with interest. These interest payments can be very high, 
particularly in countries where the financial market is poorly developed.  
Between these two extremes there are already several financing approaches that reduce the hurdle of high 
interest payments for developing countries. In Financial Cooperation (FC), low-interest loans are employed 
in which the KfW Development Bank for instance combines budgetary resources of the German Federal 
Government with capital of its own in so-called development loans. The costs of these development loans 
for the borrowers are thus significantly lower than the costs of commercial loans. Loans provided by (D)FIs 
(such as KfW promotional loans) are somewhat less expensive for the borrowers. These loans are fully 
refinanced on the financial market by the (D)FI, and must therefore be cost-effective. However, their costs 
too are lower than those of commercial loans, as good ratings and scope for diversification mean that (D)FIs 
generate lower costs than most other financial institutions. Moreover, (D)FIs focus less on profit.  
For the FI the costs of a loan from a structured fund fall between those for (D)FI loans and commercial 
finance. According to the OECD Blended Finance Principles, funds extend loans on market terms in order not 
to distort the market. The sharing of potential losses by the official donors and opportunities to diversify 
enable funds to procure liquidity at lower cost. At the same time, private investors expect a certain profit. 
Structured funds therefore fall between (D)FI loans and commercial finance along the spectrum of financing 
options.  
Figure 2 The position of structured funds along the spectrum of financing approaches 
Source: authors' own visualisation. 
Defining structured funds 
In consultation with the reference group of this evaluation, structured funds were defined for the purposes 
of this evaluation as FC funds that are structured on the liabilities side into various risk tranches in 
accordance with Luxembourg law (société d’investissement à capital variable – specialised investment 
funds, SICAV-SIFs). The structured funds approach to financing involves the financing instrument of the 
fiduciary holding. Through their fiduciary holdings, the funds primarily provide debt capital (loans and 
mezzanine financing). Equity funds, which (as the name suggests) primarily provide equity, are usually not 
structured (KfW, 2017). One exception here is the SANAD Equity Fund. The opposite of a structured fund in 
the broad sense would be a flat fund, in which repayment and return are usually distributed equally among 
all investors. Typically, flat funds invest in equity (e.g. as seed capital), and are usually smaller than structured 
funds (around 150 million dollars). Structured funds are considered more suitable for commercial investors 
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Structured funds aim to mobilise additional resources by assuming part of the risk. One main feature of 
structured funds is that losses up to a certain amount are covered by official donors (first loss tranche) 
(Eurodad, 2013; Mustapha et al., 2014; Pereira, 2017). The official capital reduces the risk that the private 
investors need to take, de facto 'subsidising' it. Structured funds possess a so-called waterfall structure that 
(usually) splits the fund into three tranches with different risk profiles (see Figure 3). These tranches have 
differing degrees of seniority, which means that in case of losses or insolvency investors are served in a 
certain order. The first junior tranche is usually provided by ODA donors, while the mezzanine tranche is 
financed largely by (D)FIs. Private investors are expected to invest in the senior tranche or notes. These 
tranches have the shortest durations (between two and 15 years) and the lowest risk, and are therefore also 
attractive for private, risk-averse investors. Losses are not incurred in the senior tranche until the junior and 
mezzanine tranches are exhausted (Colla, 2016).  
Figure 3 Typical structure of a structured fund 
Source: authors' own visualisation, after DANIDA (2016). 
Most structured funds are also accompanied by grants for Technical Assistance (TA). Among other things, 
TA is used to mitigate capacity-related risks or boost environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards 
(DANIDA, 2016). The grants are also used to support the capacity development of the funds' FIs in order to 
improve project development and implementation quality. In some cases these grants are also used to advise 
and support the end clients, such as farmers or agribusinesses, in settings where the agricultural finance 
sector is being established from scratch. 
The selection of funds 
The population of funds comprises all FC investment funds that finance debt products (see Table 8 in Annex 
9.1). Of these 18 debt funds, this evaluation examines ten typical funds. Of the 18 debt funds of German 
FC, 13 are domiciled in Luxembourg and are therefore structured on the liabilities side in accordance with 
Luxembourg law. Two of the debt funds are domiciled in Mauritius. One is domiciled in the USA, one in Ghana 
and one in Morocco. For this evaluation we selected only funds domiciled in Luxembourg, which therefore 
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involved in all the funds examined.  Figure 4 shows the selection criteria and Table 1 provides an overview of 
the ten funds evaluated.  
Figure 4 The selection of funds 
Source: authors' own visualisation. 
As well as the five debt funds domiciled outside Luxembourg, this evaluation also does not include the 
Rural Impulse Fund, the Fairtrade Access Fund or the Global Climate Partnership Fund, as these differ from 
the other funds in key ways. The Global Climate Partnership Fund (GCPF) is supported only by Germany's 
Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU). There is no involvement on the 
BMZ's part. With the Rural Impulse Fund investors invest only in A-class shares of equal rank. Only the fund 
manager carries a higher risk, as it holds B-class shares. The KfW Development Bank (using its own resources) 
and other (D)FIs invest in the A-class shares. The Fairtrade Access Fund, a social investment fund that finances 
and advises small farmers, does have a comparable structure. However, since it is still in the start-up phase 
it is not suitable for inclusion in this evaluation. 
2.2 The portfolio 
Financial data 
The ten structured funds evaluated are worth a combined total of more than three billion euros, some 700 
million euros of which are accounted for by German Federal Government resources and some 400 million 
by the KfW's own resources. The sizes of the funds vary widely from fund to fund, however. The EFSE is the 
largest and the oldest structured fund. Its first capital contribution was made in 2005. Similarly, the German 
Federal Government's investment varies between 15 and 226.4 million euros. The average fund promotes 40 
intermediaries or projects. On average the junior tranche accounts for 35 per cent of the fund volume, while 
the senior and mezzanine tranches represent some 30 per cent of the capital provided. Fifteen per cent is 
accounted for by notes, in which mainly private investors invest. 9  
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Table 1 Structured funds with German investment 
Name of fund Logo Net asset value of BMZ 
investment in million 
euros  
Year of first capital 
contribution  
EFSE (European Fund 
for Southeast Europe) 
226.4 2005 
SANAD (The SANAD 










Initiative for Asia Debt 
Fund) 
37.43 2012 
GGF (Green for Growth 
Fund Southeast Europe) 
57.60 2009 
REFFA (Regional 
Education Finance Fund 
for Africa) 
22.90 2012 
EBF (Eco-Business Fund) 46.80 2014 
REGMIFA (Regional 
MSME Investment Fund 







Source: authors' own table based on the quarterly reports of all ten structured funds for Q4/2018. 
* Total shares in SANAD Equity and SANAD Debt Fund
**Fund since wound up 
See Table 19 in Annex 9.10 for relevant websites. 
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BMZ budgetary resources used in structured funds are financed mainly through the budget item for 
financial cooperation with regions (FCR).10 This item has existed since 2010. Its purpose is to strengthen 
regional approaches and regional actors for which there are no partners under international law in the field 
of FC. It enables the mobilisation of market and third-party capital through innovative financing approaches 
(Bohnet, 2017), and is used to finance (inter alia) the structured funds. In 2018 the federal budget allocation 
for FCR was 119.8 million euros, some 35 per cent higher than the figure for 2012 (around 40 million euros).  
Allocations for FCR must be distinguished from the funding of multilateral and supranational organisations 
and from bilateral FC. For a fund to qualify it must be demonstrated that control of the fund is neither the 
sole responsibility of one multilateral actor, nor does any single actor wield disproportionate influence 
relative to the financial contribution. To achieve this the BMZ stipulates that the use of capital is usually 
confined to a particular region. The German Federal Government should also be actively involved in planning 
and developing the fund, or ensure that Germany actively wields appropriate influence within the fund's 
official bodies. 
Earmarked investments in first loss tranches of development-oriented structured funds are ODA-eligible. 
This point was added to the ODA regulations in 2012. Investments in mezzanine or senior tranches of 
structured funds will not be ODA-eligible until further notice.11 For earmarked contributions to regionally 
operating or multilateral organisations it is not the country in which these 'intermediary organisations' are 
domiciled that is crucial. What is crucial is that the final beneficiaries are located in ODA-eligible countries 
(D590).12  
In the long term it is envisaged that funds will be set up such that they remain sustainable without further 
injections of donor capital. Funds that issue loans usually do not have to return their official capital. Instead, 
they reuse loan amounts that are repaid to them (revolving source of capital) (BMZ, 2017a). While most 
structured funds use debt instruments, some occasionally use equity instruments alongside debt 
instruments. One example is the SANAD Fund, which operates in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
and has already set up a second equity sub-fund. The FIs supported by the structured funds include for 
instance banks, microfinance institutions(MFIs) and leasing companies. Some structured funds also provide 
direct finance to companies and projects.  
Sectoral focus of the funds 
The sectoral focus of the funds is broad. The funds are most often involved in MSME financing. Half the 
evaluated funds are involved in SMSE financing. Budgetary resources of around 500 million euros are 
deployed in this sector through the structured funds (see Figure 5). Of the other five funds, one operates in 
the agricultural sector, one in renewable energy, one in education, one in nature conservation and one in 
infrastructure. The second-highest share of budgetary resources is accounted for by renewable energy (57.6 
million euros), and the lowest shares by education (22.9 million euros) and infrastructure (15 million euros). 
This distribution contrasts with the distribution of blended finance transactions as a whole, which display a 
stronger focus on energy projects. Of the more than 500 transactions of the Convergence network, the 
largest share (44 per cent) occurred in the energy sector, followed by financial services including microfinance 
(28 per cent) and agriculture (21 per cent) (Convergence, 2019a). Although the share of transactions in the 
financial sector has remained more or less constant since 2010, the share of transactions in microfinance 
10  Structured funds are sometimes also financed using different resources, such as allocations under the BMZ Special Initiative ONE WORLD – No 
Hunger in the case of the TA of the AATIF, or bilateral funds in the case of the EFSE. 
11  Depending on the outcome of the ODA regulation on private sector instruments, which remains outstanding, in the future it may potentially be 
possible to design investments in mezzanine tranches such that they are reportable as ODA.  
12  Until 2012 FC investments in structured funds were usually considered multilateral contributions. This requires the organisation to be registered 
on the list of ODA-eligible multilateral organisations (Annex II). Once the process of registration with the OECD is complete (and subject to the 
periodic review of all Annex II organisations), all non-earmarked contributions to these organisations are also ODA-eligible. Due to the time-
consuming procedure it is no longer common practice to follow this path.  
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within the sector has declined, while increasing shares are being recorded for financial sector deepening and 
MSME finance.  
Figure 5 Budgetary resources deployed by sector in million euros 
Source: authors' own figure based on the quarterly reports of all ten structured funds for Q4/2018. 
Structured funds aim to reach the indirect target groups – MSMEs and private households with limited 
access to financial services – primarily by refinancing FIs. The structured funds aim to reach their indirect 
target groups in different ways, depending on the sectoral focus.13 Financing MSMEs is designed primarily 
to protect or create jobs, generate income and improve lives, in order to help reduce poverty. FIs also address 
food and nutrition security, education, nature conservation and the preservation of biodiversity, as well as 
energy efficiency and renewable energy, which help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The capital mobilised 
by structured funds is largely delivered to companies and private individuals through FIs. This capital can 
sometimes be used for a wide variety of activities and sectors. Microfinance, for instance, is used to fund 
machinery and materials, premises or transport facilities for microentreprises, as well as environmentally-
sound investment in living space. In some funds, though, capital is disbursed directly to companies or 
individuals who operate in a particular sector (such as agriculture) or who use the capital to finance specific 
activities (such as nature conservation). 
Country focus of the funds 
The evaluated funds operate in 78 countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans and the Caucasus in 
particular, several funds are active in the same country. The world map (Figure 6) shows the geographical 
concentration of the funds. On average, a fund operates in 16 countries. The fund with the greatest regional 
diversification is the MEF, which operates in 44 countries, while the SANAD, which was pursuing activities in 
six countries when the evaluation was performed, displays the lowest diversification. Nine of the ten funds 
have one or more regional focuses. For instance, the EFSE invests in Southeast Europe and the SANAD in the 
MENA region. The GGF invests in countries in both these regions. Three funds focus on countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (AATIF, REGMIFA and REFFA). Two others are active in Asia (MIFA) and Latin America (Eco-
Business). Only the MEF operates globally without any regional restrictions.  
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78 per cent of structured funds are present in countries classified by the World Bank as lower middle or 
upper middle-income countries. The funds maintain 18 per cent of their collective presence in low income 
countries, 42 per cent in lower middle-income countries, 36 per cent in upper middle-income countries and 
4 per cent in high income countries. Four of the ten funds operate in Tanzania, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and 
Kenya. 
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Figure 6 Geographical concentration of the structured funds 
Source: authors' own visualisation, based on information from the funds' websites and the World Bank classification system; WMS: OpenStreetMap, data from Natural Earth. 
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The structured funds included in the evaluation focus their activities mainly on BMZ partner countries. Of 
the BMZ partner countries, the so-called 'A-countries' are priority partner countries with which a bilateral 
country programme has been agreed. With the 'B countries' Germany pursues focused regional or thematic 
cooperation (see Annex 9.7 and Figure 33 for the distribution of BMZ partner countries by fund). All funds 
operate predominantly in A and B countries (see Figure 7).14 SANAD is the only fund that operates exclusively 
in A and B countries. EFSE and GGF have the highest share (35 and 23 per cent) of countries outside the A 
and B country categories in their portfolios. Only eleven of the 49 A countries and ten of the 35 B countries 
are not served by structured funds. However, it should be noted that this categorisation into A and B 
countries is subject to continuous review and adjustment by the BMZ, and that this information reflects the 
status quo in 2019. The situation may have been different when the funds were actually set up.  
Figure 7 Distribution of countries served by structured funds by BMZ partner country category 
(A and B countries, in %) 
Source: authors' own visualisation, based on information from the funds' websites. 
The countries where the structured funds operate display a similar business environment to countries 
where they do not operate. The World Bank measures business friendliness and corporate regulation at 
country level through its Ease of Doing Business Index15. On average, countries in which at least one fund 
operates achieve a score of 62 out of 100. In this respect they do not differ from other countries (see Figure 
8). However, there are major differences between the funds due to their regional focus. The EFSE, for 
instance, operates in countries with the best environment for businesses (average score of 74 out of a 
possible 100 points). The countries where SANAD and REGMIFA operate, on the other hand, only achieve a 
score of 54 out of 100.  
14  Annex 9.8 shows the distribution of A and B countries per fund.  
15  The Ease of Doing Business Index rates: the time it takes to start a new business, obtaining a construction permit, getting electricity, registering 
property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. To find 
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Figure 8 Average ease of doing business score for the funds' target countries 
Source: authors' own visualisation based on the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index, 2019. 
The structured funds primarily refinance banks, microfinance banks and non-financial institutions. Most 
partner institutions are banks (36 per cent), microfinance banks (28 per cent) and non-banks/MFIs (28 per 
cent). Leasing companies are also refinanced to a minor extent (8 per cent) (see Figure 9). Many of the 
refinanced MFIs offer only loans, while others are also entitled to accept savings deposits (I092, I064, I071)16. 
Most funds refinance a mix of different types of FI. Three structured funds finance mainly or exclusively 
(commercial) banks, and two structured funds invest primarily in microfinance banks.  
Figure 9 Types of FI financed by the funds 
Source: authors' own visualisation based on the quarterly reports of nine structured for Q4/2018; the wound-up fund is not shown 
here.  
16  To guarantee the confidentiality of the interviews conducted by DEval, these are cited in the text using an ‘I’ plus a serial number, and are not 
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Alongside financing by FIs, three funds invest directly in various projects and companies. In the agricultural, 
renewable energy and nature conservation sectors the funds also invest directly in the actors that operate 
there. This sets some positive examples in sectors where the local financial market is not yet investing (I029, 
I047, I048). Various agribusinesses, outgrower schemes and hydropower and wind energy projects have been 
financed in this way to the tune of between 12 and 32 million US dollars. 
TA Facility 
With the exception of the MEF, all the structured funds included in the evaluation also possess a Technical 
Assistance Facility (TAF). These are financially independent of the actual funds and are donor-financed or 
fund-financed. In other words, no private capital flows into the facility. Unlike with the fund, the financial 
resources of the TAF cannot be used on a revolving basis, which means that these resources are gradually 
reduced with each activity. TA interventions are implemented at both the individual and the sectoral level.  
Individual TA interventions often address the FIs' management processes or reaching of target groups, 
while sector interventions often comprise market studies. As shown in Figure10, some 58 per cent of these 
interventions are conducted at the individual level, primarily with FIs, and 42 per cent at sector or country 
level. At the individual level around 28 per cent of projects relate to FI management, which chiefly involves 
further developing processes (such as risk management) or technologies (such as lowering transaction costs). 
Around 50 per cent of these (individual) projects directly or indirectly involve enabling FIs to reach target 
groups, for instance by supporting them in developing their capacities to assess the creditworthiness of 
microenterprises, conduct financial literacy courses or improve their client protection standards. At the 
sectoral level, market research is conducted especially frequently in order to identify potential in a particular 
sector (such as educational loans). Some projects also directly target sub-borrowers. One example is a radio 
programme on basic financial literacy (I064).  
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Figure 10 Number of individual and sector-wide projects in different areas17 
Source: authors' own visualisation, based on information from the fund managers. 
The average volume of the TAF per fund is 2.3 million US dollars, with which 249 accompanying 
interventions were implemented between 2016 and 2018. The average cost per financed intervention is 
74,407 US dollars. For each investment by a structured fund, an average of around 3.5 TA projects are 
conducted. Compared to the size of the structured funds, however, the resources available to the TAFs paint 
a different picture. For each US dollar invested by structured funds, several cents in the single-digit range are 
spent on accompanying interventions. 
17  The very large number of projects in the field of monitoring/results measurement is due almost entirely to a single fund that implements many 
projects in this field. 
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3. METHODS
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3.1 Evaluation design 
In this evaluation, to identify and examine underlying assumptions the evaluation team used a theory-
based approach (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010; Chen, 2015; Funnell und Rogers, 2011) and a Theory of Change 
(ToC) tailored to structured funds (Pawson und Tilley, 1997). The evaluation was based on a ToC developed 
for structured funds. A theory-based approach enables evaluators to apply different methods and data 
collection tools (qualitative and quantitative procedures) with precision (Stern et al., 2012; White, 2009; 
White und Phillips, 2012).  
This evaluation uses the theory-based approach of 'realist evaluation', which explains how the outcomes 
are generated by looking at underlying processes. Since structured funds are geared to entire regions, 
contextual factors play a major role. Pawson and Tilley (Pawson and Tilley, 1997), who developed this 
approach, argue that evaluations must show decision-makers what effects arise in which circumstances and 
for whom, rather than just whether effects can be observed in general. Realist evaluations identify the 
underlying processes that explain how outcomes were generated, and how this was affected by the context. 
These processes are also based on a ToC supplemented by mechanisms and contextual factors, and were 
incorporated into the evaluation design because they facilitate subsequent data collection. 
This evaluation was based on the reconstructed ToC. Since the official documents of the funds do not include 
any explicit theory of change, the ToC was reconstructed in dialogue with the evaluation's stakeholders, the 
reference group. The ToC models the causal relationships and change processes that are assumed to occur 
when structured funds are used, based on social science theories. The evaluation team used the ToC to 
identify causal pathways and assumptions, and on that basis defined focal areas for the evaluation. The 
reconstructed ToC for structured funds is presented below (see Figure 11).  
Theory of Change 
The input provided by structured funds to FIs comprises capital and TA. It is assumed that the capital and 
TA make it easier to calculate the risk. This would lead to financial products being offered on terms geared 
to target-group needs, and/or to (new) target groups gaining greater access to credit, savings, leasing or 
insurance products. The adjustment of lending terms referred to here need not necessarily involve lower 
interest. It might also involve more flexible or longer maturities, better accessibility or more appropriate 
repayment arrangements. It is also assumed that the TA and capital provided for the FIs will lead to new 
financial products being offered for MSMEs and/or to existing products which are tailored to the specific 
needs of the structured funds' target groups being offered, advertised and sold on a larger scale. At the same 
time, certain TA interventions would enable entrepreneurs to meet the requirements for access to financial 
products. 
At the level of induced outputs the ToC trifurcates into 'international financial sector', 'financial sector in 
the partner country' and 'target group'. Impact on the international financial sector would unfold as a result 
of the new asset classes for investors. Structured funds would make it more attractive or possible for 
investors to invest in a large number of smaller projects in countries and sectors in the Global South. In the 
medium term, private sector investment would generate a signalling effect, and prompt further investment 
in the partner country, including outside of structured funds. The volume of international investment in the 
partner country would thus increase, and access to the international capital market would improve. Due to 
the increased pressure of competition and availability of capital, this would then tend to have a positive 
impact on local financial market development and economic growth. 
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The assumption that improved access to the capital market would under certain circumstances have a 
positive impact on local financial market development is based on empirical evidence. In their study, Kose, 
Prasad, Rogoff and Weil conclude that the positive impact of capital flows on financial market development 
is dependent on macroeconomic preconditions, for instance on a certain degree of financial market 
development and on institutional quality and governance capability of the government, as well as trade 
integration (Kose et al., 2009). The empirical evidence shows: The impact of capital flows on financial market 
development is brought about by  
• the reduction of interest rates to a market-clearing level (Baldwin and Forslid, 2000; Calderón and 
Kubota, 2009)
• the increase in competition on the financial market (Caprio and Honohan, 1999; Levine, 1996)
• stronger pressure for financial market reform (Chinn and Ito, 2006; Claessens et al., 2001; Stiglitz, 2000;
Stultz, 1999).
Moreover, the opening of the financial market has a positive effect on the size and activities of FIs 
(Calderón und Kubota, 2009). The opening of the financial market can, however, lead to risky behaviour by 
banks and thus trigger boom and bust cycles (Allen and Gale, 1999; Schneider and Tornell, 2004; Tornell and 
Westermann, 2005).  
The impact on economic growth is also substantiated by relevant empirical findings. Both the development 
of FIs and financial market development in general are important determinants of economic growth (Levine, 
2005) – at least up to a certain level of development, beyond which the growth rates of different countries 
converge (Aghion et al., 2005). It is also conceivable that cause and effect might actually be the other way 
round, i.e. economic growth might lead to stronger financial market development. Studies that include this 
point, however, conclude that despite the presence of this reciprocal effect, there is a causal link between 
financial sector development and economic growth (Neusser and Kugler, 1998; Rousseau, 1998; Xu, 2000). 
With regard to sub-borrowers, it is assumed that the new or increasingly offered financial products that 
are aligned with the needs of target groups such as MSMEs, sustainably improve access to financing. These 
products would also be more successful in reaching target groups whose financial market access is limited. 
This assumption stems from theories of political economy, which suggest that well functioning financial 
markets enable a larger proportion of the population to access financial services, rather than focusing these 
services exclusively on established large clients (Haber et al., 2003; Morck et al., 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 
2003). As a result, MSMEs would increase their investment, and thus in turn their profits and turnover. At 
the same time the track record they would accrue would establish their creditworthiness. This would simplify 
their access to follow-on products, and later on they would be able to borrow on market terms and invest. 
The income of employees would thus be secured, and existing MSMEs would grow and new ones would be 
launched. In turn, this would create new jobs, or at least protect existing ones – which corresponds to the 
assumed effect of structured funds. Taking the ToC a step further, it is assumed that the secured jobs and 
newly created jobs will reduce poverty. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the increased supply of products for MSMEs and the access of new target 
groups to financial products would lead to an increased demand for financial services. MFIs would then 
grow, further develop, or new MFIs would even emerge and other FIs would enter the sector. This in turn 
would contribute towards further development of the local financial market. 
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Based on the reconstructed ToC, the evaluation team identified the focal areas of the evaluation and 
formulated the evaluation questions. The evaluation analyses structured funds in terms of how well they 
align with German development cooperation, as well as their potential for harmonisation and leveraging 
private capital. It also examines the financial efficiency, sustainability and impact of the structured funds. 
Against this background the evaluation answers the following questions, which are clustered into three sets: 
Table 2 Evaluation questions 









To what extent do the objectives of structured funds match 
the strategic objectives of the BMZ? 
To what extent are structured funds a suitable financing 
approach for achieving these objectives?  
2 To what extent do structured funds promote a division of 








To what extent are structured funds effective and efficient in 
leveraging private capital and the capital of development 
banks? 
4 To what extent do structured funds create sustainable 
financing structures? 
Effects on FIs and 
MSMEs/employment 
5 causal To what extent do grants spent on TA help achieve the 
structured funds' objectives? 
6 To what extent do structured funds affects the portfolio of 
FIs and their success in reaching new target groups? 
7 To what extent do structured funds affect MSME 
development, employment, income security and self-
employment?  
Source: authors' own visualisation. 
Set of questions 1: Alignment with German development-policy objectives and development principles 
This set of questions enquires how closely structured funds are aligned with German development-policy 
objectives. One prerequisite for the management of resources for FCR is that the FCR interventions 
complement German development cooperation in the countries of the region concerned. Furthermore, they 
must be separate from the financing of multilateral and supranational organisations, and from bilateral FC. 
The evaluation shows to what extent the objectives of structured funds are aligned with the relevant 
strategies of the BMZ, and how structured funds differ from other financing approaches.  
FCR is designed specifically to promote supra-regional cooperation involving several donors. The 
agreement of common terms, standards for support and harmonised results measurement between several 
donors and official development banks is designed to boost harmonisation and the division of labour. The 
evaluation looks at how successfully this is achieved, and whether regional actors are strengthened, when 
structured funds are actually implemented. The findings are summarised in Section 4.2. 
Set of questions 2: Mobilisation of additional capital/financial sustainability 
The evaluation addresses the issue of how much additional capital can be leveraged by the official 
investment, and under what conditions structured funds succeed in attracting investors. Through 
structured funds, German development cooperation aims to deploy the resources of several official donors 
and development banks along with private capital for purposes that hitherto have been supported mostly 
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only with donor funding. One key question is how much capital from development banks and how much 
private capital is leveraged by the official investment, and to what extent and under what conditions 
structured funds succeed in attracting private investors. The findings are summarised in Chapter 5.  
The evaluation examines the efficiency of the funds in terms of their financial sustainability. Structured 
funds follow the principle of the revolving use of capital. This and the mobilisation of private capital are 
intended to create sustainable financing structures that amongst other things cover costs and generate 
profits for investors. Amongst other things the evaluation looks at the volume of capital invested, whether 
the capital is used on a revolving basis and whether losses arise, but also how the financial metrics relate to 
the size or for instance the business strategy of the funds. The findings are summarised in Section 4.1 . 
Set of questions 3: Effects on financial intermediaries and sub-borrowers 
The evaluation examines the effects of the capital and TA provided by the structured funds on the FIs, and 
how the FIs ensure effects on the sub-borrowers. This analysis relates only to structured funds involved in 
MSME financing. It focuses on the contribution made by structured funds to the quality of the portfolio of 
the FIs, and their success in reaching new target groups. The effects of structured funds on MSME 
development and employment are achieved indirectly through the finance provided by the FIs, and are 
influenced by the latter's lending processes and standards. This is why the evaluation looks closely at the 
selection of refinanced FIs. The findings are summarised in Chapter 6. 
When answering the evaluation questions all five OECD-DAC criteria are rated and the additionality of the 
financing approach is considered on various levels (see Table 3).18 The evaluation questions cover the 
OECD-DAC criteria as follows: 
Relevance: 
• Are the right objectives being pursued?
• Are the programmes aligned with the strategic objectives of the BMZ?
• Is the financing approach suitable for mobilising private capital and achieving development impact?
Effectiveness: 
• Is the leverage of private capital effective?
• Are the development principles being effectively implemented?
Efficiency: 
• Is the potential for mobilising capital being harnessed efficiently?
• Are budgetary resources being deployed efficiently with this form of financing?
Impact: 
• What effects on FIs, local financial markets and sub-borrowers are being achieved?
Sustainability: 
• Have sustainable financing structures been created?
Financial and development additionality were also added as a criterion. The concept of additionality is a 
central one for structured funds, as (according to the OECD definition) the instruments of blended finance a) 
mobilise additional capital, and b) use this capital for sustainable development that would not occur without 
this additional capital (Winckler et al., 2019). With this analysis the evaluation generates findings inter alia 
on whether structured funds were the right financing instrument to choose. The criterion 'coherence', which 
is designed to assess synergies and inconsistencies, was added to the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria in 2019. 
It was therefore not yet applied explicitly in this evaluation, because it did not yet exist when the evaluation 
18  The evaluation criteria were discussed and agreed on with the reference group prior to the reform of the DAC criteria in 2019 (which now also 
include the criterion of coherence).  
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was commenced. The table below shows the DAC evaluation criteria plus the criterion 'additionality' in 
relation to the evaluation questions. 



































1. To what extent do the objectives of structured funds
match the strategic objectives of the BMZ?
To what extent are structured funds a suitable financing
approach for achieving these objectives?
x x 
2. To what extent do structured funds promote a division
of labour, donor harmonisation and the strengthening
of local actors?
x x x x 
3. To what extent are structured funds effective and
efficient in leveraging private capital and the capital of
development banks (financial additionality)?
x x x x 
4. To what extent do structured funds create sustainable
financing structures? x x x x 
5. To what extent do grants spent on TA help achieve the
structured funds' objectives? x x x x 
6. To what extent do structured funds affect the FIs'
portfolios and their success in reaching new target
groups?
x x x x 
7. To what extent do structured funds affect MSME
development, employment, income security and self-
employment?
x x x 
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Causality when answering the evaluation questions 
The evaluation questions differ in terms of whether the answers provided need to establish a causal link, 
or can be established by non-causal analysis (for instance by making comparisons or examining relevance). 
This also determines the selection of cases. Causal theory distinguishes between type causal claims and token 
causal claims, where a type comprises many cases and focuses on general relationships, while a token is a 
specific case (Wetzel, 2018). For the evaluation questions that were answered by means of non-causal 
analysis, the evaluation looked at all ten structured funds as types. This applies to questions 1 to 4 (sets 1 
and 2). For the evaluation questions that were answered by means of causal analysis, the evaluation looked 
at a small number of selected cases, including through case studies (tokens). This applies to evaluation 
questions 5 to 7 (set 3) (see Table 2). This meant the evaluation team did not need to select cases for 
questions 1 to 4, as all ten funds were considered. For questions 5 to 7, however, cases were selected. 
Selection of cases for causal analysis 
The evaluation aimed to identify typical cases. The evaluation team based their selection of cases on criteria 
that differ in relation to the level of selection of the funds and countries, and are designed to answer 
evaluation questions 5, 6 and 7. The cases need to typify the causal relationship under investigation, and the 
evaluation team needs to be able to assume that the cases are subject to factors which are at least similar. 
This means that findings can only be generalised to other cases classified as typical, however (Rohlfing, 2012). 
The evaluation team also identified 'most likely' cases in which the assumed causal effect was most likely to 
occur. Due to the limited availability of data, studying 'least likely' cases might lead to incorrect findings.  
The evaluation team determined which funds could be analysed for their possible causal effects on FIs and 
sub-borrowers in relation to three evaluation questions. Evaluation question 5 addresses the effect of TA 
interventions on the structured funds' objectives. The first criterion was therefore the existence of a TA 
facility that would enable measurement of the effects of TA on the success of structured funds. The MEF is 
the only fund that does not have a TAF. To determine to what extent structured funds affect FIs' portfolio 
quality and their success in reaching new target groups (evaluation question 6), the evaluation team needed 
to look at funds that monitor objectives indicators on portfolio quality in accordance with the KfW matrix. 
These indicators usually measure the default rate or the percentage of non-performing loans. To be able to 
answer evaluation question 7 the evaluation team restricted the selection of funds to those that focus mainly 
on MSME development and promote financial products designed for MSMEs. This is the case with all funds 
except MIDF, REFFA and AATIF, whose primary development focus is on education, agricultural production 
and infrastructure. A further criterion was which funds define income and job creation as an objective, ideally 
in the KfW matrix or in their own documents. This criterion is met by EFSE, SANAD, AATIF and REGMIFA. 
However, SANAD is the only fund for which there is a KfW indicator. Another indicator is for which funds a 
maximum loan amount, and thus a specific focus on MSME promotion, has been set. This is the case with 
SANAD, MEF, EFSE and REGMIFA.  
The cases selected for the causal analysis were those funds that focus on MSME financing. The evaluation 
team selected those funds that best met the criteria, as these were the most likely cases where effects 
might be observed, thus making them suitable for testing the theory. An overview of the selected cases is 
provided by Table 11 in Annex 9.4. The cases selected for causal analysis are:  
• European Fund for Southeast Europe (EFSE)
• SANAD Fund for MSME (SANAD)
• Regional MSME Investment Fund for Sub-Saharan Africa (REGMIFA)
• Microfinance Initiative for Asia (MIFA) Debt Fund.
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The countries were then selected in a criteria-based process according to the principle of the typical and 
most likely case. The following criteria were included at country level (see Table 12 in Annex): 
• fund-specific criteria such as the number of FIs financed by the fund
• country-specific financial market development criteria
• socio-economic criteria such as income group as defined by the World Bank or Human Development
Index.
The selection of the FIs examined in the case studies was also based on the principle of the typical and 
most likely case. To guarantee data collection, FIs were selected that are currently being financed by funds. 
The FIs also had to have signed the agreement at least 12 months beforehand, so that initial effects and 
experiences would at least potentially already have been able to occur. Furthermore, selected FIs were also 
required to reflect the fund's business model, i.e. the type of FI (e.g. bank or MFI), the type of financing 
(senior loan, subordinated debt etc.) and TA, also had to be typical for the fund. Moreover, the FIs had to 
account for a significant proportion of the country-specific fund portfolios.  
3.2 Method integration 
When answering the questions the sources and methods were triangulated. The analysis of each individual 
evaluation question was informed by at least three data sources (see Table 4). For all evaluation questions, 
fund documents (including quarterly reports and issue documents), programme proposals and reports to the 
BMZ, as well as interview records, were analysed. A total of 122 interviews were conducted with 
representatives of the BMZ, KfW Development Bank, the investors, the boards of directors of the funds and 
the fund managers, as well as with the FIs, sub-borrowers and experts (see Table 20 in Annex 9.11). To answer 
the questions concerning the alignment of structured funds with the objectives of German development 
cooperation and the development principles, 16 BMZ strategy papers were analysed. Concerning the set of 
questions on effects on FIs and MSMEs/employment, impact studies were examined. Furthermore, a survey 
of FIs was conducted, to which 50 FIs of the funds responded. Finally, for the quantitative analysis secondary 
data at the level of countries (World Bank indicators, ILO) and FIs (MIX Market) were used. MIX Market 
provides a database containing annual information on the financial and social performance of MFIs 
worldwide.  
3. |  Methods    29














































































1. Objectives of structured funds –
strategic objectives of the BMZ x x x x 
2. Division of labour, donor
harmonisation, strengthening of
local actors
x x x x 
3. Leveraging of private capital x x x x 
4. Sustainable financing structures x x x x 
5. Effects of TA x x x x x 
6. Effects on the quality of FI
portfolios and success of FIs in
reaching new target groups
x x x x x x 
7. Effects on MSME development,
employment, income security and
self-employment
x x x x 
Answering the evaluation questions required an integrated approach comprising different methods. This 
approach combines mixed methods (in the broadest sense a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches) (Johnson et al., 2007), with multi-method research that seeks to establish causal 
inference both across and within the cases (Goertz, 2017). The strengths of the mixed methods and multi-
method research approaches were combined in an integrated methodical approach. First of all, this offset 
weaknesses of individual methods. While quantitative methods are suitable for capturing heterogeneity and 
variance across a large number of observations, and thus supplying generalisable findings (Hammersley, 
1989), qualitative methods are particularly well-suited to analysing the context and answering questions as 
to 'why'. Secondly, this meant that the evaluation combined different evaluation methods – depending on 
the evaluation questions – in order to facilitate causal inference on both a cross-case and within-case basis. 
Depending on the nature of the question, adapted data collection and analysis methods were used, and 
combined on the basis of their complementarity. Table 5 provides an overview of method integration for 
each evaluation question. To analyse all evaluation questions, elements of process tracing were used to 
assess the quality of the evidence. To answer questions concerning whether an effect occurred or whether 
there is a link between input and output, a contribution analysis was performed and quantitative methods 
of analysis were applied. Statistical regularities were identified through descriptive statistics, regression 
analyses and through the so-called quasi-experimental design of the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) method. 
The methods of qualitative comparative analysis and comparative content analysis were used to answer 
questions concerning the factors influencing the mobilisation of private capital and the financial sustainability 
of the structured funds. The wording of all the evaluation questions should be understood as implying that 
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for each evaluation question, the various methods were combined to determine both whether the assumed 
effect occurred, and how this came about.  



















































































1. Objectives of structured funds –
strategic objectives of the BMZ x x 
2. Division of labour, donor
harmonisation, strengthening of local
actors
x x 
3. Leveraging of private capital x x x x 
4. Sustainable financing structures x x x 
5. Effects of TA x x x x 
6. Effects on the quality of FI portfolios
and success of FIs in reaching new
target groups
x x x x x x 
7. Effects on MSME development,
employment, income security and self-
employment
x x x 
The methodical approaches applied are described briefly below. 
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Content analysis and evidence assessment 
To answer all seven evaluation questions the content of more than 500 documents and 122 interview 
records for the ten funds was analysed and assessed (Flick et al., 1995; Kuckartz, 2014). The systematic 
assessment of the information allows the findings of the analysis to be largely related to the population of 
the funds. This analytical method was applied to all the evaluation questions. The objectives and the modus 
operandi of the funds were systematically compared with the BMZ strategies and principles of development 
cooperation, as well as with comparable financing instruments and investment options for private investors. 
For the causal analysis of the third set of questions, interviews were conducted with the management of the 
FIs, the loan officers and sub-borrowers as part of the case studies, and the information obtained was likewise 
submitted to a systematic content analysis. Operationalisation of the content analysis (the code system) was 
performed for each evaluation question using the evaluation matrix, and was analysed using computer-based 
technology. 
To assess the quality of the evidence that was gathered and analysed by means of content analysis, 
elements of process tracing were used. Process tracing is used in its entirety to test a causal mechanism. 
George and Bennett (George und Bennett, 2005, p. 206) define process tracing as a method to identify an 
intervening causal process – or to be more precise the chain or the mechanism between an independent 
variable19 and the outcome of a dependent variable. The mechanism is described in the literature on process 
tracing as the system that transfers the causal forces to the outcome (Machamer et al., 2000). Process tracing 
takes place in four steps (Punton and Welle, 2015a):  
• Step 1: Develop a hypothetical causal mechanism
• Step 2: Operationalise the mechanism
• Step 3: Collect data (referred to as 'evidence' in process tracing) in accordance with the defined
mechanism
• Step 4: Analyse and assess the strength of the evidence
In this evaluation an approach based on step 4 was used to assess the evidence.
The strength of the evidence was assessed based on the assumption that the interests of the sources 
influenced the information disclosed.20 To determine the strength of the evidence, in a first step the 
evaluation team looked at how many sources provided information that was driven (in different ways) by 
interest (triangulation). In a second step the team considered whether or not the information provided was 
as expected, based on the source's interest.  
When information has been confirmed by different sources with different interests, the information is less 
likely to be biased. For this analysis the sources were clustered into groups. These differ by their assumed 
interest (for instance, one group with a largely commercial interest and one group with a largely development 
interest). The interest was inferred from the sources' roles. For example, it was assumed that interviewees 
from the BMZ had a development-policy interest, whereas the funds also pursue commercial interests. The 
more different groups that included a certain piece of evidence, the less likely it was to be biased. 
19  Or several independent variables 
20  See the concepts of 'type I error' and 'sensitivity' in the literature on Bayesian updating. 
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When this includes a source making a (negative) statement that is unexpected (based on the source's role), 
it is also less likely that this information is biased. For this analysis groups were also formed: Is the 
information supplied an expected positive statement, an unexpected positive statement, an intended 
criticism or an unintended criticism? 
Rating the evidence along a scale from strong to weak is of course only an approximation, but does allow 
comparison of the evidence base for different outcomes. For each question, all the information elicited was 
aggregated in tables.21 These tables systematically indicate how many sources supplied each piece of 
information, and whether the statement was assumed to be intentional or unintentional. It then becomes 
clear which findings were based on weaker evidence and which on stronger evidence. 
This evidence assessment was performed in each step in the analysis, and only those findings based on 
strong evidence were included in the evaluation report. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
The evaluation used the QCA method to analyse the factors affecting the mobilisation of private capital 
(evaluation question 4). This analytical method is used primarily when seeking possible causes of a given 
outcome, and when assumptions about the interrelationships can be construed as conditions. In QCA, 
interrelationships between states are analysed in the form of quantity relations, which in turn are interpreted 
as conditions (Wagemann and Siewert, 2018). In this evaluation the analytical method was used to 
investigate whether and in what combination fund-specific characteristics such as the defined risk buffer, 
other shareholders in the fund or local currency financing, are a condition for successful mobilisation of 
private capital. To this end the QCA was used to perform a systematic comparison between the states in the 
various tranches of all ten funds in which private investors can invest. Through this systematic comparison 
between the 13 private tranches of structured funds, this analytical method generates findings that indicate 
which characteristics promote the mobilisation of private capital (see Section 5.2).  
Regression analysis (logit) 
Another method for analysing causal factors is regression analysis. This was used to analyse factors 
affecting the selection of countries and FIs (evaluation question 6). The regression analysis identifies 
statistical regularities with respect to average interrelationships across all countries and financial institutions 
examined. It does not analyse individual cases, which may also be inconsistent with the findings presented. 
Unlike QCA, regression analysis is based on the law of large numbers and is only used to analyse large data 
sets. The regression analysis was used to determine, for the four funds that were part of the causal analysis, 
in which characteristics the countries and FIs refinanced by the structured funds differ from those without 
refinancing. Here the logit model was used to calculate whether and how specific variables at the level of 
countries and financial institutions affect the probability of being refinanced by the structured funds. This 
interpretation of the outcomes is based on the assumption that the countries or FIs do not differ with respect 
to those indicators not analysed (ceteris paribus). For the analysis at country level, the evaluation team used 
country-specific World Bank indicators on the country income group, the financial market and the business 
environment. To analyse the FIs, data on the financial and social performance of MFIs taken from MIX Market 
were used. For the logit model the evaluation team calculated what effect the financial performance of the 
financial institution and its target-group focus22 have on the probability of its being refinanced by the 
structured funds. The findings from this analysis form part of Section 6.1 and are summarised in Table 15, 
Table 16 and Table 17 in Annex 9.9.  
21  Based on an encoding system in MaxQDA 
22  Table 14 in Annex 9.9 provides an overview of the indicators used for the analysis. 
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Difference-in-Differences (DiD) 
DiD is a quasi-experimental method. It is used to substantiate causal effects using observational data. This 
requires investigators to explore as precisely as possible what would have happened without the 
intervention. DiD compares the trend in a treatment group that has received the invention, with the trend in 
a control group that has not received the intervention. The trend is measured using outcome indicators for 
which values are recorded at two points in time: before and after the intervention. It is assumed that without 
the intervention the treatment and control groups would have followed the same trend (this is referred to 
as the 'parallel trend assumption'). If the treatment group has changed more over the given period than the 
control group, this change can be attributed to the intervention (Shadish et al., 2002). 
This evaluation used DiD to analyse the effects of the funds on the FIs. As in the case of the regression 
analysis the evaluation team used the MIX Market database, which collects annual data worldwide on MFIs 
– though not on commercial banks or leasing companies. MFIs make up 124 of the 202 FIs financed by the
four funds with a focus on MSMEs. The analysis is confined to these four funds. Of these 124 MFIs, around
70 are included in MIX Market, depending on the indicator. They constitute the treatment group. The control
group comprises all other MFIs in the countries where the funds finance at least one MFI. Changes in the
treatment and control groups were analysed using criteria for the size of the MFIs, their financial
performance and their target-group-orientation (see Table 14 in Annex 9.9). Two points in time were
compared: one year prior to establishment of the fund, and the last year for which data were available,
provided that this was between 2016 and 2018. The year prior to establishment of the fund was selected as
a proxy for the date of financing, because data indicating the year in which the FI was first financed by a
structured fund were not available in all cases.
Contribution analysis 
Contribution analyses are used to systematically test assumed causal links. They systematically analyse the 
causal pathways in a ToC in order to determine how plausible it is that causal effects occur, why (or why not) 
this is the case, and what factors play a role in this (Mayne, 2011). To examine the causal pathways, previously 
defined assumptions and risks, as well as expected effects, are operationalised through indicators that are 
subsequently tested using the evidence gathered. If the evidence then for instance substantiates a risk or 
several risks that underlie the path, but not the expected effects, this indicates that due to the risks which 
materialised the expected effect did not occur. The analysed assumptions and risks are then used to rate the 
plausibility of the individual causal pathways, in order to subsequently update the ToC (Mayne, 2012).  
This evaluation used inter alia the contribution analysis to assess the effects of the structured funds on the 
target groups (evaluation questions 5 and 6). As well as to substantiate assumed causal pathways, 
contribution analysis was also used to analyse which factors or steps can increase the probability of the 
anticipated effect. The aforementioned steps of the contribution analysis were applied to all causal pathways 
between input (TA and capital) and induced output (simplified access to financial products for target groups 
of the structured funds) in the ToC (see Figure 11). The analysis left out the causal pathways at the outcome 
and impact levels, because it was not possible to generate any empirical evidence here. The evidence used 
comprised the findings generated by the quantitative and qualitative methods – chiefly the content analysis, 
the descriptive statistics, the regression analyses and the quasi-experimental method. A summary of all 
assumptions and risks can be found in the Annex (Section 9.2). The original ToC was adjusted on the basis of 
the evidence concerning the assumptions, the risks and the actual effects (see Chapter 7). 
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3.3 Assessment of the methodology 
Integrating different data collection and analysis methods enabled the evaluation team to triangulate the 
findings, and thus largely offset weaknesses inherent in the individual methods.  
One limiting factor for evaluating structured funds is the complexity of the causal chain. This chain is long 
due to the many actors involved, which include investors in the funds (the BMZ and other official donors, 
development banks, private investors), fund managers, FIs and finally the sub-borrowers. FIs are the direct 
target group of structured funds, and sub-borrowers the indirect target group. The effects on sub-borrowers 
in particular are achieved through refinancing by FIs, and therefore can only be an indirect effect of 
structured funds. The causal chain thus includes many theoretical assumptions, and might potentially be 
broken at several points.  
The regional and sectoral distribution of the structured funds poses a challenge for the evaluation, 
particularly with respect to the analysis of development impact. Structured funds are used in many sectors, 
for instance in MSME financing, climate action or education. Due to the sectoral and regional heterogeneity 
of funds, the evaluation team decided against 'analytical breadth', which presupposes that cases are 
comparable, and in favour of 'analytical depth', involving intensive and in-depth survey/investigation and 
analysis of individual funds, countries, FIs and sub-borrowers. The causal analysis thus focuses on MSME 
financing. Transferring the findings on effects of structured funds to other sectors is thus only possible to a 
limited extent.  
For funds in the MSMSE financing sector, the criteria-based selection of the funds did ensure the 
transferability and relevance of the findings, although the small number of units actually 
surveyed/investigated limits the extent to which the findings can be generalised to the population (i.e. 
their external validity). The criteria-based selection was performed successfully with regard to the case study 
countries and financial institutions.  
For selection of the surveyed sub-borrowers, no criteria-based or randomised selection of cases was 
possible, which limits the extent to which the findings at this level can be generalised. In general, the effects 
of MSME loans on sub-borrowers were not the focus of this evaluation, as these have already been analysed 
extensively in the scientific literature (see for example Maitrot and Nino-Zarazua, 2015). Moreover, this 
aspect does not take into account the particular feature of structured funds – i.e. financing through FIs. In 
order to nevertheless be able to draw conclusions concerning the effects of structured funds at the level of 
sub-borrowers, the evaluation team looked at the processes and standards applied by FIs when lending to 
sub-borrowers.  
A further limiting factor for this evaluation was access to information. Full information on financial and 
social metrics with respect to the FIs was not available to the evaluation team, as this information is only 
partially recorded for reporting to the BMZ. To deal with this limitation the evaluation team first of all drew 
on secondary data from MIX Market, and secondly collected data of their own at the level of the FIs. However, 
it was not possible using these two data sources either to cover the population of all FIs refinanced by the 
four funds operating in the field of MSME financing, or to produce a random sample of the population. The 
MIX Market database contains only information on MFIs. Although more than half of the FIs financed by the 
funds are MFIs, refinanced commercial banks or leasing companies are still not included when using this data 
source. Furthermore, the MIX Market database only contains information on just over half the MFIs 
refinanced by the structured funds. However, it is not assumed that this leads to a distortion of the findings, 
as the MFIs included in MIX Market are not significantly larger or smaller than the MFIs which are not in MIX 
Market.23 The response rate for primary data collection at FI level was around 25 per cent. This is explained 
inter alia by the fact that the survey was not always sent to all FIs; due to the high costs for fund managers, 
23  For this analysis the figure for the total assets of the MFIs not available in MIX Market was researched manually. This information was publicly 
available for 21 of the 52 MFIs.  
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only a selection of typical FIs was included. When interpreting the findings from the analysis of these two 
data sources, it was therefore assumed that the FIs for which no information is available do not differ 
systematically from the FIs for which information is available. Nonetheless, it is not possible to rule out a 
possible distortion of the findings of the analysis resulting from information gaps either in MIX Market or in 
the data collected. This must be taken into account when interpreting the findings.  
To decrease the probability of a possible confirmation bias that limits the interpretation of information, 
elements of process tracing were applied. Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek, interpret and favour 
information that confirms (one's own) expectations (Punton und Welle, 2015b). When only information is 
analysed that is believed to be relevant for the hypotheses being tested, important information may be 
overlooked because it is difficult to integrate into those hypotheses. The term 'confirmation bias' also 
describes the tendency of interviewees to respond in ways that confirm what they take to be the hypotheses. 
To deal with this limitation, this evaluation used elements of the process tracing method to assess the 
evidence. When assessing the strength of the evidence, factors were included that were designed to prevent 
a confirmation bias, such as the triangulation of sources and the distinction between expected and 
unexpected statements. 
The quality of the findings is largely ensured by a systematic approach in all methods. This was achieved 
for instance by operationalising the evaluation questions in the data collection instruments based on the 
evaluation matrix, and through computer-based analysis of the indicators in relation to the matrix. The 
findings were triangulated with respect to methods (cross-method synthesis), data (e.g. comparison of case 
study findings with uninvolved sector experts and benchmark groups) and team members (cross-check 
principle within the team for case summaries and synthesis). All products of the evaluation (concept note, 
inception report and this final report) underwent both internal and external peer review processes, were 
checked for factual correctness together with the reference group, and content was discussed where rival 
interpretations of findings arose. 
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To understand how best to use structured funds in German development cooperation, DEval analysed 
under which circumstances the financing approach is appropriate for achieving development objectives 
and in which cases other financing approaches may be preferable. The possible advantages of structured 
funds include  
• the pooling of financial resources
• cooperation and harmonisation between various donors
• the mobilisation of private capital
• the financial sustainability of the structured funds themselves.
Structured funds are not a financing approach designed solely to achieve a development funding goal. They 
should also operate on a financially sustainable basis, to ensure responsible management of the budgetary 
resources used. In the long term, structured funds should also be viable on the financial market without 
official investment. The present chapter explores the extent to which structured funds achieve the financial 
sustainability and development impact to which they aspire, and what preconditions need to be in place to 
make this happen. This chapter is based on the answers to evaluation questions 1, 2 and 4. It will analyse the 
logic and the financial structure of the funds, and identify the extent to which their development impact is 
ensured by appropriate management of the financial approach.  
4.1 Financial sustainability 
As well as their development orientation, the financial sustainability of structured funds is also pursued as 
a fundamental prerequisite for using structured funds in development cooperation. In the long term it is 
envisaged that this financing approach will become self-sustaining, i.e. will be able to manage in principle 
without receiving any additional financial flows. This presupposes, among other things, that the revenue 
generated from interest payments is sufficient to cover the funds' costs. The official capital paid in is used 
according to the revolving use of capital principle (see Section 2.1). Once paid in, this capital should be 
retained in the fund and help enable it to continuously extend new loans.  
Conceptual framework for rating financial sustainability 
The evaluation examined the financial sustainability of the financing approach and identified the necessary 
conditions for it. For this purpose the evaluation team constructed a multi-dimensional concept of financial 
sustainability. The financial sustainability of financing approaches in the narrow sense is often equated with 
their long-term ability to cover their costs. However, the findings of this evaluation indicate that when 
analysing the financial sustainability of structured funds there are other criteria that should be taken into 
account. These concern the revolving use of the official capital and the appropriateness of the funds' risk-
return structure. Taken as a whole, these criteria reflect whether or not structured funds are an efficient 
financing approach that can be used sustainably. Each of these criteria is assigned to a category that can be 
used to rate the financial sustainability of a fund. The categories are designed to show what level of financial 
sustainability the funds have achieved. The categories are arranged along a scale that ranges from 'partially 
achieved', through 'achieved' to 'surpassed' (see Figure 12).  
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Figure 12 Rating scale for financial sustainability 
Source: authors' own visualisation. 
The evaluation team considers a fund to have 'partially achieved' financial sustainability when it can break 
even. For the analysis the evaluation team identified three indicators: the size of the fund, the level of its 
costs and the nature of its investment. The basic assumption is that a fund must be of a certain size in order 
to be able to cover its costs (Latzko, 1999; Malhotra et al., 2007; Rea et al., 1999). For this purpose the team 
first of all measured the size of the fund in terms of its financing volume and the number of countries in which 
it operates. In a second step the fund's cost structure was analysed. This involved ascertaining the total costs 
of the fund, examining the various cost components and identifying possible cost drivers. In a third step the 
fund's investment portfolio was analysed. Depending on their nature and size, investments can have a 
considerable effect on a fund's cost structure, thus permitting further conclusions as to whether the fund can 
break even.  
The evaluation team considers a fund to have 'achieved' financial sustainability when the official capital 
paid in is actually used on a revolving basis, and a strategy is in place that defines options for the official 
donors to exit the fund in the long run. The revolving use of capital principle means that once paid into the 
fund, the official capital is maintained and can be used for continuous lending without requiring any further 
inflows from official donors. This assumes that the returns from the loans extended are sufficient for the fund 
to cover its running costs and the dividends it has promised to investors. To analyse the revolving use of 
capital the evaluation team looked at the amounts paid in by official donors since the fund was set up, and 
Efficient risk-return structure 
Key question: To what extent does the fund have an efficient risk-return structure? 
 Revolving use of capital 
   Key question: To what extent is the official capital used on a revolving basis? 
 Cost recovery 
      Key question: To what extent can the fund cover its costs? 
Level of costs Size of fund 
Metrics for 
fund portfolio 
Exit strategies Profitability 
Use of public 
capital Losses 























4. |  When is a structured fund appropriate for achieving development objectives?    39
payments into the first loss tranche. These payments may be due to losses incurred by the fund when 
replenishing the first loss tranche, or may be used to increase the size of the fund. While the latter leads to 
a growth of the fund, replenishing the first loss tranche following losses means that the official capital is not 
being used on a revolving basis.  
The evaluation team considers a fund to have 'surpassed' expectations of financial sustainability when, as 
well as being able to break even and use the official capital on a revolving basis, it also distributes risk and 
return efficiently for the investors. According to the logic of the waterfall structure, investors in riskier 
tranches receive higher dividends, while investors in less risky tranches receive a lower remuneration (see 
Figure 13). At the same time the riskier tranches serve as a risk buffer for investors in higher tranches. For 
each tranche, securities with different risks, returns and maturities are issued to investors who are then able 
to pursue their specific investment and risk strategies. The evaluation analysed the efficiency of the risk 
buffer profile and the monetary returns of the tranches, i.e. the risk-return structure. To this end the team 
looked at the size of the risk buffer and the costs incurred by the fund in deploying the risk buffer. These 
costs vary depending on the size of the individual tranches and their pay-out structure.  
Figure 13 Waterfall structure of a structured fund 
Source: authors' own visualisation. 
Findings on the financial sustainability of the funds 
4.1.1 Cost recovery 
Nine of the ten funds break even, hence in these cases financial sustainability has already been partially 
achieved. By contrast, one fund was wound up because it was unable to recover its costs. In relation to the 
three indicators (size of funds, level of costs and nature of investment), the funds evaluated differ in some 
cases considerably. This section will discuss the findings on each of the indicators.  
Size of the funds 
The ability to break even depends largely on the size of the fund. This applies to both the financing volume 
of the fund and to the number of countries in which it operates. For the financing volume the evaluation 
team identified a benchmark of around 100 million US dollars that a fund should have at its disposal, at least 
in the long term, in order to break even (I035). In the case of the fund that was wound up the volume fell far 
short of this value. As a result, it was no longer able to recover its costs in the low-interest environment of 
its target region (D287; I035). For the remaining nine funds the financing volume varied widely depending on 
the maturity of the fund and the target region (see Figure 14). Eight funds have a financing volume of at least 
100 million US dollars, while one fund has just 31 million US dollars. This can be attributed to both the difficult 
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recovering its costs so far. In the long term, however, there are plans to grow the fund to 100 million US 
dollars (D403).  
The average total investment of the funds is around 342 million US dollars. Figures range between 21 
million and one billion US dollars, depending on the size and age of the funds. In many cases the volume of 
investment has been continuously increased since the funds were set up. In a small number of cases difficult 
macroeconomic conditions in the target countries or a poor-quality portfolio have led to a stagnation or 
sometimes a reduction in investment (I059; D430).  
Figure 14  Financing volume 
Source: authors' own visualisation, based on the funds' annual reports; figures as at: 31 December 2018. 
The analysis showed that most of the funds operate in fewer than 15 countries. This low number of 
countries can have a negative effect on the development of a fund's business (I042). Depending on the 
economic situation in just one or two of a fund's target countries, for instance, the fund might then generate 
only moderate profits or face increased losses. Funds with a strong regional focus are most likely to poorly 
diversify their risks.24 One example that demonstrates this is the liquidated fund. The target region of the 
fund was confined to six countries, all of which were subject to a similar economic cycle. The market 
environment in the region, which was characterised by historically low interest, made it impossible for the 
fund to generate the returns it needed in order to break even. As a result the fund had to be wound up (D287; 
I035). Figure 15 shows the nine active funds together with the number of countries in which they operate 
and number of partner institutions.  
24  The scope for diversifying risk is one of the basic ideas underlying this financing approach. This includes both the number of countries and the 
number of FIs in which a fund can invest. Diversification enables a fund to achieve a broad spread of the country-specific and financing risks 
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Figure 15 Number of countries and partner institutions 
Source: authors' own visualisation, based on the funds' annual reports; figures as at: 31 December 2018. 
Cost structure 
The total expense ratio of the selected funds25 is between 1.5 and 2.16 per cent, which is significantly 
lower than the industry average of 2.3 per cent (Symbiotics, 2019). Even compared to selected actively 
managed emerging market funds, the total expense ratio of the evaluated structured funds ranges from 
average to above average. The total expense ratio reflects the administrative and management fees of the 
fund in relation to their outstanding average loan volume. However, this method of calculation ignores other 
costs incurred by funds inter alia as a result of hedging transactions or the payment of dividends and interest 
to their investors. To obtain a more comprehensive and better contextualised picture of the cost structure, 
DEval therefore calculated an expense ratio for the nine active funds that relates all their identified cost 
components to their average investment volume.26 According to this method of calculation the total expense 
ratio of the funds is between 4 and 20 per cent. 
The level of costs and the cost structure vary widely depending on the size and type of investment of the 
funds. On the operational side, the costs include for all funds the direct operating costs (costs for 
administrative and legal services, marketing etc.) and costs for the fund manager. The latter are generally 
based on a basic fee that is aligned with the managed portfolio volume, plus a performance bonus that is 
based on previously defined performance criteria (I038). In many cases costs are also incurred for hedging 
interest and exchange rate risks (see Box 3 on hedging). These costs are significantly higher for funds that 
provide local currency financing than for funds that provide financing chiefly in hard currency. Usually, 
however, these hedging costs are passed on to FIs financed in local currency, which means they do not remain 
with the fund (see next section on 'Type of investment'). All funds also incur financing costs in the form of 
interest and dividend payments to their investors. These costs are determined chiefly by the number of 
investors, the risk they carry and the performance of the fund.  
25  The data on the total expense ratio are only available for six of the nine active funds (as at 31 December 2018). Due to the limited availability of 
data the team looked only at funds focused on MSME financing.  
26  This method of calculation takes account of direct operating costs, management fees, costs for hedging transactions, and interest and dividend 
payments to noteholders and to A and B shareholders. The sum total of these costs is placed in relation to the outstanding investment volume of 
the funds. The figures are average values for the period 2016-2018. 
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Type of investment 
The average size of loan granted by the funds varies between 2.3 and 18.5 million US dollars. Table 6 shows 
the distribution of the average loan sizes. Most funds issue mainly small loans of less than 10 million US 
dollars, plus occasional larger loans. The size of these loans is determined largely by the type of FI financed 
and the sector in which the financed FI operates. Banks or project financing arrangements in the renewable 
energy sector, for instance, usually require larger loans than small MFIs. Since the award and management 
of small loans is relatively cost-intensive (I015; I017), FC approaches that operate cost-effectively often 
extend loans in excess of ten million euros. By contrast, the cost structure of structured funds enables the 
financing of smaller loans in some cases. So compared to other FC approaches the pooling of resources by a 
fund is additional particularly in cases where the financed FIs are served with relatively small loans. 
Table 6 Average loan sizes and their distribution (in US dollars) 
Source: authors' own table. 
The majority of the evaluated funds provide local currency financing – depending on the needs of the FI 
and the risk framework prescribed by the fund. Figure 16 shows local financing as a percentage of the 
volume of investment27 for each fund. Only one fund spends 100 per cent of its investment volume in a local 
currency (other than the US dollar or the euro). By contrast, two funds provide financing only in euros or US 
dollars. The issue of local currency loans depends on the needs of the FI and the risk framework prescribed 
by the fund. Funds have defined limits for the assumption of exchange rate risks, for instance. If these limits 
are exceeded due to the absence of hedging options for the fund, or if the costs entailed are no longer 
financially viable, the fund is no longer able to make the relevant local currency transactions (see next 
section). The evaluation shows that local currency financing need not necessarily mean that the fund assumes 
the exchange rate risks. In one case, for instance, a loan was granted in local currency, but the loan accounts 
entered the balance sheet in US dollars and therefore the loan had to be repaid in US dollars. So although 
the fund had spent local currency, the exchange rate risks remained with the FI taking out the loan (I091). 
The conditions attached to local currency loans – and the transparent handling of them – are thus a crucial 
factor.  
27  A distinction is drawn between financing in US dollars, euros or a local currency (other than the euro or the US dollar). When interpreting this it is 
important to note that in some target countries the euro or the US dollar are considered local currency. These countries include Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama. 
< 8 million 8 – 10 million > 10 million
Number of funds 4 3 2 
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Figure 16 Percentage of investment in local currency 
Source: authors' own calculations, based on the funds' annual reports; figures as at: 31 December 2018  
The funds have various options for managing the exchange rate risks. The costs incurred are usually passed 
on to the FIs taking out the loans (see Box 2). Access to the international capital market and the expertise 
of the fund managers often enable the funds to manage the exchange rate risks better and more cost-
effectively than the FIs taking out the loans. Local currency loans are provided where needed, however, as 
larger banks or more formalised FIs in particular are able to bear the risks themselves, or do not require local 
currency financing. In many cases the costs incurred by the funds when hedging the exchange rate risks are 
passed on to the FIs taking out the loans in the form of a risk premium. The funds may become less 
competitive as a result, and therefore do not fully hedge the risk exposure of all their local currency 
transactions, which means they bear some of the risks of the financing (D134). Some funds have introduced 
so-called L shares on the liabilities side, which absorb losses from transactions not hedged (D470; I047; D122). 
These enable the funds to issue financing in local currency without hedging the risks, as the high costs of 
hedging would not be cost-effective (I031). The risks are then borne chiefly by the investors in the L shares, 
which are usually official donors. The L shares are remunerated in accordance with the waterfall structure of 
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Box 2 Local currency financing – Risk management solutions of the funds 
Hedging 
Various hedging solutions are available to the funds. One possibility is to pursue their own hedging strategy 
by themselves trading in financial derivatives (swaps, futures and options), thus hedging part of their 
portfolio (D3012, D413). Another possibility is to have the currency risks hedged by a currency solution 
provider. The best-known of these is the TCX Fund, which – also operating as a structured fund – pools a 
large number of different currency risks in a single fund. This enables it to provide hedging solutions for 
highly volatile or non-marketable currencies (TCX, 2018). 
L shares 
In some funds so-called L shares have been introduced within the capital structure that bear the risk of the 
funds' unhedged currency positions (D470). This enables the funds to issue local currency loans which 
would otherwise not be financially viable due to the high hedging costs. The risks are assumed by the 
investors in the L shares, which are usually official donors. The pay-outs for the L shares are based on the 
waterfall principle of the fund in question. 
Back-to-back financing 
In this risk management mechanism the local currency loan is passed on to the FI through a local third-
party provider. For this purpose the fund makes a hard-currency deposit, which has the same term as the 
loan to be issued, with a local bank. The local bank then issues a loan in local currency to the FI. The fund's 
deposit serves as collateral for the loan (I091).  
The supply of local currency financing delivers considerable additional development benefits compared to 
other financing approaches, as the latter usually issue loans in foreign currencies (see Section 4.2.1). The 
exchange rate risks that arise then remain entirely with the borrowers, who have to manage them either by 
hedging or by paying risk premiums (Colla, 2017). However, in view of high risk premiums or non-marketable 
local currencies, numerous borrowers in recipient countries are unable to fully offset the exchange rate risks. 
Furthermore, many borrowers underestimate the currency risk and are therefore unwilling to accept the risk 
premiums, which are sometimes high (Colla, 2017). Consequently, many borrowers are not fully protected 
against the exchange rate risks. For a long time this practice was considered acceptable, because it was 
assumed that local currencies would remain stable. However, not least the financial crisis in 2008 exposed 
the unexpected volatility of global foreign exchange markets (e.g. the South African rand in 2008, the 
Ukrainian hryvnia in 2015 or the Nigerian naira in 2016), along with the associated consequences for the 
borrowers, which in some cases threatened their livelihoods.  
4.1.2 Revolving use of capital 
The findings of the analysis show that the majority of the funds use the official capital on a revolving basis. 
The majority of the funds therefore had either few losses to report, or none at all. In most cases losses 
occurred especially after the funds were launched, as at this point in time they did not have any significant 
repayments that would enable them to cover their initial costs (e.g. I024; D065). In some cases funds also 
recorded losses later on, due largely to defaults on loans issued (D419; D259; D019). All these losses were 
absorbed by the junior tranche of the funds, which means that the investors in the mezzanine and senior 
tranches were not affected. In two cases the junior tranche had to be replenished with official capital 
following losses, in order to maintain the required capital in the tranche (D020; D259).  
If losses can be compensated by prior or subsequent profits they can be considered harmless with regard 
to the financial sustainability of the funds. One fund has recorded losses almost without exception since its 
establishment, as a result of heavy loan defaults (D020; D019). This suggests that the official capital has so 
far not been used on a revolving basis. Consequently, the financial sustainability of this fund can only be 
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considered to have been partially achieved. Although appropriate measures28 have since been taken to 
improve the fund's management and portfolio quality, it remains to be seen how effective they will be over 
the next few years. 
There are considerable differences between the funds in terms of their profitability. While the returns of 
some funds are just about sufficient to cover their operating costs and the agreed targeted dividends for the 
investors in the mezzanine and senior tranches, in other cases they allow additional dividends to be paid out 
to shareholders (D255; D089; D239). One reason for this is the different ages of the funds. It emerges that 
the three funds that generated the highest profits29 have existed the longest. This is partly due to the higher 
repayments that they receive compared to younger funds. Secondly, the cost efficiency of the funds also 
plays a role. The more cost-efficient a fund is, the higher its profits will be. Finally, the market environment 
in which the funds operate is also very important here. The findings of the evaluation show that the profits 
of the funds operating in sub-Saharan Africa are lower than those of the funds operating in other regions. 
This is due to the macroeconomic conditions in sub-Saharan Africa, which are often more difficult (D413; 
D403). 
The analysis of the exit options for official donors shows that only two funds have a defined maturity for 
the BMZ shares (D065; D343). While the securities of the mezzanine and senior tranches all have fixed 
maturities, in most cases the capital of official donors is paid into the junior tranche with unlimited maturity. 
A clear exit strategy that defines dates for reviewing the continued need for the official capital and the nature 
of the exit was in most cases not yet in place when the capital was paid in, as it was at that point very difficult 
to predict ex ante when the right time to exit would be, and what the best exit strategy would then be (I122). 
The findings of the analysis indicate that an exit by official donors might make sense particularly when the 
fund has been operating sustainably for several years, when the supply of financing has been successfully 
established in the target markets, or when other investors have been found for the junior tranche (D403). In 
the case of the evaluated funds these conditions were not yet met as of the date of the evaluation, and there 
were no examples of an exit by official donors. In a small number of cases, once the fund has been operating 
for a certain period a review will be conducted to examine when and how an exit might be possible (D403). 
This might for instance involve a pay-out to the official donors, or a transfer of the official capital to the fund. 
In the first case the capital would be returned to the federal budget (D497). In the second case the shares 
could be sold to another investor or transferred to the partner countries (I122; D020; D403). 
4.1.3 Risk-return structure and its efficiency 
In many cases the funds display partial efficiency losses in the design of their risk-return structure. Only in 
a few cases can the target of financial sustainability be rated as 'surpassed' (based on the defined rating 
criteria, see Section 4.1). Although the waterfall structure of the funds is basically an efficient structure for 
various risk-return profiles of different investor types, in a few cases its specific design displays partial 
efficiency losses. These result first of all from the cost structure of the mezzanine tranche, and secondly from 
the country windows in the junior tranche applied in some funds. The complexity of this structure means 
that investors require more information.  
Since the official donors have so far done without a risk-appropriate remuneration of their shares, the 
mezzanine tranche is the most expensive asset class of the funds (I008). Generally speaking, higher-risk 
tranches are remunerated with higher returns. According to this logic the junior tranche would then need to 
be remunerated with the highest returns. This is not the case, however, as the investors in the junior tranche 
– so far almost exclusively official donors – have not claimed their risk-appropriate remuneration. The 
investors in the mezzanine tranche therefore receive the highest returns (D470). In some funds the 
mezzanine tranche is currently being restructured in order to save costs and simplify the structure of the 
funds (I047; I040) (see also Section 5.2). This should make the funds more efficient and create more space 
 
 
28  These include an investment of the fund manager in the junior tranche (and in the losses) and expanding the local presence of the fund manager.  
29  Average figures for the years 2016 to 2018. 
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for private investors. While some funds are reducing the volume of the tranche, one fund was already 
configured with just two tranches (junior and senior tranches) when it was set up (I048).  
Furthermore, the use of country windows within the junior tranche in its present form limits the efficient 
distribution of risks by the funds. The so-called country windows stipulate that the BMZ capital may only be 
used for investments in predefined countries. Country windows enable a fund to use bilateral resources from 
the BMZ, and thus to focus on particular countries within its structure (I030; I031). Country windows are 
currently being used in four funds. The approach followed to date affects both the assets side and the 
liabilities side of the evaluated funds. On the assets side the budgetary regulations on the use of resources 
lead to restrictions on the funds' scope for diversification.  
On the liabilities side, in the present form they also lead to efficiency losses in the distributions of risks 
within the funds (I042; I031). In the evaluated funds the country windows require the introduction of 
additional C shares to cover specifically the risks of the respective country investments. This means that the 
risk buffer of the junior tranche has to be spread across different C shares, and that the funds' profit and loss 
account has to be adjusted. As a result the structure of the fund becomes more complex, more expensive 
and – for private investors in particular – more difficult to understand. This is why the KfW Development 
Bank and the BMZ are already discussing a possible simplification of the structure on the liabilities side. One 
recently launched fund was set up without any further sub-division of the junior tranche. 
4.2 Development orientation 
This section will focus on the question of how the development orientation of the funds is realised and 
ensured both when they are set up and in the course of their business operations. 
Structured funds can pursue development objectives through: 
• complementarity to other development activities 
• the strategic orientation when a fund is set up 
• adjustment of the funds after launch 
• decision-making on the funds' day-to-day business 
• the division of tasks within the fund 
• harmonisation of the approaches of the donors involved in the fund 
• strengthening of local actors 
The following sections look at how effectively these options are used. 
4.2.1 Complementarity of structured funds and bilateral development cooperation approaches 
A distinctive feature of structured funds is that they address the following objectives: 
• Support local FIs in order to stabilise and strengthen the financial sector  
• Deliver a higher number of loans through the supported FIs, thus increasing access to finance 
• Design and build a portfolio of supported FIs to benefit sub-borrowers with a particularly high financing 
requirement 
• Build markets and platforms in various sectors and areas such as MSME development, and climate and 
education finance. Create and develop financial services for the respective markets through these FIs, 
and support platform-building through dialogue between countries and between groups and 
associations (see Section 4.2.5) (I038; I060)  
• Set regional priorities – which is enabled by the regional structure of the funds  
• Bring together individual bilateral FC projects (I122; I047) 
• Mobilise private capital 
• Pool the finance provided by individual donors and investors (I030; I126; I050; I043).  
 
See Table 10 in Annex 9.3 for an overview of the objectives of each fund. 
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Structured funds meet the need to finance small-scale loans to FIs that is not met by other bilateral 
cooperation approaches. It is particularly appropriate to compare direct lines of credit with structured funds 
because the objectives pursued through these two financing approaches coincide. Both finance the 
development of MSMEs or other development-related interventions. Direct lines of credit to single FIs are 
provided by individual donors, which means that for smaller loans, for instance to support MFIs, they are 
usually not cost-effective. Structured funds operate particularly in cases where an intervention is too small 
to be a project in its own right. By pooling the finance provided by various donors and bringing together 
several projects (some of which already exist), structured funds can also operate efficiently with small-scale 
loans (I038). While it is true that under the so-called APEX approaches, which are classified as direct lines of 
credit, resources are also pooled and small-scale loans thus become financially viable, the financing delivered 
through this approach is tied to its guidelines. In the case of structured funds, the issue document produced 
when a fund is set up defines the fund's own guidelines, which are important for managing the fund in line 
with its development orientation (I038; I002; I122; I123). 
Structured funds also support interventions that are not covered by an existing BMZ priority area, through 
which local currency financing is to be offered or which seek to cooperate with private FIs. Since their 
operations involve a regional financing approach, funds can set regional priorities that complement existing 
bilateral projects and interventions. This enables them to address topics that do not fall within an existing 
BMZ priority area. Unlike other approaches, structured funds enable financing in local currency and/or 
cooperation with private FIs. In bilateral projects both are currently possible only to a limited extent (I038; 
I017), which demonstrates the complementarity of bilateral development cooperation and structured funds. 
Supporting interventions that do not fall within a BMZ priority area, however, also means a thematic 
fragmentation that will need to be harmonised with the future development-policy priorities that the BMZ 
sets in relation to the core areas of the 2030 reform process (BMZ, 2020). 
Structured funds are a market-oriented financing approach that delivers loans on normal market terms, 
and should therefore be seen as complementary to other approaches and instruments. For example, as 
described in Section 4.1, as part of the risk diversification strategy only a small number of riskier countries 
and FIs are promoted, and the approach allows only limited control at the level of the sub-borrowers. The 
approach should therefore be seen as complementary to other approaches and instruments. For financing 
in least developed countries (LDCs), and for interventions whose impact at target group level need to be 
directly influenced, other instruments can be considered. The traditional choice is grants. For financing that 
is to be provided on concessional terms that do not reflect market conditions, instruments such as 
development loans are used. In development loans, the official funds are used to reduce costs for the 
borrowers by offering more favourable terms, whereas in structured funds they are used to cover the risk of 
private investments. This has clear advantages for attracting private investors. On the other hand, as long as 
the premise of market conformity needs to be met the approach is unlikely to elicit a willingness to finance 
target groups that are more risky, even if they are highly relevant for achieving development objectives. 
Setting up a fund is a time-consuming process that is not well suited for quickly closing acute financing 
gaps. The average time taken between the first programme proposal, i.e. the design of the fund, and its 
actual establishment, is at least one year. Designing a fund involves consulting with the parties involved in 
establishing the fund concerning its strategy, and setting up the fund's structure in accordance with 
applicable law (in this case Luxembourg law). This affects the speed at which a fund can respond to acute 
financing gaps (D014; D070; D124; D213; D270; D294; D343; D397; D424; D501). 
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4.2.2 Strategic orientation when a fund is set up and scope for adjustment thereafter 
When a fund is set up the development objective is defined jointly by the BMZ and the KfW Development 
Bank, and any other relevant official actors. Under Luxembourg law (SICAV-SIF), when structured funds are 
set up they have great flexibility in their strategic orientation. At this point both the regional focus and the 
sector to be addressed are defined, and the principles and objectives of the relevant BMZ strategies are 
integrated (I002; I003; I035; I020; I038). Here, it must be remembered that the budgetary resources provided 
by the BMZ need to be ODA-eligible based on the refinancing of ODA-eligible countries (D590).  
The objectives pursued by the funds closely match the goals defined in the BMZ strategies. The evaluation 
compared all objectives formulated by the funds, with those formulated by 16 strategies of the BMZ (see 
Annex 9.5) that are linked to the structured funds either thematically or geographically. Both the thematically 
oriented sector strategies and papers, and the regional strategies, show a close match (D522; D523; D524; 
D525; D526; D527; D528; D529; D530; D531; D532; D533; D534; D535; D536; D537). However, it should be 
borne in mind that the 16 strategies cover a broad array of themes. The core areas and initiative areas defined 
as part of the BMZ 2030 reform strategy prioritise development themes that may also affect the future 
orientation of funds and their objectives. However, that fact that funds' objectives match the BMZ's goals in 
itself does not yet indicate whether or how much exchange there is between structured funds and related 
interventions, for instance in the field of financial market development, or whether synergies are being 
harnessed. 
The structured funds are for instance aligned with the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda and with Germany's 
'Development policy for 2030' strategy. Because the structured funds cover topics such as business 
development (especially MSMEs) and job creation, gender equality, climate action, renewable energy, and 
environment and biodiversity, they make a particular contribution to SDGs 1 (no poverty), 2 (zero hunger), 5 
(gender equality), 8 (decent work and economic growth), 12 (responsible production and consumption), 13 
(climate action) and 17 (partnerships for the Goals) (D019; D065; D122; D212; D259; D290; D335; D403; 
D430; D496; SDG website30). At the same time, the strategies 'Development Policy for 2030' and 'BMZ 2030' 
plan to focus German development cooperation on a smaller number of themes and countries. These 
countries include reform-minded bilateral partners, global partners for transboundary challenges, and nexus 
and peace partners. In the future, regional projects (which include structured funds) will be implemented 
exclusively in BMZ partner countries, and will be thematically oriented toward the BMZ's core areas and 
initiative areas (BMZ, 2020). To harmonise this strategy with the regional approach, the BMZ will need to 
clarify for future funds how they can be aligned with these priorities. (D527; D019; D065; D122; D212; D259; 
D290; D335; D403; D430; D496, (BMZ, 2017b)). 
The objectives of the structured funds also reflect the goals of the BMZ's Africa policy. The BMZ's Africa 
policy is embedded in the strategies 'G20 Compact with Africa', 'Africa and Europe' and the 'Marshall Plan 
with Africa'. Funds pursue two key objectives of the Africa strategy: the use of ODA funds to mobilise private 
investment (strategy for Africa and Europe), and the improvement of macroeconomic, business and financial 
frameworks in order to boost private investment (D522; 523; D515; D512; D019; D403; D430). 
The objectives of the structured funds are largely consistent with the objectives of the BMZ's sector 
strategy for 'financial systems development'. However, there is relatively little exchange between the 
bilateral portfolio or country division working on private sector and financial systems development, and 
the structured funds. Both the evaluated structured funds and the sector strategy aim to support partner 
countries in developing inclusive and stable financial systems. This does not mean simply promoting specific 
target groups through lending; it means strengthening the financial system in the partner country as a whole 
(D537). Through local FIs, structured funds indirectly extend loans to specific sub-borrowers such as 
microentrepreneurs or entrepreneurs, thus providing them with access to finance. At the same time, by using 
and strengthening local FIs such as MFIs, banks and leasing companies they also strengthen the financial 
 
 
30  https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs 
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system of the partner country concerned. Furthermore, the funds also support the capacity development of 
sub-borrowers, FIs and the financial system as a whole, for instance through dialogue forums with banking 
and business associations. 
Currently, however, there is relatively little exchange between the activities of the structured funds and 
the bilateral portfolio or the country division in private sector and financial systems development. 
Examples of bilateral programmes in the case study countries with which there is little or no exchange at all 
include the start-up financing programmes in Serbia (start-up initiative) and the SEDIN programme in Nigeria, 
which provides SME training and promotes microenterprises. Close exchange, particularly with larger funds 
that generate systemic results in individual countries, would enable the BMZ to manage financial sector 
development more strategically and to create synergies. 
The sector strategy 'financial systems development' identifies MSMEs and small farmers in particular as 
(indirect) target groups, as they often lack access to credit. However, structured funds are of only limited 
suitability for serving small farmers. Structured funds are geared entirely to MSMEs as sub-borrowers, 
whereas only one of the ten evaluated funds targets smallholders (D537; D019; D065; D122; D212; D259; 
D290; D335; D403; D430; D496). Structured funds are of only very limited suitability for financing this target 
group. This is due to the fact that in Africa there are only few MFIs or banks that offer agricultural finance – 
and those that do, issue large-scale loans to agricultural corporations. Furthermore, loans of the size required 
by farmers are usually not financially viable for funds, and should be delivered through other financing 
approaches (Dalberg, 2018). 
Scope for adjustment once a fund is set up 
When structured funds are designed and set up there is flexibility regarding the envisaged target groups, 
sectors and regions. Once they are established, however, strategic adjustments are a very complicated 
matter. This is due to the way the funds are structured. Adjustments to the investment strategies require 
approval by the shareholders' meeting as well as amendment of the issue document. This complex process 
protects the fund's strategy that was defined when the fund was set up against particular interests of the 
various investors in the fund. Discussing and defining the strategy when setting up the fund, as described in 
Section 4.2.1, therefore takes on even greater importance with regard to the development orientation (issue 
document). In this respect the limited flexibility of structured funds makes them less suitable for responding 
quickly to acute liquidity problems and acute crises outside of their defined area of operation. 
Nonetheless there are opportunities for (strategic) adjustment of funds in their business operations. This 
is made possible first of all by the funds' leeway for responding to market developments provided for in their 
issue documents. This leeway exists for instance with regard to the possible credit volume as well as the 
volume of current assets and investment loans (all issue documents of the nine funds). Secondly, major 
changes of direction can be agreed by vote at the shareholders' meeting. Examples from the ten evaluated 
funds include 
• thematic adjustments, such as supplementing biodiversity with adaptation to climate change and 
emission reduction (EBF) or the addition of renewable energy to energy efficiency (GGF) (D056; D234) 
• adjustments to the regional focus, such as broadening it to include the MENA region and the European 
Neighbourhood Region (D234) 
• adjustments to the fund structure, such as extending the maturity or modifying the elative sizes of the 
tranches (I055; I039; I040; I041)  
• adjustments to monitoring and reporting, usually with regard to reporting indicators (D019, D068) 
• in one case the complete dissolution of the fund (I035). 
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The introduction of country windows makes funds less flexible and adversely affects their risk 
diversification (I003; I123; I030; I031) (see Section 4.1.3). As well as FCR resources, the structured funds also 
include bilateral resources and resources from special initiatives. Budgetary regulations stipulate that these 
resources must be used for their designated purpose. For example, country allocations must be used for the 
country concerned. Furthermore, additional C shares have been introduced for specific countries and regions 
(I028; I030) within the funds. This means that the profit/loss distribution must be adjusted. The BMZ and the 
KfW are currently discussing whether and to what extent the structuring on the liabilities side is necessary or 
might be amended in the future. 
4.2.3 Decision-making within the funds and distribution of tasks  
Decision-making on fund business by official bodies, and their roles 
In operational decision-making for the funds an important role is played by the members of the official 
bodies, in particular the fund's Board of Directors and the Investment Committee. The Technical Assistance 
Facility Committee also decides on the use of additional funds for TA. These bodies ensure compliance with 
a fund's strategy, including its development objectives, for instance by deciding on which FIs to select for 
support. The Board of Directors is responsible for all general affairs of the fund. In two funds this body is 
supplemented by a Supervisory Board. On the basis of the investment proposals put forward by the fund 
manager the Investment Committee decides either for or against investment in particular FIs, or in some 
cases for or against direct investment. These decisions are taken within the framework set out in the 
investment guidelines. Some funds require a minimum number of committee members to be provided or 
proposed by the official institutions involved (in some cases at least 50 per cent, and in others at least 75 per 
cent). The Technical Assistance Facility Committee decides which interventions will be provided to which 
partner institutions in order to help achieve the fund's objectives. This Committee coordinates its actions 
with those of the Board of Directors, but is independent of the latter (D400; D429; D272; I029). 
Key decisions are taken at the Meeting of Shareholders, where all investors are represented and enjoy 
voting rights on a basis commensurate with their shareholdings. The Meeting of Shareholders votes on 
fundamental matters concerning the fund such as amendments to the articles of association or the issue 
document, and concerning the annual financial statements. These meetings usually take place by telephone, 
and opportunities for investors to dialogue tend to be limited (D019; D065; D122; D212; D259; D335; D403; 
D430; D496, D016; D075; D136; D228; D272; D352; D400; D429; D489). 
One fund has also appointed a compliance advisor, who ensures that the fund complies with 
environmental and social standards in the course of its business. This compliance advisor is tasked to audit 
FIs and ascertain whether and to what extent they observe internationally recognised standards of 
responsible finance (ESG standards) and comply with these in their onward lending to sub-borrowers. These 
audits thus focus specifically on the development impact of the funds and the risks (D013; D019; I002; I026; 
I059). A compliance advisor of this kind is an exception, and only a single fund has one. 
The Board of Directors, the Investment Committee and the Technical Assistance Facility Committee are 
comprised among others of representatives proposed by the KfW Development Bank and elected by the 
Meeting of Shareholders, as well as KfW Development Bank employees or external experts. The members 
of these bodies are personally mandated to perform important roles in the fund bodies regarding the 
governance, decision-making and supervision of the funds. Decision-making on the development orientation 
of the funds is therefore highly dependent on the individuals who are active within the fund bodies (D364; 
D013; D434; D056). In one large fund a BMZ employee has a seat on the Board of Directors; there are no BMZ 
employees with personal mandates within the other bodies.  
There are three main points at which the BMZ is able to exercise political management: when the fund is 
being set up, when financial resources are being increased, and when comments are made in reports. The 
BMZ decides on financial increases or replenishments of the junior tranches in two cases in particular: when 
there are plans to expand the fund's activities, or when the fund has incurred losses that are to be offset by 
replenishing the junior tranche (see Section 4.1.2) (D019; D065; D122; D212; D259; D335; D403; D430; D496). 
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Furthermore, the KfW Development Bank sends an annual report to the BMZ containing information on the 
achievement of the agreed indicators. The BMZ is also able to exercise control through its comments and 
queries on these reports (I001; I003; I006). Within the BMZ the funds are usually the responsibility of the 
country divisions. As a result, the focus tends to be on the activity and effects of a fund in a particular country, 
while the regional focus of the funds tends to be neglected. This makes political management more difficult. 
In other cases the funds are managed by lead or sector divisions, which are better able to respond to the 
regional focus of the funds. In many divisions the capacities for dealing with this financing approach – which 
is very different from bilateral FC – are not sufficiently well developed. This is a further factor which makes 
strategic management of this financing approach more difficult (I002; I003; I122). 
Through dialogue with the KfW Development Bank during project implementation, the BMZ is also able to 
influence how the KfW Development Bank performs its role as a shareholder in the funds. The bank's large 
shareholdings in the funds, and the extensive voting rights which this entails, enable it to influence strategic 
decisions. Depending on the size of their investment investors have different voting rights (one vote per 
share), and in almost all funds the KfW Development Bank – on the BMZ's behalf – is the largest shareholder. 
Some funds ensure that the mezzanine tranche holds a simple majority of the voting rights (D075; D272; 
D429). 
Influencing decision-making on fund business through reporting 
The agreed indicators for reporting relate to the FIs as the direct target group of the structured funds. The 
funds thus report among other things on  
• the amount of additional capital mobilised 
• disbursement of the invested capital to partner financial institutions and/or enterprises 
• disbursement of the capital by the FIs to the sub-borrowers 
• the credit default rate  
• the nominal amount of the funds 
• the number of loans in local currency 
• the number of countries where investments were made (D019; D065; D122; D212; D259; D335; D403; 
D430; D496). 
Since the structured funds also promote local FIs in order to stabilise and strengthen the financial sector, as 
described in Section 4.2.1, the aforementioned indicators for reporting reflect this objective. 
Only one fund has an indicator specifying which type of FI should be supported. For the MIFA an indicator 
was agreed that defines a minimum proportion of institutionally less mature FIs (tier 2 and tier 3 FIs) that the 
fund should support. This minimum percentage is monitored through reporting on the indicator.  
Furthermore, indicators were occasionally defined at FI level to monitor which groups within the FI 
portfolio were the recipients of sub-lending (inter alia, to determine whether the FIs' micro/MSME 
portfolio was enlarged). The MEF, for instance, indicates how many female borrowers in the FI portfolio 
should be reached. Indicators of this kind were not agreed in other funds, however. This means that reporting 
does not sufficiently monitor which sub-borrowers are given access to financing through lending by the FIs, 
or whether for instance the micro/MSME portfolio or the percentage of female sub-borrowers in the FI 
portfolio was increased. On the whole, therefore, too little weight is attached to measuring how effectively 
the defined sub-borrowers of the funds are being reached, hence the BMZ lacks the foundation for effective 
political management. 
Some indicators provide information on how the funds affect the sub-borrowers. Indicators for instance 
involve measuring the area of sustainably managed land (EBF), energy savings (GGF), the safeguarding and 
creation of jobs (SANAD) or the enhancement and boosting of agricultural production (AATIF) (D019; D065; 
D122; D212; D259; D335; D403; D430; D496). However, this is the case for at most one out of usually six 
indicators per fund.  
Reporting on how the funds affect the sub-borrowers largely relates to output parameters, however. Most 
of the data is collected through the FIs, and operational and financial information is monitored monthly (I024; 
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D301; D065), while more detailed information on social performance and on the portfolio is reported at 
quarterly or six-monthly intervals (D301; D136; D231; I052). For example, information is reported on total 
investment, volume of lending, number of loans and borrowers, type of loan and default rate (D403; D011; 
I124; D301; D284). Reporting on the funds' sub-borrowers is confined largely to output parameters such as 
the number of sub-borrowers reached. With one fund, for example, this figure is calculated as the sum of 
each investment by the fund in each FI, divided by the average loan balance of the FIs per borrower (D414). 
The percentage of women and the rural population among the borrowers is also often ascertained (D011; 
I124; D301).  
As well as the quarterly reports, most of the evaluated funds also issue annual impact reports (e.g. GGF, 
EBF, EFSE and MIFA) that cover the effects of their activities in more detail. The GGF and EBF, for instance, 
report on CO2 savings and energy production from renewables, or CO2 storage in (agro-)forestry and on 
water savings. In the MSME-focused funds such as the EFSE and MIFA, figures are estimated for the numbers 
of jobs protected (EBF, 2018; EFSE, 2018; GGF, 2018). Other development effects and the contribution made 
to them by the funds are not measured, as this can usually only be achieved through time-consuming and 
costly evaluations (I010; I052).  
Division of tasks within the funds 
The strategy and objectives of each fund defined at the outset are ensured through clear roles and tasks 
of the stakeholders and in the funds' official bodies. This encompasses the division of tasks between 
investors in the fund, fund managers and fund bodies, as well as the composition of the bodies and the 
division of tasks within them. 
In the funds' business operations the BMZ is represented by the KfW Development Bank as the responsible 
implementing organisation (trustee). When funds are established the BMZ – through the KfW Development 
Bank – plays a key role in shaping the fund's strategic orientation, as described in Section 4.2.1. Thereafter 
the KfW Development Bank takers charge of day-to-day business, and the BMZ can influence how the KfW 
Development Bank performs its role as a shareholder through regular information sharing (see Section 4.2.4). 
The KfW Development Bank wields major influence at shareholder level. It and other investors propose their 
representatives for positions in all fund bodies. These appointments are finally approved by the Meeting of 
Shareholders, and the appointees are personally mandated to perform leadership, managerial and 
supervisory roles (see Section 4.2.4 on management). The KfW Development Bank participates in the funds 
first of all as a trustee on behalf of the BMZ. Secondly it invests its own funds, usually in the mezzanine 
tranches of the funds (D019; D065; D122; D212; D259; D335; D403; D430; D496, websites of the funds (see 
Annex 9.9)). There is usually little exchange between the other investors. This is coordinated by the fund 
managers (I007; I009).  
The responsibilities of each of the bodies are clearly defined and demarcated. However, conflicts of 
interest arise when individuals are appointed as director of more than one of these bodies. These are dealt 
with using the rules described below. The official bodies of the fund comprise the Meeting of Shareholders, 
the Board of Directors, the Investment Committee and the Technical Assistance Facility Committee. As 
described in Section 4.2.4, each body has clear responsibilities. Conflicts of interest may arise where  
• in some cases, the same individuals are appointed to the boards of directors of several funds or the 
investment committees of several funds (D193; D234; D254; D364; D408; D510; websites of the funds) 
• in some cases, the same individuals are appointed to the Board of Directors (or the Investment 
Committee as a subcommittee of the Board of Directors) and the Technical Assistance Facility Committee 
within a fund (D193; D413; D025; D254; D076) 
• in a small number of cases, the same individuals serve on the boards of directors of the funds and of the 
FIs financed by them (D250; D089) 
• in some cases, the fund managers are represented on the boards of directors of the funds (D364; D408; 
websites of the funds). 
The rules for dealing with conflicts of interests are set out for each fund in its issue document and conflict of 
interest policy.  
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With all funds, if a conflict of interests arises the Board of Directors is notified. The Board is then required 
to decide on an appropriate solution that is in the interest of the fund and its investors. A conflict of 
interests is described in the issue documents as an 'interest conflicting with the interest of the fund'. 
Accordingly, what constitutes a conflict of interests can be interpreted very differently (D016; D075; D136; 
D228; D272; D352; D400; D429; D489). The exception to this is two funds in which a Supervisory Board 
decides on conflicts of interest instead of the Board of Directors. The Supervisory Board also ensures that the 
members/directors concerned do not deliberate or vote on matters that relate to the object of the conflict 
of interests. Reports on all conflicts of interest are prepared every three, six and twelve months (D272; D352). 
If a conflict of interests exists with regard to particular directors that affects the work of the Board of 
Directors, in some funds the member in question is excluded from voting. This is detailed explicitly in the 
issue documents of three funds. Furthermore all conflicts of interest must be documented before the next 
vote (D228; D429; D489). In another fund the members concerned are excluded from the deliberations 
(D016). However, a few individuals are members of both the Board of Directors of the fund and the Board of 
Directors of an FI financed by the fund, which can lead to a conflict of interests in the selection of FIs to be 
supported. In such cases of significant risk there is therefore no standard rule to exclude the member in 
question from voting in cases where this affects the object of the conflict of interests. These cases for instance 
include votes by the Board of Directors on future support for the financed FI in question. 
If a conflict of interest exists for individual committee members that affects the work of the Investment 
Committee, the committee must be notified. In three funds this entails exclusion from voting. Three funds 
stipulate in their issue documents that a member must be excluded from voting as a result of a conflict of 
interests (D075; D136; D429). Two funds also require disclosure of any conflict of interests, although the 
member of the Investment Committee is entitled to participate in voting, for instance when the fund invests 
in areas in which a member of the Investment Committee has already invested (D228; D016). 
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4.2.4 Harmonisation of donor approaches  
The structure of the funds with various asset classes brings together official investors (D)FIs and private 
investors in a single financing approach. The different risk-return profiles offered by the individual asset 
classes enable the funds to serve the interests of different investors, and bring together official and private 
investors along with (D)FIs. Unlike credit lines, in which only one investor provides finance, the structured 
funds bring together between 6 and 21 different investors. Table 7 breaks down by type of investor the 
number of investors in each fund (I031; I030; I022; I043; I044; I050; I054; I055). 
Table 7 Number of investors per fund 
Funds  Official investors (D)FIs 
Africa Agriculture and Trade Investment Fund S.A., SICAV-
SIF (AATIF) 2 3 
Eco-Business Fund S.A., SICAV-SIF (EBF) 3 3 
European Fund for Southeast Europe S.A., SICAV-SIF (EFSE) 8 6 
Green for Growth Fund S.A., SICAV-SIF (GGF) 4 6 
Microfinance Enhancement Fund S.A., SICAV-SIF (MEF) 2 6 
Microfinance Initiative for Asia Debt Fund S.A., SICAV-SIF 
(MIFA)  2 2 
Regional Education Finance Fund for Africa S.A., SICAV-SIF 
(REFFA) 1 2 
Regional MSME Investment Fund for Sub-Saharan Africa 
S.A., SICAV-SIF (REGMIFA) 
5 8 
SANAD Fund for MSME S.A., SICAV-SIF (SANAD) 3 3 
Source: D013; D042; D089; D205; D250; D364; D382; D521; D510. 
In most cases several official donors and (D)FIs are actively involved in the funds. Alongside the BMZ as a 
founding member, another official donor involved in most funds is the European Commission. Several donor 
country development agencies also invest. These include the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 
(SECO) in three of the evaluated funds, and in one case a German federal state as well as some governments 
of the countries in which the fund invests. On the (D)FI side the KfW Development Bank is invested in all the 
funds. Also invested in many funds are the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), the Dutch Entrepreneurial Development Bank (FMO), the IFC, the Austrian 
Development Bank (OeEB) and the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) (D013; D042; D089; 
D205; D334; D364; D250; D382; D521; D510; I040; I041). 
The number of investors in a fund and their agreement with uniformly applicable investment guidelines is 
key to harmonisation. These guidelines are laid down by the founding members of the fund and must be 
accepted by all investing parties. They guidelines can only be amended through a resolution of the Board of 
Directors (and the Meeting of Shareholders), in order to protect the fund against the particular interests of 
individual investors (D015; D074; D137; D219; D278; D353; D402; D426; D490; D122). 
As well as approving standard investment guidelines, the funds also promote harmonisation by serving as 
a platform for stakeholder dialogue. For example, annual meetings take place in the countries where the 
funds invest, at which both investors and local FIs and other stakeholders meet to deliberate on specific 
issues relating to the fund (e.g. FinTec) (D120; D121; D122; D492; D493; D494; D495; D496; D335; D339; 
D338; D337; D336). SANAD for instance supports the annual meeting of the largest microfinance network in 
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the MENA region (Sanabel), which is attended by all investors in the region (D126; D127). The annual 
meetings hosted or supported by the funds are seen by some stakeholders as expert forums for private sector 
and financial sector development (e.g. the EFSE annual meetings in 2015, 2017 and 2019, the Sustainable 
Futures Forum and the GCF Clim@ Competition in 2018, and the Eco.business Conference in 2019) (D082; 
D083; D084; D085; D086; D087; D088; D089). 
There is some competition between the funds and (D)FIs not investing in them, which constrains the 
harmonisation of different forms of investment. Since both the funds and (D)FIs invest in similar FIs they 
compete for these institutions, particularly when the latter are attractive for economic or social reasons. 
With regard to sub-borrowers the funds and the (D)FIs do sometimes agree that the fund should serve micro 
and small enterprises when the direct clients of the (D)FIs invested in are medium-sized enterprises, in order 
to reduce competition (I022; I030; I126; I127; I046; I056; I057). 
4.2.5 Strengthening local actors 
The financing of FIs in the funds' partner countries strengthens regional actors.31 The special feature of 
structured funds is that they do not lend to end borrowers directly. They do so (usually) through FIs. Most of 
these FIs are local or regional banks and MFIs that are strengthened and supported in their formalisation 
processes. The latter is important particularly for less well-established MFIs. With banks and established 
MFIs, on the other hand, the aim is to strengthen portfolio development to benefit the target group. The 
MIFA, for instance, explicitly pursues the objective of supporting less formalised FIs, which often have less 
access to finance from other investors (D335). On the other hand, four of the nine evaluated funds support 
between 7 and 15 listed FIs; the fact that they are listed suggests that these intermediaries are already highly 
formalised (D538; D539; D540; D541; D542; D543; D544; D545; D546; D547; D548; D549; D550; D551; D552; 
D553; D554; D555; D556; D557; D558; D559; D560; D561; D562; D563; D564; D565; D566; D657; D568; D569; 
D570; D571; D572; D573; D574; D575; D576; D577; D578; D579). 
While structured funds support mainly local and regional FIs, some of the FIs are subsidiaries of 
international holding companies. Theirs numbers vary from fund to fund: In three of the nine funds there 
are ten or more. In the remaining six funds there are fewer than ten (see Figure 17) (D538; D539; D540; D541; 
D542; D543; D544; D545; D546; D547; D548; D549; D550; D551; D552; D553; D554; D555; D556; D557; D558; 
D559; D560; D561; D562; D563; D564; D565; D566; D657; D568; D569; D570; D571; D572; D573; D574; D575; 




31  The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) recently adopted the so-called Kampala Principles on Effective Private 
Sector Engagement in Development Co-operation. These comprise inclusive country ownership, results and targeted impact, inclusive partnership, 
transparency and accountability, and leave no one behind. They build on the basic principles of effective cooperation, and extend them in line with 
the SDGs. The focus on strengthening local actors in this section will also provide information on inclusive country ownership as one of the Kampala 
Principles. 
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Figure 17 Geographic reach of FIs (left) and proportion of them listed (right) 
  
Source: authors' own visualisation based on data from the funds' annual reports. 
In a few cases local actors are shareholders in the funds, which enables them to represent the interests of 
the partner country. For example, in two funds the governments of various countries supported by the fund 
are present as shareholders. At the shareholder meetings they are able to partially influence the orientation 
of the fund in accordance with their own development strategies (I046; D122; D212). In one fund the central 
bank of an investment country is represented (I046), and in another the partner banks from the fund's 
investment countries are represented (I035). These actors are thus able to articulate the interests of the local 
financial markets within the funds. However there is a risk of conflicts of interests, particularly where these 
actors for instance receive TA through the funds. 
Some large funds also have an Advisory Board comprised of local authorities and organisations, which is 
designed to link the fund with local interests. These advisory boards are comprised for instance of 
representatives of local authorities, business and banking associations, central banks, as well as ministries of 
finance, energy or the environment in the investment countries, and articulate their interests within the 
funds. Their recommendations are not binding, however, and the boards of directors take the final decisions 
both on implementation of the recommendations brought forward and on the existence and composition of 
the advisory boards (D429; D430; D212; D122; I046; I031). Such advisory boards exist chiefly in very large 
funds that are networked at sector level, as their activities generate additional costs for travel, overnight 
stays and conferences.  
Particularly the TA at sector level strengthens local actors. Some 41 per cent of all TA interventions are 
conducted at sector level, and each has an average budget of 65,000 US dollars. The SANAD and EFSE funds, 
for instance, are advising the central banks of the investment countries e.g. on rehabilitating a state-owned 
agricultural bank, on local currency financing and on developing a financial literacy campaign for SMEs that 
have previously had no access to official financial services (D509; D510; D089). These interventions also 
address the financial policy of the investment country and are in the funds' interests.  
TA also includes dialogue forums at which financial sector development issues are discussed together with 
local actors. Examples of this include the financing of the annual meeting of the Arab microfinance network 
Sanabel by the SANAD, the Economic Forum involving the EFSE and for instance the central banks of the 
Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Georgia, the annual meeting of the MIFA and the GGF Round Table with 
energy experts from six markets (I046; D089; I126; I127; I047; D205). A further aim is to build regional 
networks by supporting incubators for start-ups (I031). To further develop the sector or tap into new markets, 
feasibility studies and market research is performed for instance to identify mechanisms for avoiding 
deforestation risks associated with cattle rearing (D046).  
As well as strengthening FIs, three of the nine funds also invest directly in enterprises and projects. This 
includes for instance investment in agricultural enterprises designed to boost the development of integrated 
value chains in the agricultural sector, as well as investments in companies and projects in the fields of energy 
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Finally, the local presence of the fund managers ensures that the funds' business is aligned with local 
circumstances and that local actors are strengthened. One fund manager that manages four of the nine 
funds maintains a strong regional presence with 17 regional offices with experienced personnel that cover a 
large proportion of the funds' investment countries. Other fund managers have regional hubs – usually one 
office in each of the continents where the funds invest. It is more difficult to align business with local 
conditions through these hubs (websites of the funds; I046). 
4.3 Summary in relation to the DAC criteria 
The financial sustainability and development orientation of the structured funds can be summarised in 
relation to the selected DAC evaluation criteria32 as follows: 
Relevance: Given the high financing requirement for sustainable investment and MSMEs in developing 
countries, structured funds make an important contribution to development by creating reliable access to 
financing opportunities for FIs and sub-borrowers. Since some regions, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, suffer 
more than others from liquidity bottlenecks in the MSME sector, structured funds play an important role 
particularly in regions where markets are less formalised but where the financing requirement remains high. 
In view of the current Covid-19 pandemic, however, more regions and markets may be affected by liquidity 
bottlenecks in the MSME sector in the future. At the same time the waterfall structure of the funds is 
particularly well-suited to financing innovative sectors that have so far been poorly served by commercially 
oriented approaches, because it addresses different risk-return profiles. These include for instance 
renewable energy, education and nature conservation.  
Effectiveness: This financing approach provides the financed FIs with direct access to financing, thus covering 
– in the case of the MSME funds examined – the high requirement for MSME finance. By supporting the 
development of less formalised (M)FIs and providing FIs that are already formalised with reliable access to 
financing opportunities, structured funds have a stabilising effect on partner country financial systems. At 
the same time local actors such as banks, MFIs and leasing companies are strengthened through the 
intermediary structure.  
By selecting the FIs to be financed, the funds ensure that the envisaged sub-borrowers are reached. However, 
the latter has so far not been adequately monitored, primarily because reporting to the BMZ focuses more 
on the FIs and less on the sub-borrowers. Once a fund has been established, the BMZ's scope for political 
management is generally limited, as operational decision-making in line with the development objectives 
and the selection of the FIs is primarily the responsibility of the fund's bodies. 
Sustainability: The majority of funds break even within a few years of their establishment, and use the official 
capital on a revolving basis. In this respect the funds meet the criteria for financial sustainability defined by 
the evaluation. Some funds surpass these criteria by also distributing and compensating their risk efficiently. 
On the whole the majority of the funds represent a financing approach that can be used sustainably and for 
the most part works effectively. In one case the sustainability criteria were only partially met, as no revolving 
use of capital was evident. By ensuring their own financial sustainability, the funds can also generate 
sustainable development results.  
Efficiency: Structured funds operate more efficiently than other financing approaches chiefly when they issue 
a large proportion of their loans in small sizes and/or in local currency. This is particularly true with regard to 
MSME financing, as this sector is already being served by many other financing approaches with loans of over 
ten million US dollars. On the other hand, the waterfall structure is particularly well-suited to financing 
innovative and risky sectors (such as green investments and education) that have so far barely been served 
by commercial approaches. Apart from that, the costs incurred by the fund structure for fund management, 
 
 
32  The DAC criteria in relation to which each of the evaluation questions was to be addressed were defined in the evaluation design. This is why the 
criterion of 'impact' is not included at this point.  
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maintenance of the fund and payments to investors need to be weighed up against the objectives achieved 
by the funds.  
The waterfall structure is basically an efficient solution for serving different risk-return profiles of various 
types of investor. In some cases, however, the design of the waterfall structure to date displays partial 
efficiency losses. These result from the cost structure of the mezzanine tranche, and the country windows 
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Structured funds are designed to leverage additional private capital in order to achieve development 
objectives. This chapter looks at their success in achieving this objective. To transparently assess the leverage 
of structured funds it is first of all necessary to take a critical look at the different approaches to measuring 
mobilisation. The definitions of blended finance used by the OECD-DAC and the DFI Working Group differ in 
key respects, which also affect how the two bodies measure leverage effects. Section 5.1 presents the 
different approaches for measuring the mobilisation of private capital, and compares them in order to 
highlight the significance of the different approaches for interpreting metrics. Section 5.2 describes how 
much private capital structured funds leverage. It also discusses the factors that enable or constrain 
mobilisation. As well as official donors who leverage private capital with their own resources, (D)FIs also 
invest in structured funds. Their role in mobilisation is discussed in Section 5.3.  
5.1 Measuring the mobilisation of private capital 
German and international development cooperation set different priorities when determining how 
successfully private capital is mobilised. To close the financing gap for achieving the SDGs in developing 
countries, donors aim to use financing mechanisms that can mobilise private capital (DANIDA, 2016) To 
measure this mobilisation, different actors in German and international development cooperation use 
different metrics, and by doing so set different priorities. The OECD and the DFI Working Group are working 
to harmonise some of these different approaches (DFI Working Group, 2018; OECD, 2018a). This section will 
present and compare the different approaches for measuring the mobilisation of private capital for the 
financing approach of structured funds.  
A distinction is drawn between four approaches to measuring the mobilisation of private capital: 
Mobilisation of private capital as the  
a) absolute amount of private capital deployed  
b) total amount leveraged by official investment  
c) amounts leveraged by individual donors  
d) degree to which the risk buffer defined by the fund is used up.  
In these approaches, the mobilisation of private capital is measured either on the basis of the source of 
the capital (approaches a), b) and c)), and/or on the basis of the tranches in which the capital is invested 
(approaches c) and d)). In approach a) the private capital used to achieve the SDGs is measured in full 
(expressed in absolute figures) and not in relation to other investment (see approach a) in Figure 18). In 
approach b) the total official investment in the fund is measured in relation to all the private investment in 
the fund. In this approach the uniform categorisation of the capital as official or private investment is key to 
the assessment. Approach c) distinguishes between the various official donors (see measurement approach 
c) of the OECD-DAC in Figure 18). In this approach the amount of private capital mobilised is calculated for 
each individual donor. This metric takes into account both the amount of capital invested by the donors and 
the risk tranche of the investment. Thus the fictitious example in Figure 18 c) acknowledges that donor 1 has 
mobilised more capital than donor 2, as donor 1 invests in the riskier junior tranche. In approach d) the 
mobilisation of private capital is calculated according to how much private capital could be mobilised and 
how much actually is mobilised due to the structure of the fund. Why is the mobilisation of private capital 
controlled by the structure of the funds? The official capital and the capital of the (D)FIs function in the fund 
as a risk buffer for the invested private capital, by being invested in the junior (and in some cases mezzanine) 
tranches, which is subordinated to the senior tranche. This risk buffer is determined for each fund, and 
defines the minimum share of the total volume of the fund that must be accounted for by the subordinated 
tranches (see defined risk buffer in Figure 18 d). This definition of the risk buffer leads to a situation in which 
private capital cannot be mobilised endlessly in the fund, and in this respect limits the mobilisation of private 
capital. In approach d) the defined risk buffer (yellow box in Figure 18 d) is related to the risk buffer actually 
used up (red box in Figure 18 d). This shows the extent to which the risk buffer defined in the structured 
funds has actually already been exhausted.  
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Figure 18 Approaches to measuring the mobilisation of private capital in structured funds 
Source: authors' own visualisation of a fictitious example. 
The question of the attribution of mobilisation to different actors is also the subject of controversial debate 
in international development cooperation (Attridge and Engen, 2019). The DFI Working Group differentiates 
between direct and indirect mobilisation (DFI Working Group, 2018). In direct mobilisation, the private capital 
is attributed only to the lead multilateral development bank. No leverage is attributed to the multilateral 
development banks that provide co-financing but do not play an active role in mobilising private capital 
(indirect mobilisation). By contrast, in the OECD method the question of attributing leverage relates to the 
level of risk assumed by investors.  
The amount of private capital mobilised by the BMZ depends very much on whether the calculation 
involves the absolute figures for private capital, or whether it includes only the private capital attributed 
to BMZ investment using the OECD-DAC method. To highlight the importance of using different indicators, 
Figure 19 compares the absolute figures for private capital invested by the funds between 2012 and 2017 
(blue bar). The yellow bars represent the share of private capital in the funds that is attributed to BMZ 
investment. This is calculated using the OECD-DAC method (OECD, 2018b). According to this method, 50 per 
cent of the private capital mobilised is attributed to those donors that serve the riskiest junior tranche. The 
remaining 50 per cent is attributed to all other investors, regardless of which tranche they invest in.33 The 
advantage of this method is that it takes into account both the amount of official investment and the risk 
appetite of individual donors. A comparison of fund 1 with fund 3 clearly shows how the calculation method 
applied affects the figure obtained for private capital mobilisation. In fund 1 the BMZ is the only official donor 
involved in the highest risk tranche. 100 per cent of the private capital invested is therefore attributed to the 
BMZ. In fund 3, far more private capital was invested in absolute terms. However, since other official donors 
are involved in the fund only 20 per cent of the private capital mobilised is attributed to the BMZ. In other 
words, the more non-private investors that invest in the fund, the lower the figure obtained for mobilisation 
by the BMZ is when using the OECD-DAC method. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the fund is 
mobilising less private capital overall. 
33 The OECD-DAC method for tracking private capital mobilisation by Official Development Finance (ODF) is applied as follows: Capital mobilised by 
the BMZ = 1/#donors senior tranche*(private capital in the fund*50 per cent) + BMZ capital/total capital senior and mezzanine*(private capital*50 
per cent). The private capital is only attributed to the official investment over a period of five years.  
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Figure 19  Private capital and mobilised private capital 2012 – 2017 
Source: authors' own visualisation based on KfW data on mobilised private capital calculated using the OECD-DAC method. 
The fact that eight funds are shown is due to two reasons: in one fund no private investor had invested until 2017, while in another 
fund no data on private capital mobilisation are available. 
The figure given for mobilised capital in the funds' reports sometimes also includes both the private 
investments and the (D)FI investments (approach b)). In the funds' reports, leverage is often given as the 
ratio of German Federal Government capital to all other capital invested in the funds (D212; D263; D122). 
Presenting the data this way implies that as well as the private capital, the capital of the (D)FIs is also 
leveraged by the financing approach of structured funds and the risk buffer provided by the official 
investment. It is thus assumed here that the capital of the (D)FIs is additional investment, which is not in fact 
the case for all (D)FIs (see also Section 5.3). In a transparent analysis of leverage a distinction is drawn 
between the sources, i.e. between private investment and (D)FI investment. Figure 20 shows what share of 
the respective fund is accounted for by investment by the private sector, the (D)FIs, the official donors and 
the fund managers. Presenting the data in this way permits a differentiated analysis of leverage by the various 
funds.  
When assessing the amount of capital mobilised we also need to take into account the defined risk buffer. 
The funds are designed such that the various tranches address the risk appetite of the various types of 
investor (source of capital). Private investors usually invest in the tranches with the lowest risk, i.e. the senior 
tranches and/or notes. This means that when analysing mobilisation by structured funds, we can also include 
the share of the total volume of the fund accounted for by the individual private tranches. However, we also 
need to remember here that the risk buffer defined in the fund also determines the mobilisation limit of the 
private tranches – i.e., the minimum share of the total volume of the fund that must be accounted for by the 
tranches subordinated to the private tranches. The share usually corresponds to the sum of the mezzanine 
and junior tranches. Figure 21 in Section 5.2 shows the risk buffers defined and those actually used in each 
fund. The difference between the two indicates the extent to which the risk buffer defined in each fund has 
already been exhausted. If it has – and the size of the subordinated tranches remains the same – private 
investors can no longer make any investments in the 'private' tranche.  
The different measurement methods need to be taken into account when interpreting the amount of 
capital mobilised. The discussion above shows that the figure obtained for the capital mobilised by 
structured funds depends on the measurement method used. Therefore, the indicator(s) selected are crucial 
for correctly interpreting the amount of capital mobilised. The assessment of leverage by the structured 
funds is based on a method that relates the sources of capital in the funds to each other. As discussed in 

















Private capital in fund Private capital mobilised by BMZ
5. |  How successfully do structured funds leverage capital?    63
by the capital invested by official donors, (D)FIs and private investors. This analysis avoids any supposed 
underestimation of the mobilisation of private capital, as would probably result using the OECD-DAC method 
due to its inclusion of other donors. Furthermore, the method used in this evaluation distinguishes between 
the different sources of capital. This avoids any overestimation of the mobilisation of private capital, as would 
be probably result from a simple comparison between the official capital and the capital from other sources 
in a fund.  
5.2 Mobilisation of private capital by the structured funds 
By deploying budgetary resources to 'subsidise' the investment risk for private investors, the evaluated 
structured funds mobilised private capital of more than 700 million UD dollars up to 2018.34 To this end, 
roughly similar amounts of budgetary resources were invested in the funds up to 2018. Figure 20 shows 
the distribution of capital in the funds by source. Across all the evaluated funds, the share of capital 
accounted for by official donors is 36 per cent, the share for (D)FIs 40 per cent and the share for the private 
sector 22 per cent. By international comparison, the shares accounted for by official donors and private 
investors are thus below the average values (42 and 26 per cent respectively), while the share of (D)FI capital 
is above the average (31 percent ) for comparable approaches (Basile and Dutra, 2019).35  
The share of the total volume of the funds accounted for by private capital varies widely by region and 
sector. The average share accounted for by private capital excluding the capital of the fund managers is 19 
per cent, and varies between 2 and over 40 per cent from fund to fund. Since the funds operate in very 
different regions and sectors that entail different risk appetites for private investors, this variance is not 
surprising. The funds themselves barely formulate any specific objective for mobilising private capital. Only 
the Eco Business Fund has an indicator for such an objective. This indicator states that the capital invested 
by private investors must amount to at least 15 per cent.  
Some funds, however, do have indicators for leverage by BMZ investment. The target ratio of BMZ 
investment to investment from all other sources within the fund varies between 1:1 for funds in sub-Saharan 
Africa and 1:4 for funds in Southeast Europe. Across all ten funds, the average figure for leverage is 1:3.5 
(BMZ investment to investment from all other sources in the fund). To assess the mobilisation of private 
capital across the funds, despite the different orientations of the funds a point of reference is required. In 
the funds' reports on private capital mobilisation and from interviews, it emerged that across various funds 
a private share of over 20 per cent was considered high (I056; D212; D444; I026). By this measure, more than 
half the funds evaluated achieved a high degree of mobilisation. This benchmark is applied in this instance 
across all funds, and is not suitable for assessing the mobilisation of private capital by individual funds. For 
this purpose a benchmark should be applied that takes into account the region and sector in which the fund 
operates. For example, at the end of 2018 private capital accounted for less than ten per cent of the total 
volume of funds operating in sub-Saharan Africa. For private investors this remains one of the riskier regions, 
which makes it more difficult to mobilise private capital.  
34  This assessment of private capital mobilisation is based very largely on the figures for the 4th quarter of 2018. It includes all the funds, except for 
the MIDF, which is already being wound up. This fund had not mobilised any private capital prior to its liquidation. The assessment is based on the 
analysis of the amount of private capital in the fund, the types of investor from the private sector and the factors influencing the mobilisation of 
private capital.  
35  In 2018 the OECD conducted a survey of funds and facilities, to which 180 funds and facilities responded.  
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Figure 20 Source of investment as a percentage of fund volume 
Source: authors' own visualisation  
Note: Due to its special structure the SANAD Equity Fund is not included here. Nor is the liquidated fund included, hence the total 
number of funds is 9. 
In most funds the private tranches account for less than 30 per cent. Since the risk buffer is set very 
differently, the degree to which it is used up varies widely. Depending on the fund the private sector invests 
in senior tranches and/or notes, referred to here as private tranches. However it is not necessarily only the 
private sector that invests in these tranches. If private capital mobilisation is considered in terms of the 
percentage of the total volume of the funds accounted for by the private tranches, it emerges that in 11 out 
of 13 private tranches considered, the risk buffer provided through junior and mezzanine tranches is over 70 
per cent (see Figure 21). The risk buffer is exhausted in 2 of the 13 tranches considered. Here the difference 
between the risk buffer as defined and the risk buffer actually used is around ten percentage points. In these 
cases, therefore, it can be assumed that if the amount of capital in the subordinated (mezzanine and junior) 
tranches remains the same, it is no longer possible to mobilise further private capital. In most funds, however, 
the defined risk buffer is not yet used up and additional investment in the private tranches is possible (D412; 
I056; I041).  
Despite the willingness of some private investors to take on more risk, the defined risk buffer plays an 
important role in mobilising private capital. The majority of funds that mobilise a high degree of private 
capital36 have a defined risk buffer of over 60 per cent (QCA). The evidence from the qualitative interviews 
also shows that the risk buffer secured through the waterfall structure is important for mobilising private 
capital (D025; I043; D065; D124; I031; D118; I050; I017). Particularly in times of crisis, when private investors 
see their investment risk as higher, a sufficiently high risk buffer can absorb the predicted fluctuations in 
default rates and thus have a positive effect on investment decisions by private investors. On the other hand, 
some investors rate the existing risk buffer of the structured funds as high (I007; I040) and express an interest 
in investing in the mezzanine tranche. This shows that as well as the private investors that invest in the 
structured funds due to the high risk buffer, there are also investors with a higher risk appetite (I122; I050; 
D340; I040; I024; I048; I011). Adjusting the defined risk buffer in funds that enjoy a high level of confidence 
due to their good performance can enable private investors to obtain a higher return if they take on a higher 
level of risk, while at the same time smoothing the path for mobilising a greater amount of private capital 
(I047; I042; I009; I017; I028). Reducing the risk buffer would increase the share of private capital at the 
expense of the official capital and the capital of the (D)FIs. Since private investors – unlike official donors – 
receive dividend payments, their investments in the senior tranches are more expensive than investments 
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by official donors in the junior tranche, but less expensive than the investments (of the (D)FIs) in the 
mezzanine tranche.  
Figure 21 Defined and actually used risk buffer for the private tranches of the structured funds 
Source: authors' own visualisation, funds 4, 8 and 9 do not have a defined risk buffer. 
*Fund has different risk buffers in notes and senior tranche. 
SANAD Equity and SANAD Debt Sub-Funds are treated separately here.
Confidence in the funds promotes the successful mobilisation of private capital. Thanks to the participation 
by official donors, the funds gain a certain track record as well as a more differentiated and low-risk 
portfolio. Since the structured funds in most cases are not rated by a renowned rating agency, the confidence 
that inspires investment is created largely by their positive track record (I043) and the fact that they are 
domiciled in Luxembourg (I050). The majority of the funds with a relatively high proportion of private capital 
have more than two official donors in the junior tranche (QCA). Furthermore, confidence in the fund is also 
generated by a diversified and lower-risk portfolio (QCA). This is also reflected in the fact that private 
investors tend to invest in funds that operate in potentially lower-risk and more investment-friendly regions; 
in other words, in countries a) that have a good investment rating37, b) in which a business-friendly 
infrastructure exists38 or c) that have a well-developed financial market39 (QCA). One crucial factor for 
private investors here is that the reputational risk of their investments can be minimised (I058; I111; I016).  
The 31 investors in the structured funds represent a wide range of investor types. According to the funds' 
issue documents, well-informed professional institutional investors such as banks, reinsurers, social insurers, 
foundations and others with the same attributes such as family offices can invest in the funds40 (D296; D349; 
D231; D429). In other words, there are a wide range of private investors that could invest in the structured 
funds. Figure 22 shows the percentage shares of private investors in the ten evaluated structured funds. It 
shows that the 31 private investors represent 11 different investor types. These investors pursue different 
investment strategies and have different investment conditions. These conditions include the risk taken, the 
37  Data source: Moody's. A rating of Ba2 or higher is considered a good investment rating.  
38  The getting credit score of the Doing Business Index is used as a proxy for a business-friendly infrastructure. A country's infrastructure is considered 
business-friendly when it achieves a score of more than 45 out of 100.  
39  The World Bank's Entrepreneurs Survey is used to operationalise access to the financial market. When fewer than 30 per cent of respondents see 
access to the financial market as the main barrier to business, access to the financial market is considered good.  
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size of investment, the duration of the investments, the return expected and the focus of the investment. 
The characteristics of the structured funds with their waterfall structure, their sectoral and regional 
orientation, and their reporting, would appear to appeal primarily to commercial banks and asset managers 
(see Figure 22). However, the fact that only five commercial banks are involved suggests that the funds could 
acquire more investment from the banks.  
Figure 22  Private investors in structured funds 
Source: authors' own visualisation.  
Impact-oriented investors are only partially being reached. More and more private investors41 are taking 
environmental and social issues into account in their investment decisions (HSBC, 2019). According to the 
fund managers, the development orientation of the structured funds appeals to these impact-oriented 
investors (I050; I031; I009; D065; D496). So-called sustainability banks are usually among the first private 
actors to invest in the funds (I043). Currently two sustainability banks, one religious bank, four impact-
oriented asset managers and one non-governmental organisation have invested in the funds. This shows that 
the funds have not yet exhausted their full potential for acquiring investment from impact-oriented investors. 
Investors cite the lack of expertise and inadequate information on ecological and social issues as the greatest 
obstacle to impact-oriented investment (HSBC, 2019). The interviewees emphasised that in response to this 
interest on the part of investors, the funds should keep track of their development orientation and report 
transparently on the results achieved (I052; I043). To this end, various strategies are being pursued in the 
field of sustainable finance.  
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These include for instance the formulation of exclusion criteria, the application of principles, the use of 
certificates, information on target groups reached for instance among the FIs and sub-borrowers, and the 
measurement of impact among these target groups (Richter, 2018). These strategies to ensure transparent 
communication on sustainability issues differ significantly in terms of their focus and intensity. 
Ensuring impact orientation in the structured funds is based chiefly on the formulation of development 
objectives at the levels of the FIs and sub-borrowers. Reaching sub-borrowers and achieving impact at their 
level is only monitored through appropriate indicators in a few cases, however. Four funds report indicators 
at the level of the sub-borrowers, and two of these funds pursue sophisticated impact monitoring. This is 
based on evidence of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), the scientific community and a data survey conducted by the fund itself, and determines among other 
things the impact of the fund's investment on reducing CO2 emissions (D076). The methods used to measure 
impact are explained very transparently. The funds' effects on employment are estimated using an ex ante 
impact model based on project-specific inputs and regional elasticities (D118, D062). In addition, in three 
funds TA finances impact studies that report on impact in various countries. In eight of the ten funds the 
envisaged development impact at the level of sub-borrowers is not monitored by corresponding indicators. 
Although four funds do formulate target indicators at the level of sub-borrowers, in the case of two funds 
these indicators are limited to the number of sub-borrowers to be reached. They do not capture the 
dimension of impact.  
The absence of ratings, the complex waterfall structure and investment in local currency for private 
investors make it difficult to compare the structured funds with other investment options. Due to the 
development orientation of structured funds and their relatively high number of tranches, a standardised 
rating for the structured funds is not seen as conducive (I031; I057; I020). As a result not a single structured 
fund has a rating from a well-known international rating agency, despite the fact that for some investors this 
is a precondition for investment and that this prevents some potential investors from investing in the 
structured funds (I009; I057). Nevertheless, one European corporate group did rate individual tranches of 
the three funds EFSE, GGF and SANAD with respect to the actual investment decisions made by individual 
private investors. Without a rating, potential investors find it difficult to assess the risk-return structure. This 
is due to the waterfall structure and the relatively high number of different tranches in some cases (I043; 
I011), as well as to the fact that some investments are made in local currency (QCA). In some cases the funds 
invest in several currencies, the risk management of which is spread across various tranches (I050) and risk 
management instruments (see Section 4.1). Since the complexity of the structured funds makes it difficult to 
assess the investment, cross selling plays an important role here. Once an investor has understood the 
product of the funds, they often also invest in other similar products (I043; I050).  
5.3 The role of (D)FIs in mobilising private capital 
(D)FIs play an important role for the structured funds in terms of both the size of their investments and
the number of them that invest. Across all the funds, (D)FIs account for over 40 per cent of the total volume
of the funds. Between the individual funds, (D)FI capital accounts for between 25 and 62 per cent (see Figure
20). In one fund the combined capital of the (D)FIs and the official donors is so high that, given the limited
scope for investment in the target region of the fund, there is no need for additional private capital (I040;
I022; I002). The (D)FIs invest mainly in the mezzanine tranche, and in some cases also in the senior tranche 
of the same fund. A total of 12 (D)FIs invest in the structured funds. Figure 23 shows that seven (D)FIs invest
in more than two structured funds, while the five remaining ones invest in only one fund.
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Figure 23 Number of funds in which each (D)FI invests 
Source: authors' own visualisation based on information supplied by the fund managers. 
The (D)FI capital tends not to be leveraged by the official investments, but is important for mobilising 
private capital. In some cases the funds' reports present the resources provided by (D)FIs as leveraged capital 
(D212; D263; D122), which suggests that the (D)FIs would not have invested in the funds had it not been for 
the official donors. This interpretation is understandable for funds that operate in riskier sectors and regions. 
In MSME financing, however, many (D)FIs invest outside the fund in similar regions and in some cases also 
directly in the same FIs. Therefore, the investment of (D)FIs in the funds with a focus on MSME financing 
should usually not be considered additional in the sense of financial additionality. It is rather the case that 
the (D)FIs serve the mezzanine tranche, thus enlarging the risk buffer for private sector investment. 
Moreover, the (D)FIs possess a high level of expertise on the markets in which the funds invest. Their 
investment in the funds shows other investors that the (D)FIs have confidence in the structured funds (I011; 
D432; I030; D268 (Clark et al., 2018)). In this respect the investment made and the signal sent by the (D)FIs 
are an important instrument for leveraging private capital in structured funds, particularly when the funds 
are launched.  
5.4 Summary in relation to the DAC criteria 
Relevance: With their development orientation and risk buffer, structured funds are suitable for mobilising 
private capital to achieve the SDGs. More and more investors are taking social and ecological issues into 
account in their investment decision-making. The structured funds enable private investors to make such 
investments at low risk, as they are subsidised by official donors.  
Effectiveness: The structured funds usually succeed in mobilising private capital. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
however, a region that requires a high level of financing in order to achieve the SDGs (SDSN, 2019), this 
presents a challenge. This is also due to the fact that investment opportunities on market terms that also 
meet the criteria of financial sustainability and development orientation are limited in this region. In one 
fund the need for additional private finance is limited due to the extensive investment of official donors and 
(D)FIs.
Moreover, private investors associate investments in sub- Saharan Africa with possible (reputational) risks, 
due to the poorer governance structures there. When evaluating the structured funds, however, we should 
remember that the funds use official investment in the junior tranches and in the risk buffer which this 
provides to 'subsidise' the risk faced by private investors, thus encouraging them to make investments like 
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Efficiency: The potential to mobilise private capital that is inherent in the structured funds is not being used 
to the full. In the private tranches of two funds the defined risk buffer is virtually exhausted, which means 
that the funds' defined limit for mobilising private capital has been reached. At the same time a small number 
of private investors indicate that they would be willing to take on more risk. There are various reasons why 
mobilising private capital has so far been a challenge for other funds. First of all, due to the amount of official 
and (D)FI capital they already have, plus the limited investment opportunities they offer, some funds do not 
require further investment. Secondly, these funds for the most part lack a clear strategy for attracting private 
investors.  
Financial additionality: The private capital mobilised can largely be classified as additional. Through the 
structured funds, private investors are able to invest in regions, such as the Middle East/North Africa or sub-
Saharan Africa, that are less well covered by the purely private-sector microfinance funds which operate 
globally. However, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where MSMEs have too little access to finance and where 
the private capital would provide financial additionality to a particular degree, the mobilisation of private 
capital was rather low as of the end of 2018. Here we see the tension between financial sustainability and 
additionality. Private capital mobilisation, which is necessary in order to secure financial sustainability, is 
more successful with a lower-risk portfolio. However the structured funds, with their official donors in the 
junior tranche and the risk buffer provided, are designed to subsidise the risk for private investors and thus 
encourage them to invest in riskier areas. More successful in mobilising private capital are funds that operate 
in sectors and regions where the investment risk tends to be low, but where at the same time there is also 
more access to finance. Financial additionality can thus also be considered rather low. One reason for this 
assessment is that many (D)FIs and some private investors in the structured funds also invest directly in the 
financial institutions refinanced by the funds. There is no financial additionality for the capital of these 
investors.  
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The structured funds aim to provide sub-borrowers with easier access to financial products and services 
through FIs. This chapter will examine how successfully this is achieved. It will first of all look at how the 
funds select the countries and FIs. The funds can control the effect the finance has on sub-borrowers chiefly 
through their selection of FIs, for instance by refinancing FIs that lend largely to vulnerable groups. To reach 
the sub-borrowers targeted by the funds, the objectives of the funds and the FIs therefore need to coincide. 
Finally, the chapter analyses the effects of the finance and the TA on FIs and sub-borrowers. 
The effects on FIs and sub-borrowers were analysed using a contribution analysis based on the 
reconstructed ToC (see Figure 11). The key assumption of the ToC42 is that the supported FIs use the capital 
provided to align financial products more closely with the needs of the targeted sub-borrowers (output 
level)43 and/or to expand their business segment for these groups. In many cases the finance is accompanied 
by TA interventions. It is assumed that these will enable the sub-borrowers to meet the formal requirements 
for receiving financial products (also output level). The ToC assumes that these changes simplify access to 
financial products for the sub-borrowers (induced output) and that they will take up the financing offerings 
more often as a result. The assumption is that the income of borrowers will be increased and secured as a 
result, that enterprises will grow and that jobs will be created. It is also assumed that the simplified access to 
financial products will lead to a stronger demand, as a result of which the FIs will grow and/or new FIs will 
emerge (outcome level).  
The contribution analysis systematically examined whether the causal links within the ToC described above 
actually hold true. The links were analysed up to the level of the induced outputs (simplification of access to 
financial products). For each of these links, underlying assumptions and risks were formulated (see Table 9 
in Annex 9.1). The elements of the ToC and the assumption and risks were operationalised with indicators, 
which were subsequently verified using quantitative and qualitative evidence.44 
One key assumption of the ToC is that the anticipated development impact can only be achieved if the 
selection of countries, FIs and sub-borrowers is also based on their relevance for development and 
additionality. However, economic reasons mean that the selection is not based exclusively on development 
criteria. Instead, the selection needs to balance financial and development concerns.  
Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 therefore examine how these conflicting aims affect the selection of countries and 
FIs, and which aspects are prioritised when selections are made. Section 6.1.3 looks at which FIs benefit from 
the TA in addition to the finance, and how these TA interventions are aligned with the needs of the FIs. The 
second part of the chapter (6.2) focuses on how the capital provided by the funds affects the FIs (6.2.1) and 
the sub-borrowers (6.2.2). It analyses whether the aforementioned assumptions contained in the ToC are 
borne out by the evidence, and adjusts the ToC accordingly. Finally, this chapter summarises the findings in 
relation to the selected DAC criteria and the criterion of additionality (6.1.3). Apart from Section 6.1.1 on the 
selection of countries, the analyses look mainly at the funds which focus on MSME financing (see Section 
3.1). 
42  The assumptions in the contribution analysis are based on the reconstructed ToC, and are explained in Section 3.1 with reference to scientific 
literature. 
43  The terms used for the various levels refer to the ToC that was reconstructed for this evaluation (see Section 3.1). These differ from the levels used 
in the funds' results matrices. 
44  The findings of the contribution analysis are shown in Annex 9.2. 
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6.1 Reaching the targeted FIs and sub-borrowers 
6.1.1 Selection of countries in which the funds operate 
Which countries are selected for the funds is largely determined by the issue documents. As indicated in 
the description of the portfolio (Section 2.2), the evaluated funds operate in 78 countries worldwide. Three 
funds focus on sub-Saharan Africa, one each on the MENA region, Latin America and Asia, two on Southeast 
Europe, and one on Southeast Europe and Asia. One fund is not restricted to any particular region or regions. 
The issue documents stipulate the countries or regions in which the funds may invest. This specification of 
countries is based amongst other things on feasibility studies and needs analyses. There are also stipulations 
concerning risk diversification (see Section 4.1): To reduce the likelihood of major losses caused by negative 
developments in a country, the issue documents place a maximum limit on the percentage of the total 
investment volume that may be invested in a given country. This is usually 20 per cent, and in the case of one 
regional fund is 35 per cent. In some funds this diversification is restricted by country windows or prescribed 
minimum percentages in certain countries (see Sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.2). At the same time, however, the 
country windows and stipulations on minimum percentages do offer the opportunity to prescribe a stronger 
focus on countries that are particularly important for achieving development objectives. Moreover, the 
selection of countries depends on how many suitable FIs exist in the particular country. Depending on the 
region this can mean a major restriction on the selection of countries. 
The structured funds make 79 per cent of their investment in lower and upper middle-income countries.45 
The distribution of income groups varies widely between the funds, however (Figure 24). While funds 3 
and 4 operate mainly in upper middle-income countries, funds 1 and 8 focus chiefly on low and lower middle-
income countries. One reason for this is the different regional orientations of the funds. A comparison of the 
selected countries with other countries within a region shows that the probability of being selected as an 
investment country is lower for high-income countries (finding of the regression analysis46). Nonetheless, 
the funds do also invest in three such countries (Poland, Panama and Croatia).47  
Risk diversification also enables investment in LDCs48; these are not reached to the same extent as other 
countries, however. To reduce risk the funds endeavour to invest in as many and as many different countries 
as possible. For example, the funds offset the risk of investing in small, economically rather unstable countries 
by also investing in large, economically stable ones. This is also reflected in the fact that most of the funds 
invest in three or more different income groups (see Figure 24). Risk diversification also enables investment 
in LDCs, though only to a minor extent. The funds operate in only 19 of the 47 LDCs; four of the nine funds 
are not present in any LDC, and within a region and income group LDCs are selected less often than other 
countries (finding of the regression analysis). The low percentage of LDCs limits the potential development 
impact and additionality of the funds, as LDCs have less access to financing. The United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that the rate of growth in private investment in LDCs would 
need to be doubled in order to close the financing gap (UNCTAD, 2014).  
45  The World Bank income groups are defined more precisely in Table 14 in Annex 9.9.  
46  The regression analysis did not examine how many funds operate in a country or how much they invest there. It only looked at whether one or 
several funds operate in a country.  
47  Another MFI is domiciled in Hong Kong, though its business operations are in mainland China. 
48  LDCs are a group of 47 countries defined by the United Nations as especially needy. Three criteria are used to identify them: per capita Gross 
National Income, the Human Assets Index (HAI) and the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) (UN-OHRLLs, 2020). 
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At present, LDCs benefit from only six per cent of the private capital mobilised by development finance. Low-
income countries also have difficulty gaining access to finance: Studies show that they are unable to provide 
the finance needed to achieve the SDGs, and are dependent on funding from international development 
cooperation (IMF, 2019; SDSN, 2019). One possible reason for the lower levels of financing of LDCs and low-
income countries is that these countries are often characterised by high instability, which increases the 
probability of a default by an FI in the country concerned, and might therefore negatively affect a fund's 
financial sustainability. Moreover, investing more in financially weak regions might make it more difficult to 
mobilise private capital (see Section 5.2).  
Figure 24  Income status of countries by fund 
Source: authors' own visualisation based on the quarterly reports for Q4/2018 
The funds invest in regions with a relatively high investment risk. Most of the selected countries either have 
no investment rating (23 per cent) or a rating below Baa349 (58 per cent), which is considered speculative 
(Country Economy, 2020). The country ratings are a main criterion in the investment decisions taken by 
private investors – particularly for institutional investors, who are bound by strict requirements in this regard 
(see Section 5.2). For countries with poor ratings or none at all, it is safe to assume that without the risk 
buffer provided by structured funds, private investors would not invest directly in those countries. Within a 
region the investment ratings for the selected countries do not, however, differ systematically from those 
for other countries (finding of the regression analysis). Nor do business friendliness or corporate regulation50 
in the selected countries differ from those of other countries in the same region. This means that the financial 
additionality of the funds is achieved through their focus on risky regions, but not through a selection of 
countries within those regions with an above-average risk.  
49  Moody's investment ratings. BAA3 = lower medium grade borrowers that are currently operating successfully. 
50  Measured using the ease of doing business score. The ease of doing business score is a World Bank index published annually that rates business 
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Interpreting the findings 
The funds select mainly countries rated as risky, but only a few LDCs. The funds focus on regions that are in 
line with development objectives, and select countries that are typical of the respective region – which means 
mainly lower-middle or upper-middle income countries. Most of these countries are rated as risky 
(speculative). Since risky investment ratings discourage private-sector actors from investing in these 
countries directly, the additionality of the country selection should be considered high. Due to the sometimes 
higher levels of instability and uncertainty in LDCs, however, the funds invest only little in these countries, 
even though their developmental relevance and financial additionality is especially high. This is the case 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where 24 of the 31 low-income countries are located. Given the need for 
the funds to achieve financial sustainability, the financing approach does not appear suited to investment in 
LDCs on a large scale. However, the option of portfolio diversification does enable funds in a few cases to 
offset the relatively high investment risk in LDCs with investments in less risky countries. 
6.1.2 Selection of the FIs refinanced by the funds 
The analysis below examines which development and financial aspects play a role in the selection of FIs. 
The section begins by looking at the conditions for selecting the FIs. This encompasses the agreed reporting 
indicators and the criteria for deciding on investment proposals. The section then identifies which types of FI 
the funds actually invest in, and examines how these differ from other FIs. This analysis permits conclusions 
as to whether the selected FIs are relevant for achieving development objectives, and whether it is therefore 
likely that the FIs will offer more favourable terms and focus more strongly on the sub-borrower target 
groups.  
Conditions for selecting the FIs 
To ensure that investments contribute to development, the funds select FIs whose portfolios are aligned 
with the funds' objectives, and provide earmarked financing. Most of the funds define the sectors and target 
groups for which the loans may be used in the contracts with the FIs. In most cases this means that the loan 
product, for instance an MSME loan, and other conditions such as the maximum size of loans, are stipulated. 
Should the FI fail to comply with this or other contractually stipulated conditions (including anti-money 
laundering requirements), the fund managers can either withdraw their capital from the FI (I111; I059), take 
protective measures or impose sanctions such as demanding additional collateral (D228). However, the 
contractual agreement cannot ensure that the previous financing of the business segment by other investors 
is not substituted by the fund financing (I091). One fund stipulates, for example, that microenterprises must 
account for at least 50 per cent of the FI's portfolio. In practice, however, it is not possible to say which money 
of the FI – i.e. the money from the fund or money from another source of financing – is being used for this 
group (I091).  
Although the funds endeavour to strike a balance between development benefits at the level of sub-
borrowers, and the establishment or support of sustainable financial institutions, the indicators for 
reporting to the BMZ refer mainly to the FIs. Generally speaking the fund managers take into account both 
development-related and financial considerations when selecting the FIs (D496, D489; D414; I035; D025; 
I028). As a general rule, however, only financially viable institutions are supported (D134; D017; D264). The 
investment guidelines stipulate the conditions that FIs must meet in order to qualify for financing. The 
eligibility criteria include indicators on reaching sub-borrowers (eligible FIs must for instance demonstrate 
that their portfolio serves these sub-borrowers, or must have set a maximum loan size), indicators on the 
financial strength of the FIs (e.g. on their portfolio quality and risk management) and on ESG standards (D015; 
D074; D137; D219; D278; D353; D402; D426; D490). Most of these eligibility criteria are also reflected in the 
investment proposals of the fund managers.51 As well as describing the financial strength and analysing the 
51  The investment proposals are prepared by the fund managers following the due diligence audit of the FIs and submitted to the investment 
committee for assessment. 
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portfolios of the FIs (D370, D410), in some cases the investment proposals also describe the anticipated 
development effects of the investment (D478; D078, D010, D031). One criterion here for instance is which 
sub-borrowers will be reached by the FI. Sometimes the investment proposals also include a section on 
additionality, where for instance they describe how high the FI's need for international finance is (D410, 
D010). Since these assessments are not quantified, it is for the investment committee to decide how much 
they influence the investment decision. The reporting criteria that the BMZ uses for steering (see Section 
4.2.3) primarily include aspects of the FI's financial stability, such as the maximum default rate and/or the 
maximum share of non-performing loans (portfolio at risk  – PAR) (D019; D065; D122; D212; D259; D335; 
D403; D430; D496). For all the funds, only a few of the indicators reported to the BMZ aim directly to ensure 
effects on the sub-borrowers and/or the additionality of the funds; instead, they are confined mainly to 
indicators such as the number of sub-borrowers or the average maximum loan size of the FIs.52 The funds, 
on the other hand, require the FIs to supply additional information on the loans deployed, for instance on 
their distribution across urban and rural areas, demographic information on the end clients, and the purposes 
to which the loans were put.  
Only few funds ensure that they also reach FIs which have poorer access to financing and are therefore 
especially important for the objective of promoting sustainable institutions. Here too there is a certain 
conflict of objectives. On the one hand, selecting financially stable FIs helps to promote a stable financial 
system and ensure the sustainability of the funds. On the other hand, selecting financially weaker FIs is 
especially additional in development terms, as these FIs have fewer alternative financing options (D335). 
Only one fund stipulates that at least 30 per cent of financing must be provided to tier 2 or tier 3 MFIs,53 
which are institutionally less mature. Even with a 30 per cent share of financing, tier 2 and tier 3 MFIs are 
under-represented, considering that according to a study, in 2013 tier 2 and tier 3 MFIs together made up 93 
per cent of all MFIs (MicroRate, 2013). In two funds, financial incentives were also created for fund managers 
to invest in riskier FIs (e.g. tier 2 and tier 3) (I050; I030). In one fund there is a risk pot that accounts for some 
five per cent of the investment volume and invests in tier 3 institutions using small loans (200,000 – 300,000 
US dollars) (I020).  
All the funds rate and/or assess the ESG standards of the FIs; however, a few FIs with very poorly rated 
ESG standards are also financed. The ratings are based on up to 100 indicators that cover various dimensions 
such as working environment, financial inclusion and client protection (D419). The funds also check that the 
FIs do not contravene the exclusion criteria (exclusion list), for instance by financing weapons. The 
investment guidelines of most funds do not, however, set a minimum standard that must be met in order for 
FIs to qualify for financing. In some cases the fund managers themselves set a limit value for their ratings. FIs 
with a rating below this critical value are then only proposed for investment if the financing is tied to a TA 
intervention designed to improve environmental and social standards. In the absence of such standards, FIs 
with very poor environmental and social standards may also be selected. This is demonstrated by the 
example of one of the four commercial banks financed by the funds that were rated by Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI).54 While three of the banks received an average (BBB) to good (A) rating, one 
bank received a B rating, making it one of the worst nine per cent of all banks rated by MSCI (D581; 582; 583; 
584).  
52  Only the indicators for reporting to the BMZ are included here. The fund managers receive more information from the FIs (see Section 4.2.3). 
53  The tier system classifies MFIs into different groups depending on their institutional maturity. Tier 1 institutions: mature, financially stable and 
large MFIs that are highly transparent; tier 2: small or medium-sized, slightly less mature MFIs; tier 3: start-up MFIs or small NGOs that are not yet 
financially sustainable (MicroRate, 2013). 
54  MSCI awards ESG ratings based on performance in various areas such as corporate governance, privacy & data, security, financing environmental 
impact, human capital development, access to finance, financial system instability and financial product safety. 
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Characteristic features of the selected FIs 
The funds prioritise FIs with a high percentage of female borrowers. The evaluation team used regression 
analyses to compare the selected institutions with non-selected institutions in the same countries. Due to 
the data available (MIX Market), this analysis is confined to MFIs (microfinance banks and non-bank actors), 
which do, however, make up more than 50 per cent of all FIs selected by the funds.55 The analysis shows that 
the probability that an FI will receive financing from a fund rises with the percentage of women in its 
portfolio. This finding is consistent with the objective of many funds to prioritise support for women (e.g. 
D263). It also suggests a development orientation in the selection of FIs by the funds. A high percentage of 
women in the portfolio also has financial advantages for the funds, however, as a higher percentage of female 
borrowers correlates with a better portfolio quality (PAR90).  
Structured funds tend to select large FIs.56 The probability that an FI will be financed by the funds rises with 
the size (financial assets) of the FI. This finding suggests that investment decisions focus primarily on reducing 
the probability of default by FIs, in order to prevent losses and thus ensure that financing can be delivered 
sustainably. The analysis of the MFIs, however, also shows that the selected MFIs do not differ from the non-
selected MFIs with respect to portfolio quality or profitability.57 In other words, diversification means that 
riskier or less profitable MFIs are treated neither more nor less favourably in the selection process, even 
though they usually have few other financing options. 
Almost all selected FIs are also financed by other investors; many of them are among the FI market leaders. 
Only one of the 40 FIs that took part in the survey is not financed by any investor other than the structured 
fund in question. One reason for this might be that in many regions, MFIs are not allowed to accept deposits 
and therefore rely on various investments to refinance their lending business. Most of the financed FIs (75 
per cent) are also financed by at least two other types of investor in addition to the fund (see Figure 25) – 
very often (D)FIs, international financial institutions (IFIs) or commercial investors. The (D)FIs often finance 
the same FIs as the structured funds, even though they are often also investors in the funds (I059; I007; I011; 
D228; I091; I104). There is also a major overlap between the structured funds: 19 per cent of FIs are 
refinanced by two or even three of the funds (source: FIs per fund). One reason for the major overlap 
between the investments of the structured funds, private funds and (D)FIs is that many FIs are among the 
market leaders in the respective country (D025; D241; D463; I064; D081; D031; D370). All things considered, 
this shows that in the selection of FIs, the objective of financial sustainability is more of a prime concern than 
supporting riskier FIs with fewer financing options. The latter are supported by the funds only in a few cases 
as part of the diversification strategy (see next section). 
55  Commercial banks and leasing companies, which together account for 45 per cent of all FIs, are not included in the regression analysis. 
Furthermore, only around half of MFIs are available through MIX Market, though these do not differ significantly from MFIs that are not available 
(see Section 3.3). 
56  The finding that many of the factors examined do not have any significant effect on the probability of selection does not mean that these factors 
do not play a role in the selection process. The selected FIs do not, however, differ significantly in these respects from FIs that were not selected. 
57  The following indicators were compared, and were found not to differ significantly: Portfolio at Risk 30 (PAR30), Return on Assets, (ROA), Return
on Equity (ROE), Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), Debt-to-Equity Ratio (DER). 
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Figure 25 Percentage of FIs surveyed that are also financed by other types of investor as well as the 
structured funds 
Source: survey of FIs financed by the four funds selected for the causal analysis. 
Risk diversification enables high-additionality investments in risky, less mature FIs. However, these 
account for only a small proportion of all FIs, in order not to jeopardise the financial sustainability of the 
funds (for example, only 20 per cent have a PAR90 of over five per cent). The regression analyses described 
above, which showed for instance that larger FIs are more likely to be financed, only look at how the FIs 
selected differ on average from those not selected. They do not say anything about the variance or 
diversification of the portfolio. Yet portfolio diversification plays a major role, particularly as regards the 
tension between financial and development factors when selecting FIs. To maintain the junior tranche the 
funds must avoid high losses, which is only possible when investments in smaller or riskier FIs are offset by 
investments in larger or less risky FIs (I040). In all funds the investment proposals place checks on 
diversification by defining limits to the share of the total volume of the fund that an FI may account for 
(normally 10 to 15 per cent). The distribution of the FIs actually financed reflects this high level of 
diversification, particularly the portfolio quality of the FIs, which is a crucial determinant of the degree of risk 
of a fund's portfolio (see Figure 30 in Annex 9.5). The PAR over 90 days varies between 0 and 44 per cent, 
which means that some FIs have no interest or principal payments in arrears after 90 days, while others have 
44 per cent in arrears. However, three quarters of the FIs of all funds have a PAR90 of between 0 and 3.44 
per cent. This shows that by refinancing low-risk FIs, the funds are then able to finance a small number of FIs 
with a very high risk. The distribution of assets is also highly diversified (see Figure 31); they vary between 
25,000 and 2.38 billion US dollars. Two funds in particular also finance extremely large FIs. The high level of 
diversification also enables the financing of some FIs that operate mainly in rural areas or would like to 
expand in that direction (I124; I089; I064; D241), but do not have a track record (D432) or do not receive 
financing from other donors (D313, I104). 
Interpreting the findings 
The analysis of the conditions for selecting FIs, and the institutions actually selected, shows that in a first 
step, FIs are selected which already have a business segment – in this case MSME financing – for the 
targeted sub-borrowers. From these, mainly FIs with a high degree of financial stability are then selected 
in a second step. Selecting FIs involves a balancing act between the conflicting aims of financial sustainability 
and development impact. To ensure financial sustainability, mainly financially robust FIs are selected as this 
minimises the probability of payment defaults. Conversely, this means that the financing approach is suitable 
primarily for financing FIs that are already economically successful and therefore have easier access to 
financing. Investments with greater development benefits and additionality, such as investments in FIs that 
have riskier portfolios and fewer other financing options, are made possible by risk diversification, though 
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6.1.3 Technical assistance (TA) – selection of FIs, usefulness and financing 
In addition to capital, some FIs also receive support in the form of TA interventions. Which FIs are selected 
for this is crucially important for the effectiveness of these interventions. It is assumed that TA will only 
lead to a stronger focus of the FIs on the targeted sub-borrowers, such as MSMEs, when the FIs have a strong 
need for support in this area, i.e. when additionality is high and the FIs are highly relevant for development. 
This analysis therefore looks at the criteria by which the FIs are selected for the interventions, how the 
additionality of the interventions is to be assessed, how the FIs rate the usefulness of the TA and how 
sustainable the financing of the interventions is. 
FIs selected for TA often have deficits with regard to their environmental and social standards, their risk 
management or their ability to reach sub-borrowers. The selection of FIs thus also depends on the objective 
of the intervention (see Figure 10 for an overview of the interventions). In many cases interventions are 
carried out for FIs whose environmental and social standards are not yet very mature. The need in this area 
is often identified by fund managers during FI due diligence audits. Some funds make their financing 
dependent on the introduction of a social and environmental management system or a package of measures 
to manage social performance and client protection; others support the introduction or improvement of such 
systems through TA delivered concurrently with the financing (D025; D413, D195). In other cases, FIs are 
supported that have a risky portfolio and therefore also represent a high risk of default for the funds. For 
example, one fund supports especially tier 2 and tier 3 institutions58, i.e. less formalised FIs, with TA designed 
to increase the financial sustainability of their operations. Others use TA to compensate riskier investments, 
for instance in cattle farming (D045). One fund also provides TA to FIs that are already financially very 
successful, and in some cases are among the FIs with the best ratings in the region (D580). However, these 
interventions can be also relevant for financially strong FIs, if they do not yet have the necessary processes 
and systems in place to reach new sub-borrowers with particularly high financing requirements. 
The additionality of the TA is limited by the fact that the financial scope of the interventions is relatively 
small. FIs often also receive TA from other investors. The costs for such interventions are relatively low, 
averaging 65,000 euros each. For FIs with average assets of 225 million euros, this hardly seems sufficient to 
facilitate structural changes. Just as they receive financing from several investors, FIs also receive TA 
interventions from several investors. In the survey, 20 out of 25 FIs59 indicated that they receive additional 
TA from at least one other type of investor. This is delivered especially often by invested (D)FIs/IFIs (see 
Figure 26). It is nevertheless assumed that the interventions do provide additionality, as the relatively low 
level of funding for TA suggests that funding is required from several providers in order to bring about 
structural changes.  
58  Tier 1 institutions: mature, financially stable and large MFIs that are highly transparent; tier 2: small or medium-sized, slightly less mature MFIs; 
tier 3: start-up MFIs or small NGOs that are not yet financially sustainable (MicoRate, 2013). 
59  This refers only to surveyed FIs that also receive TA from the funds. 
6. |  How do the funds affect the FIs and sub-borrowers?    79
Figure 26  Percentage of surveyed FIs that also receive TA from other investors 
Source: survey – response to the question: 'From which other investors do you also receive technical assistance?' 
The usefulness of the TA is reflected in the needs-orientation of the interventions, the positive feedback 
from the FIs and the strong demand. In most cases the providers of the interventions apply similar methods 
for all FIs, but adapt implementation of the projects to the respective FI to ensure that the interventions are 
demand-driven (D412; I045). In most cases the TA requirement is identified either by the FI and the fund 
manager jointly (39 per cent), or by the FI alone (29 per cent) (finding of the survey).60 This indicates that FIs 
consider the intervention necessary, and therefore have an interest in its successful implementation. The 
usefulness of the TA is also confirmed by the positive feedback from the FIs, 99 per cent of which rate the TA 
as 'largely helpful' or 'very helpful' (finding of the survey). The strong demand for TA also indicates its 
usefulness: Many FIs point to the combination of capital and TA as a reason for selecting the fund as an 
investor, as borrowing conditions are otherwise based on standard market terms – in line with the funds' 
objective of not distorting the market (I048; I064; I020; I028). In some cases the continued disbursement of 
the loan is tied to successful implementation of the recommendations that the TA providers make to the FIs 
(D389, D025). The contribution made by the TA to the additionality of the structured funds as a financing 
approach is also corroborated by a World Bank evaluation of blended finance instruments (World Bank, 
2020).  
The TA is usually financed from donor grants, fund revenues and cost sharing by the FIs. In most funds the 
TA Facility is funded from grants provided by several donors (D389; D412; D217; D287). In most funds 
additional funding for the interventions comes from fund revenues, if the fund makes a profit. In these cases 
the maximum percentage of profits that can be spent on the facility (e.g. 6 per cent of profits or 0.2 per cent 
of the net asset value) is defined in the issue document. However, the Board of Directors decides annually 
on the actual amount disbursed (D136; D231; D296; D429; D075; D489; D400; D025). The third channel for 
funding the TA is cost sharing by the FIs, which on average contribute between 20 and 30 per cent of the 
project costs (D134), though depending on the size and financial strength of the FIs this can be between 5 
and 70 per cent (D134; D333; I024; D412). Not all funds use all three financing channels, which reduces the 
sustainability of the financing. One fund had to discontinue the TA, because the donor financing was not 
forthcoming and it was not possible to use fund revenues (I125).  
Cost sharing creates an incentive to implement the interventions, and ensures that the FIs actually require 
the support. Nonetheless, there are cases where the recommendations are not implemented due to a lack 
of will or capacity on the part of the FIs (D580). In one case, one or two FIs paid consultants out of their own 
pockets to improve their processes before the fund interventions were implemented (D580), which places a 
question mark against whether the funds need to share the costs in all cases.  
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The costs of implementation are sometimes reduced by synergy effects. In many cases synergies are created 
by using the same method or by replicating the same intervention in different FIs across sectors or countries 
(I045; D432). Costs are saved here for instance through the standardisation of processes by fund managers, 
e.g. for monitoring, or through group discounts for consulting firms implementing the interventions (D318).
Many funds also address the sector and country levels through TA. At the sector and country levels, projects 
are usually realised through programmes involving central banks, associations and incubators (to promote 
start-ups) (I045; D082; I031). These are designed to promote networks and knowledge building, as well as to 
further develop the local financial market (see Section 4.2.5). One example is the support of a central bank 
in Southeast Europe in the field of financial technology (D093), which was identified as an increasingly 
important topic for the financial market in the country concerned. At a workshop, good practices for handling 
guidelines, regulations and system development were discussed with the management of the central bank, 
and a plan of action was drawn up to create an enabling environment for promoting financial technology. 
However, cooperation with central banks can lead to conflicts of interests, as TA interventions often serve to 
regulate new products that refinanced FIs may introduce in the country concerned. This may give them a 
competitive advantage over other FIs. Furthermore, some central banks are also investors in the funds and 
therefore have an additional interest in creating regulatory conditions from which the invested FI will profit. 
Some funds address the sub-borrowers directly through TA. At the level of the sub-borrowers, some 
interventions serve to enhance the quality of FI portfolios, for instance by providing training for school 
principals in the management of schools. Other interventions aim to provide financial literacy for sub-
borrowers, for instance through radio broadcasts (I064). 
Interpreting the findings 
The analysis indicates that the TA is relevant for achieving development objectives. Although it is not 
unique to the funds, in many cases it is additional despite its small financial scope. The selected FIs often 
display deficits in their environmental and social standards or in some cases have a risky portfolio, which 
suggests that the FIs that are selected for the TA are relevant for achieving development objectives. The 
interventions themselves are also of developmental relevance, as they largely focus on enhancing access to 
sub-borrowers. The FIs see the TA as highly beneficial, express a strong need for the interventions and share 
the costs, which also indicates that the interventions provide additionality. At the same time, many FIs also 
receive TA from other investors. In other words, TA is not a unique characteristic of structured funds. The 
additionality of interventions may nevertheless be high, however, if they focus on areas that are not financed 
to a sufficient degree by other donors. 
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6.2 Effects of the financing and TA on the FIs and sub-borrowers 
This section will examine the effects of the financing and the TA on the FIs (Section 6.2.1) and on the sub-
borrowers (Section 6.2.2), for example through the portfolio and the responsible finance processes 
established by the FIs. As described in Chapter 3, the analysis is largely based on the four MSME funds 
selected for the causal analysis.  
6.2.1 Effects on the FIs 
Effects of local currency financing and the signalling effect 
The local currency financing offered by some structured funds enables the FIs to better manage the 
exchange rate risk. Local currency financing (see Section 4.1.1) is a bottleneck in MSME financing, as it is 
rarely provided by international donors despite the strong demand (D134; D284). At least a few structured 
funds provide local currency financing, and in doing so assume the exchange rate risk. At the same time this 
enables the FIs to better manage their risk, although the additional costs are usually passed on to them 
through higher borrowing costs. Furthermore, for some FIs structured funds were the first investor to offer 
fixed interest rates (D580) and thus protect the FIs against interest rate fluctuations.  
Financing by structured funds sends a signal to other investors. This signal can have an effect both at the 
level of individual FIs and at the level of the financial market. The 'prestige effect' associated with an 
investment by an international donor boosts the profile and the track record of FIs, making them attractive 
for other investors (D580; D105). This is also reinforced by the fact that structured funds ensure stable, long-
term financing (I046), and help diversify the financing structure D580; I009). This reduces the investment risk 
for other investors. If a country is in crisis, investment by a structured fund can create confidence in the 
market and encourage other investors to also invest in the market or the FI itself (I091; D264). In some cases 
the fund was the first commercial investor (D105).  
Effects on the volume of investment by the FIs 
The FIs financed by the structured funds have increased their volume of investment significantly since the 
inception of the funds. The evidence confirms that since the funds were launched, the financed FIs have 
grown significantly in terms of both their volume of investment and their overall size (Source: MIX Market61). 
However, the average growth of the selected FIs was not significantly higher than that of non-selected FIs in 
the same countries over the same period (Table 18 in Annex 9.9). This contrasts with the signal effect of the 
financing described above, for which there are various possible explanations.  
• The other FIs have access to financing, e.g. from IFIs or (D)FIs, that does not differ significantly from that
of the structured funds, and also sends a signal.
• The financing provided by the structured funds sends a signal to the microfinance sector of the country,
from which FIs not financed by the funds also benefit.
• The financed FIs would otherwise have obtained finance on similar terms, had they not received financing
from the funds.
• A combination of these factors will probably come into play, depending on the sector and region.
61  The analyses, which used MIX Market as their source, include only microfinance banks and non-bank actors. See Sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
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In many regions and sectors where the structured funds operate there remains a strong demand for 
financing, which means that additional financing is highly beneficial despite the presence of other sources. 
This applies particularly to sub-Saharan Africa (D370; I083, D521) and the LDCs (OECD/UNCDF, 2019). 
However, the funds also operate in countries where there is strong competition between financial 
institutions, at least in the field of MSME financing (I092; I096; I074; I067; I082; I064). This suggests that at 
least certain groups of sub-borrowers already had good access to financing before being financed by the fund 
(see Section 6.2.2), and that the added value of the additional financing is low.  
In other sectors such as education, environment and climate the funds have market-building effects. In 
these sectors the financing from the funds supports some established financial institutions in adopting new 
financial products for sub-borrowers that the fund in question is targeting (D396). The healthcare sector too, 
where the structured funds have not yet been active, has great potential. In the Convergence database 
(2019b), for instance, only three per cent of projects are in the healthcare sector; the role of blended finance 
in the healthcare sector is considered undersized (Convergence, 2019c). One example of a successful blended 
finance project in this sector is the guarantees provided by the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and other investors to facilitate market 
entry for medicines in low income countries (BSR, 2017). The additionality of the structured funds thus 
depends on the financing needs in the sector and the region.  
6.2.2 Effects on the sub-borrowers 
This section will look at which sub-borrowers are reached by the funds, and how the increased volume of 
investment and implementation of the TA affect which sub-borrowers are reached. The authors assume 
that the additional capital and the TA lead the FIs to strengthen their focus on the sub-borrowers targeted 
by the fund, for instance by adapting financial products more closely to the needs of these sub-borrowers 
and by employing processes to protect them.  
Reaching the sub-borrowers 
Four funds monitor the extent to which the selected FIs reach the sub-borrowers through indicators used 
in their reporting to the BMZ, though these indicators are only partially reflected in the investment 
proposals. In three cases indicators determine the average size of sub-loans (D430; D496; D259), which 
depending on the fund may amount to a maximum of 5,000, 10,000 or 15,000 US dollars. In two cases the 
number of individuals to be reached within the respective group of sub-borrowers is also defined (depending 
on the fund, e.g. small farmers or households) (D403; D019). However, these indicators are only partially 
described in the investment proposals. Compliance with the average loan size (up to 10,000 US dollars) is 
only considered in the investment proposals of one fund (D410). Further development criteria that relate to 
reaching sub-borrowers and are described in the investment proposals, are the ratio of MSME loans or 
educational loans to the portfolio as a whole (in both cases at least 50 per cent) (D370, D410). 
Each fund reaches the targeted sub-borrowers because the majority of financing it provides is earmarked. 
However, many of the sub-borrowers already had access to financial services prior to receiving the loan 
from the refinanced FI. The borrowers of the fund-financed FIs are mostly micro and small enterprises with 
fewer than ten employees. The sub-borrowers also include medium-size enterprises (D412; I109; I092; D217; 
D306; D124; D122). These enterprises operate mainly in the trade, agriculture and services sectors (D412; 
I129; D232; D340; I078; I070; I071; I108; D028). In five funds women account for between 50 and 80 per cent 
of the sub-borrowers (D403; D520; D412, I092; I124; I129; D312; I076; I082; I071; I108; D240). This is also 
corroborated by the regression analysis, which shows that FIs with a higher percentage of female sub-
borrowers are more likely to be selected (see Section 6.1.2) (source: MIX Market).62 As the sub-borrowers 
62  See Section 6.1.2. 
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usually take out follow-on loans with the same FI, and the FIs already served the MSME business segment 
before being financed by the funds63, the FIs only rarely reach individuals who previously did not have access 
to financial services (I096; I098; I099; I100; I074; I076; D282). This also results from the fact that the FIs offer 
their financial products on market terms (D310; I082, I071; I097; I100, I064). Many sub-borrowers also have 
loans with other FIs. However, a small number of FIs target sub-borrowers that are not served by other FIs 
(I104).  
Expanding the portfolios for the sub-borrowers targeted by the funds, and terms of the FIs 
There is no relative expansion of the business segments for the targeted sub-borrowers. With MFIs at least, 
this is because they already specialise in these target groups. Based on the survey data collected for the 
four funds in the MSME financing sector, the evaluation team analysed whether the business segments for 
the targeted sub-borrowers were expanded between the year prior to fund financing and 2019. The 
percentage of female sub-borrowers, SMEs, microenterprises, enterprises in the agricultural sector and sub-
borrowers without collateral64 in the FI portfolios did not change significantly, or even tended to fall over 
time (see Figure27). The FIs attribute this not to the financing or TA provided by the funds, but to external 
factors. However, since the overall volume of investment by FIs has increased (see Section 6.2.1), more sub-
borrowers are being reached in absolute terms even though the portfolio shares remain the same. One 
reason why the business segments for the sub-borrowers have not increased in relative terms might be that 
the financing provided by the funds often accounts for only a fraction of the total financing of the FIs, in one 
case for instance just 0.4 per cent (I071). Furthermore, in the case of MFIs the group in question – micro and 
small enterprises – already accounts for such a large share of the total portfolio (sometimes up to 100 per 
cent) that no further expansion is possible. In some cases, one or two large loans may also distort the relative 
proportions of business segments. 
Figure 27 Percentage shares of the portfolios by sub-borrower group 
Source: survey. 
63  As explained in Section 6.1.2, the existing business segment is often the criterion for selecting FIs. 
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In many cases the TA leads to financial products being aligned more closely with the needs of sub-
borrowers targeted by the structured funds. As discussed in Section 2.2, more than half the TA interventions 
at FI level promote access to sub-borrowers. These involve 
• support for the (further) development of financial products for various sectors such as agriculture (D028),
affordable housing (D313) or MSME financing (I062)
• support for the introduction of new products that are geared more closely to sub-borrowers, such as
loans for renovating buildings (I064), agricultural loans (I071), products for pensioners (I104) or leasing
products for MSMEs (D586)
• training for loan officers, for instance to improve the assessment of MSMEs' creditworthiness (I062)
• support for digitalisation measures, for instance to facilitate sub-borrowers' loan repayments (I092,
I062), particularly when they live in remote areas (D134, D025, I129)
• training for sub-borrowers, for instance in financial literacy, with modules on income and expenditure,
savings and deposits, and credit management (D306; D305; I062)
• support for the expansion of FIs into rural areas (I124; I089; I064; D241).
Here it should be noted that developments at the level of sub-borrowers are not attributable solely to the 
TA. 
Box 3 Example of an FI financed by the REFFA fund 
The FI is a non-bank actor that offers lending and deposit services for MSMEs in Ghana and plans to expand 
its business in the education sector. The TA intervention supports this objective through 
• research and analysis of the potential for financing education
• support for the development of financial and savings products
• testing of the products with sub-borrowers
• training of staff
• full product roll-out.
The intervention helps facilitate access to financing for education providers and meet the need for savings
products among learners and their families.
This is especially important because over the last few years many private schools have emerged in Ghana
that are also directly accessible for the middle class, which increases considerably the number of people in
the country who can access quality education.
Box 4 Example of an FI financed by the REGMIFA fund 
This FI is a commercial bank in Tanzania that focuses on the microfinance sector and offers financial services 
for MSMEs. The TA supports the bank in developing loans that are specially geared to the needs of the 
agricultural sector. This involves an automated credit scoring system to assess the creditworthiness of the 
sub-borrowers. The bank has also been advised on which branch offices would be best suited to piloting 
and implementing the score card. 
Like other FIs, the FIs financed by the funds offer their financial products on market terms; the reduction 
of interest rates since the funds began providing the financing is also a general trend. While the average 
monthly interest rate of the FIs has fallen significantly from 14.35 to 13.61 per cent since the fund financing 
began (finding of the survey), the FIs state that this is due to external factors. The quasi-experimental analysis 
(source: MIX Market) confirms this: Although the portfolio return of the refinanced FIs has fallen significantly 
since the funds were launched, it has not fallen any further than that of the control group of non-selected FIs 
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in the same countries.65 The falling interest rate thus reflects a general trend in those countries where the 
funds invest. The lending terms of the financed FIs are generally considered to be in line with the market, 
and do not differ from the terms of other FIs with regard to either loan size or interest (D310; I082, I071; 
I097; I100, I064). One possible reason for this is that the funds also lend to the FIs on market terms D501; 
D580; D134; D218; D025; I009). In the cases examined there is also no indication that the financial services 
to which the sub-borrowers previously had access were offered on less favourable terms. 
The average portfolio yield66 of the supported FIs in the field of MSME financing is between 24 and 38 per 
cent, depending on the fund. This portfolio yield is a proxy for interest rates that also includes other revenue 
generated by the loan portfolio such as penalties and fees, and therefore more accurately reflects the actual 
costs for the sub-borrowers. The portfolio yield is largely determined by the FIs' operating costs and financing 
costs, rather than by loan losses and profit (see Figure 32 in Annex 9.7).  
In some cases, refinancing the FIs in local currency leads to more favourable terms for the sub-borrowers. 
The fund managers of some funds monitor the currency in which the FIs lend to the sub-borrowers. In at 
least two cases the percentage is even higher than the percentage of local currency loans to the FIs (D310). 
However, there is also the converse case – in which the FIs extend loans in hard currency (euros or US dollars), 
even though they were refinanced by the fund in local currency (I105; D496). Some of the FIs that are 
refinanced accordingly also offer their clients loans in different currencies and leave the choice of currency 
to the sub-borrowers (I108). The sub-borrowers are sometimes tempted by the more favourable interest 
rates of the loans in US dollars, and underestimate the risk they then face from currency fluctuations. One 
general problem with credit lines and with structured funds is that financing in hard currency tempts the FIs 
to grant more hard-currency loans in order to lower their own risk (D105; D134; D310). Unlike credit lines, 
however, structured funds can support local currency financing. 
Processes to protect sub-borrowers 
This section will describe how the FIs ensure that sub-borrowers are protected, for instance by preventing 
over-indebtedness and aggressive sales tactics. Here too, the authors analyse first of all the conditions and 
then the measures taken. 
Microcredit in particular has repeatedly been criticised for leading sub-borrowers into over-indebtedness, 
which is partially confirmed by studies in Cambodia. The high level of over-indebtedness of some 
microborrowers came to light following the suicide of microfinance clients in India in 2010 (Mader, 2013). 
This prompted a debate on the practices of FIs and on microfinance in general. In 2019 the problem once 
again became the focus of public attention when the human rights organisation LICADHO published a study 
on the effects of microfinance in Cambodia. LICADHO surveyed 28 households that had suffered repeated or 
serious human rights violations in connection with a microloan, and found that 22 households had been 
forced to sell their land, while 26 households had to reduce the quantity or quality of their food (LICADHO, 
2019). A large-scale study involving more than 1,600 microborrowers in Cambodia found that around 56 per 
cent of the sub-borrowers were moderately indebted and up to nine per cent were heavily indebted.67 More 
than one-fifth of respondents indicated that in order to repay the loans they had to make sacrifices which 
they found unacceptable such as taking out new loans, selling their property or deferring medical treatment 
(D585). Over-indebtedness is made more likely above all by the taking out of several loans at the same time 
(Microfinance Opportunities, no date). 
65  The quasi-experimental analysis compares the year prior to inception of the fund with the last year for which data are available, provided that this 
is no more three years ago (2016 to 2018). These data are therefore less exact that the survey data, which compare the year prior to fund financing 
with 2019. 
66  Proxy for interest rate: financial revenue from loan portfolio/average gross loan portfolio 
67  The study uses various data sources to construct a metric for over-indebtedness that includes both subjective and objective dimensions.  
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When selecting the FIs the funds emphasise the importance of complying with the principles of responsible 
finance. However, the investment proposals do not monitor the implementation of these principles 
sufficiently. The Responsible Finance Forum, which was founded by among others the  BMZ and the IFC, 
defines responsible finance as the guiding principle for the way in which financial services are delivered in 
order to meet the challenge of promoting sustainable development (RFF, 2011). For the KfW Development 
Bank, responsible finance essentially comprises transparency of the terms of financing, fair marketing 
practices and careful analysis of the sub-borrowers' solvency (D396). Almost all funds emphasise the 
importance of responsible finance, which they prioritise when selecting FIs (D501; D414; D134; D218; D268; 
D296; D396). One key aspect of responsible finance is client protection, which is also mentioned in the 
investment guidelines (D015). Funds are supposed to select only FIs that take these aspects into account. 
However, the guidelines are very vague in this regard and do not, for instance, define what the respectful 
treatment of clients actually means. In the investment proposals examined too, only three of the nine funds 
state explicitly whether the FIs subscribe to the principles of client protection. Thus in most cases, the 
investment proposals do not provide the investment committee with the information on client protection by 
an FI that they would require in order to consider this aspect when making their investment decision.68  
So far only few FIs have been certified by the Smart Campaign. The Smart Campaign is a global campaign to 
protect microfinance clients which is supported by the KfW Development Bank, among others. It certifies FIs 
that have undertaken to abide by its principles69 and meet its standards. However, so far this is the case with 
just over 20 of the roughly 440 MFIs refinanced by the structured funds. A similar certification system for 
banks and leasing companies has only been in place since 2019.70  
The FIs looked at by the evaluation team have implemented processes to protect against over-
indebtedness, but are lagging behind on other client protection principles. Some FIs have put in place 
processes to protect sub-borrowers against over-indebtedness. These include for instance limiting the loan 
size to 40 per cent of revenue (D370), and/or ensuring that savings are in place and that over-indebtedness 
is prevented by close monitoring (I079, I129, I092, I080, I071). In the funds' target regions, verifying the 
existence of revenues and savings is a particular challenge, and is very difficult to carry out in practice. Some 
FIs also permit the extension of multiple loans to one client, despite the fact that this is one of the main risks 
for over-indebtedness (I074). Generally speaking, loan officers and clients enjoy a close and trustful 
relationship (I093; I099; I074). However, clients do express concern about sanctions in the event of late 
repayment, even though these sanctions do not come into force until very late (I066, I082). In a market 
economy with a functioning financial system, sanctions in the event of repayment delays are the norm. 
However, for vulnerable groups in the target regions they may represent an incomparably heavy burden. 
Furthermore, strong competition on the market means that loan officers sell loans aggressively and 
proactively, which increases the risk that sub-borrowers decide to take out a loan despite their low income.  
Box 5 Example of an FI financed by the MIFA fund 
The FI is a tier 3 microfinance organisation in Kyrgyzstan that was established in 2007. In 2016, the fund 
manager's standardised rating method revealed that the FI's social performance was below the average for 
all the financed FIs. As a result the FI received support from the TA Facility to improve its client protection. 
The interventions included staff training on how to prevent over-indebtedness, analyse client information 
and price products responsibly, as well as suggested improvements for conducting and analysing client 
surveys. In April 2019, the plan of action that ensued resulted in the FI being certified by the Smart 
Campaign. 
68  It is not possible to say how much dialogue and discussion of client protection processes takes place at investment committee meetings, and goes 
beyond information contained in the investment proposals. 
69  http://smartcampaign.org/. The seven principles of the Smart Campaign are: 1. appropriate product design and delivery; 2. prevention of over-
indebtedness; 3. transparency; 4. responsible pricing; 5. fair and respectful treatment of clients; 6. privacy of client data; 7. mechanisms for 
complaint resolution. 
70  The UNEP FI Responsible Banking Principles were adopted in September 2019. 
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Interpreting the findings 
The structured funds provide FIs with access to reliable finance, sometimes in local currency. This enables 
institutions to increase their investment volume and reach more sub-borrowers, including women and 
MSMEs. A further outcome, albeit in only a small number of cases, is improved access to financial products 
for sub-borrowers, for instance as a result of TA interventions. Since access was not made easier in most 
cases, only few clients are being reached that did not previously have access to formal financial services. 
When selecting FIs, the funds do generally comply with client protection principles such as the prevention of 
over-indebtedness. However, the monitoring of these principles should be improved – for instance through 
documentation and indicator-based reporting to the BMZ. There is also evidence that some FIs disregard 
client protection principles, for instance by allowing multiple simultaneous loans to a single client.  
6.3 Summary in relation to the DAC criteria 
Relevance: The investment risk of the countries in which the funds invest is largely considered risky, which 
suggests that these countries have relatively few financing options. However, most of them are middle-
income countries; low-income countries and LDCs receive only little investment. FIs are selected that already 
have a business segment – in this case MSME financing – for the targeted sub-borrowers, as well as 
possessing a high degree of financial stability and thus easier access to financing than riskier FIs. The option 
of portfolio diversification is used to finance a small number of riskier FIs. The FIs reach the sub-borrowers 
on which the funds focus. However, since the FIs offer their financial products on market terms, only few of 
those sub-borrowers did not previously have access to official financial products.  
The analysis shows that the TA is relevant for achieving development interventions, as there is strong demand 
for the interventions and the recipients confirm that the TA is beneficial and meets their needs. Particularly 
the interventions at sector level, which account for around 42 per cent of all interventions, are considered 
highly relevant.  
Efficiency: The development objectives of the structured funds are pursued efficiently through the financing 
of intermediaries. The advantage of this approach is that the objectives of promoting the sustainability of FIs 
and developing inclusive financial systems can be jointly addressed by promoting under-financed groups. 
Thanks to their local presence and market knowledge, the FIs are able to efficiently select and monitor the 
sub-borrowers and their loans. The efficiency of the intermediary structure is limited by the possible 
substitution effect of the fund financing. Although the financing provided by the funds is earmarked in most 
cases, this cannot prevent the fund's capital substituting the capital of other investors in the targeted 
business segments. Nor can it prevent the capital of other donors from being shifted to business segments 
that do not serve the funds' objectives.  
The TA is efficient because the FIs identify the needed interventions – either jointly with the fund managers 
or independently – and thereby ensure that they are demand-driven. Cost-sharing by the FIs also fosters the 
successful and sustainable implementation of the interventions and reduces the costs that the fund facility 
must meet. The implementation costs are also reduced by synergy effects, which are created by using the 
same methods or replicating the same interventions with different FIs. 
Impact: The structured funds increase the financial sustainability of financial institutions in developing 
countries and emerging economies by providing the FIs with reliable financing as well as expertise for TA. 
This enables FIs to diversify and professionalise their financing structure, and gain easier access to other 
financing opportunities.  
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As the FIs increase their investment volumes, they can reach more sub-borrowers from under-financed 
groups. This is achieved by selecting FIs for financing that already have a business segment – in this case 
MSME financing – for the targeted sub-borrowers.  
Apart from increasing the volume of the business segments, the financing by the structured funds leads only 
in few cases to easier access to financial products for the targeted sub-borrowers. This means there is no 
relative expansion of the business segments, as it is not possible to prevent other sources of financing being 
shifted into other business segments, and because many MFIs already focus on the target groups and are 
unable to make any proportionate increase. Nor do the terms offered by the FIs lead to easier access, as they 
are market-based in order to avoid any distortion of the market. In some cases, however, the TA interventions 
do lead to simplified access when they aim to promote the target-group-orientation of the FIs by enabling 
them to develop new demand-driven financial products and by conducting training for sub-borrowers.  
The findings of the contribution analysis to determine how the structured funds affect the FIs and sub-
borrowers are summarised in a revised ToC. Figure 28 shows the evidence-based causal pathways in relation 
to the FIs and sub-borrowers. 
Figure 28 Evidence-based causal pathways for the FIs and sub-borrowers 
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Development additionality: The structured funds achieve development additionality especially when they 
invest in regions, sectors, countries and FIs with a strong need for financing, and poor access to it. However, 
these investments may constrain the financial sustainability of the funds due to their higher risk. The funds 
respond to these conflicting objectives by first of all investing in regions with a strong need for financing, and 
in FIs that through their existing portfolio reach the sub-borrowers targeted by the funds. Secondly, of these 
FIs, mainly those that are already financially stable are financed. Despite the strong general demand for 
MSME financing, these FIs often already have access to direct financing through (D)FIs or in a few cases 
private investors. This to some extent limits the development additionality of the structured funds. Here the 
focus is on the financial sustainability of the funds rather than their development additionality. However, the 
high diversification of the funds' investment portfolios enables them to also invest in some less developed 
countries and riskier FIs.  
Development additionality is also achieved through local currency financing, which some structured funds 
provide. These funds then assume the exchange rate risk, which in the case of hard currency loans remains 
with the FI or the sub-borrowers. Despite the strong demand, international donors rarely offer local currency 
financing. 
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The structured funds financing approach aims to achieve three main development objectives:  
1)  to promote the development of stable and inclusive financial systems by financing FIs 
2)  to improve access to finance, especially for MSMEs, by enabling the supported FIs to grant a larger number 
of loans 
3)  to shape and expand the portfolio of FIs in favour of sub-borrowers with particularly high financing needs.  
To achieve these goals, structured funds should mobilise capital from private investors. 
Impact (achievement of development objectives)  
This evaluation of structured funds shows that the financing approach contributes to the goals of a stable 
financial system and greater access to financing. However, easier access to credit for sub-borrowers who 
previously had no access to finance was rare. In the field of MSME financing, structured funds contribute to 
the stability and financial sustainability of FIs, and thus of partner-country financial systems. They achieve 
this by providing long-term financing, partly in local currency. They facilitate access to capital for sub-
borrowers by increasing the volume of lending and providing TA. However, improvements in borrowing terms 
or easier access for groups that previously had no access to financing were rare. 
In a trade-off between financial sustainability and development impact, the funds focus on financial 
sustainability when it comes to reaching the target groups. The achievement of the funds' development 
objectives is influenced significantly by the selection of FIs to be supported. While the funds finance FIs that 
reach the targeted sub-borrowers, they prioritise those that are low risk. This focus on financial sustainability 
also affects the achievement of development objectives: Promoting predominantly financially stable FIs helps 
to build a stable financial system and improve access to financing. However, the third objective of increasing 
the FIs' orientation towards particularly vulnerable groups is made more difficult by the funds' focus on 
financial sustainability, as this would require the issue of riskier loans. 
Mobilisation 
As of 2018, the examined structured funds had mobilised a total of more the 700 million US dollars in 
private capital in order to achieve the development objectives. However, the amount of private capital 
mobilised in riskier sectors was lower. To mobilise that amount, the BMZ invested approximately the same 
figure in budgetary resources. The funds are thus a suitable financing approach for providing additional 
capital to achieve the above-mentioned objectives. However, less private capital is mobilised in regions and 
sectors where there is a higher investment risk, where the financing needs of MSMEs are often not met. 
Appropriateness of the approach for achieving development objectives 
The stronger focus on financial sustainability distinguishes structured funds from other development 
finance approaches. Structured funds are a market-oriented financing approach that delivers loans on 
standard market terms. This has clear advantages for attracting private investors. On the other hand, as long 
as the premise of market conformity needs to be met this approach is unlikely to elicit a willingness to finance 
target groups that are more risky, even if they are highly relevant for achieving development objectives. For 
example, as described above, as part of the risk diversification strategy structured funds promote only a small 
number of riskier countries and FIs, and allow only limited control at the level of the sub-borrowers. The 
approach should therefore be seen as complementary to other approaches and instruments. To finance LDCs, 
and for interventions whose impact at target group level needs to be managed directly, other instruments 
can be considered. The traditional choice is grants. For financing that is to be provided on concessional terms 
that do not reflect market conditions, FC uses instruments such as development loans. In these loans, the 
official resources are used to reduce the costs for borrowers by offering more favourable terms, while in 
structured funds they are used as a risk buffer for private investment. 
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The structured funds were established partly in response to the financial crisis in 2018, in an environment 
characterised by severe liquidity shortages and an urgent need for stable and inclusive financial systems. 
Between then and the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020, liquidity was available on the 
markets and microfinance institutions were already formalised in some of the regions examined in this 
evaluation. However, there is still a high demand for funding, especially in markets that tend to be less 
formalised. In many African countries in particular, there is still a very large financing gap for MSMEs that 
cannot be covered by purely private sector investment in the short to medium term. In addition to financing 
MSMEs, younger funds also address sectors such as education, the environment and climate change, and FIs 
are starting to include new financial products for these sectors in their portfolios as a result of the fund 
financing. In these sectors the financing approach can help to create markets.  
The coronavirus pandemic has already aggravated the existing undercapitalisation; as early as March 2020 
private investors withdrew 83 billion US dollars from developing and emerging countries. Even in 
previously liquid regions and markets, financing gaps arose within the first two months of the outbreak of 
the pandemic. This affects MSMEs in particular, as they often have fewer reserves than large companies. 
Taking into account the recommendations listed below, structured funds are in principle suitable for 
meeting both financial and development needs. The recommendations indicate how the funds should be 
designed in order to make better use of their potential, particularly regarding development objectives.  
Recommendations 
Based on the findings and conclusions outlined above, the following recommendations of this DEval 
evaluation are addressed to the BMZ and the KfW Development Bank as its implementing organisation. 
DEval acknowledges that decisions at the fund companies require the agreement of all shareholders and 
cannot be made by the BMZ and KfW Development Bank alone. In these cases, however, the BMZ and/or 
KfW Development Bank should work towards implementing the respective recommendation.  
The following recommendations do not always apply to each one of the 10 funds examined. This is the case 
for instance where a particular fund is already being implemented as proposed, or because the 
recommendation does not apply to the specific case of one of the 10 funds. Instead, the recommendations 
should be understood as guidelines for the general design of the financing approach, whether in the further 
development of existing funds or when setting up new funds. 
Financial sustainability 
The financial sustainability of the financing approach was assessed during the evaluation using a rating 
scale. This scale measures the financial sustainability of a fund through its ability to cover costs, its use of the 
official capital on a revolving basis and the efficiency of the risk-return structure (see Section 4.1 for a detailed 
description of the rating scale). When a fund is able to cover its costs and uses the official capital on a 
revolving basis, the evaluation team considers it to have achieved financial sustainability. Where an efficient 
risk-return structure is also in place, the evaluation team considers the financial sustainability requirement 
to have even been surpassed. 
The majority of the funds can now be considered to have achieved financial sustainability. The majority of 
the funds break even within a few years of their establishment, and use the official capital on a revolving 
basis. 
The size of a fund is a key precondition for it to become financially self-sustaining. This requires at least 
around 100 million US dollars. At the same time a fund needs to be able to diversify its risk adequately. If the 
diversification criteria are too restrictive with respect to potential investment countries, this can affect the 
development of a fund's business. This includes the use of additional C shares (junior tranche) for specific 
countries or regions. By providing for investment in selected countries, country windows restrict the scope 
for diversification on the assets side. The way the country windows have so far been designed on the liabilities 
side has meant that the yields and risk buffers for the junior tranches have had to be split, thus preventing 
an efficient distribution of risk. This not only causes additional costs, thus reducing the efficiency of the funds, 
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but also increases the complexity of the structure. This is why the financial sustainability requirement can be 
considered to have been surpassed in only a few cases. 
The structure of the funds enables them to issue small-scale loans and local currency loans, as well as to 
cooperate with private FIs. Most of the funds issue mainly small loans of less than 10 million US dollars. They 
also issue a few large loans in response to, among other things, the needs of large local FIs or project financing 
arrangements for renewable energy. Nearly all the funds offer local currency financing to a certain extent, 
though in many cases financing is provided in hard currency (US dollars, euros). Whether loans are issued in 
local or hard currency depends on the risk that the fund can bear and the needs of the financed FIs. For 
example, larger, more formalised FIs often have no need for local currency financing. At the same time, the 
findings of the evaluation indicate that the capacity of the funds to provide local currency financing should 
be strengthened (e.g. by introducing/increasing L shares).  
Recommendation 1  
The BMZ and the KfW Development Bank should ensure the additionality and efficient functioning of the 
funds and, once the funds have been established, their financial sustainability. 
Implementation guidance for recommendation 1 
Financial sustainability, additionality and efficient functioning can be ensured by setting up and managing 
a fund in such a way that it 
• has a sufficiently high financing volume in the long term 
• can invest in an appropriately large number of countries for diversification purposes 
• does not have country windows on the liabilities side of the junior tranche for efficiency gains  
• extends its loans in local currency according to the financial intermediaries' (FIs') needs and the risks 
involved 
• extends part of its loans in small ticket sizes to the FIs. 
In most cases the official capital is paid into the junior tranche of the funds with unlimited durations. With 
the exception of two funds, for this capital there exists neither an exit strategy that defines the timing and 
nature of the exit, nor fixed mechanisms for reviewing the continued need for the official capital at regular 
intervals. Thus in many cases it is not sufficiently clear what long-term options for exiting the funds are 
available to the official donors. 
Recommendation 2  
The BMZ and the KfW Development Bank should define the long-term options for official donors to exit the 
funds as part of an exit strategy. 
Implementation guidance for recommendation 2 
The exit strategy should 
• define the timing and nature of the exit of the official donors, or  
• define processes to review the relevance of the official capital for the funds at regular intervals. 
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Development orientation 
The development orientation of the structured funds is highly consistent with the objectives of the 16 BMZ 
strategies that are linked to the funds either thematically or geographically71. The funds aim to create 
access to finance for sub-borrowers who have thus far had insufficient access to finance, and to support the 
stability of the partner-country financial systems. They are thus designed to help implement the BMZ sector 
strategy for financial systems development in particular. However, there is relatively little interaction 
between the objectives and activities of the structured funds, and the bilateral portfolio/country division, 
with respect to private sector and financial systems development. So far the BMZ has thus made barely any 
proactive use of potential synergies between funds, and the bilateral portfolio/country division. 
Implementation of the BMZ 2030 reform process and the intended prioritisation of reform-minded partner 
countries and core areas (also within the framework of regional projects) mean that the BMZ will need to 
discuss the future orientation of new funds in line with these priorities. The coronavirus pandemic might also 
necessitate a change of direction in order to provide greater support to countries and sectors that are 
particularly hard hit. 
At the same time, the structure and regional setup of the funds allows them to meet financing needs in 
partner countries that are not covered by other approaches of bilateral FC. As well as the possibility of 
offering small loan sizes and local currency financing, this also includes the financing of private FIs. In this 
way the funds make a development contribution to building stable and inclusive financial systems and to 
creating financing opportunities for groups with previously limited access to sources of finance. They can 
thereby demonstrate a high degree of additionality to other financing approaches. Moreover, their structure 
enables them to ensure continuity in times of crisis, such as the current coronavirus pandemic, by meeting 
financing needs in markets that are considered risky.  
Setting the strategic direction of a fund when it is created is crucial for its development orientation, as the 
BMZ's options for exercising political management are limited thereafter. Once a fund has been set up, 
strategic adjustments usually require complex coordination processes and a change in the issue document 
to ensure the agreement of all investors. There are three main points at which the BMZ is able to exercise 
political management: when the fund is being set up, when financial resources are being increased, and when 
comments are made in reports. However, a lack of capacities within BMZ and the way the responsibilities for 
the funds are organised within the Ministry prevent better political management. 
Recommendation 3 
The BMZ should ensure more effective management of the development impact of the funds. 
Implementation guidance for recommendation 3 
More effective management of the development impact should 
• include long-term capacity building for structured funds within the BMZ to enable strategic
management, especially when the funds are set up and through reporting, and
• use synergies in the field of financial market development. To this end
o the responsibilities for the funds should lie within the BMZ division with a sectoral or regional
focus to account for the regional nature of the funds
o there should be increased exchange with the activities of the sector divisions and the bilateral
financial market development programmes (especially for larger funds), for example when
country programme strategies are designed.
In operational decision-making for the funds an important role is played by the members of the official 
bodies, in particular a fund's Board of Directors and the Investment Committee. These bodies ensure 
71  See list of strategies in Annex 9.5. 
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compliance with a fund's strategy, including its development objectives, for instance by deciding on which 
FIs to select for support. The responsibilities of each of the bodies are clearly defined and demarcated. 
However, a few individuals are members of both the Board of Directors of a fund and the Board of Directors 
of an FI financed by the fund, which can lead to a conflict of interests in the selection of FIs to be supported. 
Although each of the funds has a defined process for managing such conflicts, the regulations governing 
exclusion from voting in risky cases are not uniform.  
Recommendation 4  
The KfW Development Bank should work towards ensuring that in the event of conflicts of interest of 
mandate holders, who are represented both in the official bodies of funds and the boards of the financed 
FIs, abstention from relevant votes is stipulated in the regulations (in this case the Conflict of Interest 
Policy).  
Implementation guidance for recommendation 4  
In order to ensure a more effective pursuit of development objectives, the management of conflicts of 
interest should provide for  
• notifying the Board of Directors of the conflict of interest  
• abstention by persons who are represented both on the board of the fund and on the board of a 
financed FI, in cases where a vote could involve a conflict of interest, such as votes to fund that 
particular FI. 
The financing approach helps to harmonise different donor approaches within the funds, and through the 
finance provided strengthens local actors. Harmonisation is achieved primarily by defining standard 
investment guidelines and through the dialogue platforms created by the funds. At the same time, the 
competition for suitable FIs in the target countries that sometimes prevails between the funds and the (D)FIs 
invested in them constrains harmonisation. Where possible, interests that collide should be addressed when 
a fund is being established.  
Mobilisation of private capital 
Structured funds are a suitable financing approach for mobilising private capital for development. The 
waterfall structure of the funds enables them to involve investors with different risk-return profiles. 
However, the funds are not yet fully exploiting their potential for mobilising private capital. Some funds reach 
a natural limit for mobilising private investors once their risk buffer is used up. In these cases it is not possible 
to increase the share of private investment without increasing the financing volume from official capital and 
(D)FIs. Furthermore, in a few funds there is no need to mobilise private capital since the required financing 
volume is provided entirely by official donors and (D)FIs. 
Recommendation 5 
The KfW Development Bank should work towards ensuring that the structured funds develop mechanisms 
which will enable them to make better use of their potential to mobilise private capital in the future.  
Implementation guidance for recommendation 5 
The mechanisms should include a regular review of the risk buffer and risk appetite of private investors by 
the Board of Directors. Depending on the circumstances, there are three options for adjustment: 
• If the risk buffer is almost exhausted, the possibility of reducing the share of the risk buffer should be 
considered, taking into account the risk appetite of private investors. 
• If there is sufficient financing by official donors and (D)FIs, a reduction of the mezzanine tranche should 
be considered.  
• If private investors have a stronger risk appetite, the possibility of enabling private investment in riskier 
tranches should be considered. 
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A large number of different types of investor with different investment strategies, plus the complexity of 
the fund structure, make it more difficult to mobilise private capital. Many different types of investor are 
involved in the funds that have various motives for investment, investment strategies and risk profiles. There 
is no indication that the mobilisation of private investors follows a clear strategy. Moreover the structure of 
the funds, which usually comprises various tranches and notes, increases the complexity of the financing 
approach and makes it less attractive for institutional investors. This is why there is a trend towards a less 
complex structure with only two tranches (junior and senior tranches)72 or towards only different note 
categories, to serve the investment needs of private investors. 
Recommendation 6  
The KfW Development Bank should work towards developing and regularly updating a clear acquisition 
strategy for each fund for private, particularly institutional, investors.  
Implementation guidance for recommendation 6 
To facilitate the mobilisation of private capital, an acquisition strategy should be developed based on the 
following two points:  
• identify selected target investor types 
• identify the requirements of these selected investor types. 
The fund managers should be responsible for designing the respective acquisition strategies. 
Effects on the target groups 
Analysing the effects of the four evaluated MSME funds on their target groups highlights the funds' need 
to balance the conflicting priorities of development impact and financial sustainability. The funds select FIs 
that reach the targeted sub-borrowers through an existing business segment (in this case MSME financing), 
yet are also financially stable. Similarly, the funds invest in countries that are largely considered risky, yet 
mainly belong to the middle-income group. This selection of FIs and countries reduces the probability of 
losses, thus safeguarding the financial sustainability of the funds. At the same time, however, it limits the 
funds' additionality because these countries/FIs tend to also have other financing options. The option of 
portfolio diversification does enable the funds to invest in riskier LDCs and FIs with higher financing 
requirements, yet they only do so to a minor extent. With regard to development objectives the funds 
provide the financed FIs with reliable access to financing and promote the stability of financial systems in 
partner countries. 
The funds reach the targeted sub-borrowers because an existing business segment for this target group is 
a criterion for selection of the FIs to be financed. Through the fund financing, the financed FIs increase their 
investment volume and expand their portfolios in absolute terms, so that more sub-borrowers can be 
reached. Beyond that, however, the FIs do not make it any easier for the envisaged target groups to access 
financing. Usually, for example, the FIs neither modify their lending terms for the envisaged target groups 
(with the exception of local currency financing), nor do they increase the share of target-group-related 
business segments, e.g. for microenterprises or sub-borrowers without collateral, relative to their portfolio 
as a whole.  
In accordance with the strategy of the funds, the FIs' lending terms are market-based in order to avoid any 
distortion of the market. This means that the terms offered by the FIs do not differ from those of FIs not 





72  Implemented for example in the Eco-Business Fund and the newly-launched LAGreen 
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Recommendation 7 
The BMZ and KfW Development Bank should works towards using and monitoring the selection of FIs more 
effectively as the key point of leverage for ensuring development impact of the funds. 
Implementation guidance for recommendation 7 
When defining the eligibility or selection criteria for the institutions to be financed, an assessment should 
be made of the extent to which the risk profile allows for 
• earmarking a minimum percentage of the portfolio for investment in riskier, possibly younger FIs with 
a high potential for reaching the target group 
• sectors with high development potential to be addressed, especially where the funds help establish a 




The BMZ and the KfW Development Bank should work towards making lending to FIs conditional on the 
expansion of thematic areas that are key to development – in line with the BMZ 2030 strategy. 
Implementation guidance for recommendation 8 
To strengthen development impact at sub-borrower level, 
• financing should be made conditional upon the expansion of business segments, financial products or 
sectors relevant to the target group  
• appropriate indicators should be included in the reporting to measure and ensure that target groups 
are reached 
• the question should be addressed of whether further issues that are key to development policy, such 
as climate change, can be integrated into existing funds. 
The TA provided by the funds is highly effective. The findings show that the TA provided by the funds is 
highly demand-oriented and useful. Although other investors also offer TA, some 40% of the funds' 
interventions address the sector level, which other providers cover either to a lesser extent or not at all. The 
evaluation team therefore assumes that the interventions are additional, although the average financial 
volume is low. In the some cases the total lack or only minimal use made of all financing channels, particularly 
the contributions by the funds, restricts the sustainable design of the TA. 
New Theory of Change 
Based on the findings of this evaluation, the evaluation team revised the ToC formulated at the beginning of 
the evaluation and aligned the Theory of Change for structured funds with the evidence.  
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Outlook 
The evaluated funds are already displaying trends which, in light of the evaluation findings, are moving in 
interesting directions. 
This further development concerns first of all the sectoral orientation of the funds. While funds have so far 
operated with a strong focus on the microfinance and MSME support sectors (five out of ten funds in this 
evaluation alone), younger funds are also operating in other sectors, such as the REFFA in the education 
sector and the EBF in environment and biodiversity. These sectors not only have a high financing 
requirement, but are also a particular priority for development policy. In sectors such as these, funds can 
play an even greater role in creating markets than is already the case in sectors such as microfinance. This 
can also be attributed to the fact that in such sectors conventional investors face particularly high obstacles 
to investment, at which point structured funds offer appropriate incentives. Particularly in sectors where 
there is not yet any demand for financial products relevant to development, at the beginning of the financing 
and for a limited period funds might foster demand for certain financial products. To identify such sectors, 
an approach may be helpful that calculates the level of concessionality as the difference between the 
concessional price and the market price, and relates this difference to the project costs (see for instance 
IFC).73 This method allows products, sectors and markets to be compared with respect to concessionality. 
Another solution that comes to mind is to examine whether interest below the current market level in such 
new markets might temporarily create incentives for certain financial products, for instance in climate 
finance. 
In light of the coronavirus pandemic, however, financing in the microfinance and MSME sectors is gaining 
renewed importance. Since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020, liquidity shortages 
have also become evident even in formalised markets that previously displayed high liquidity. The global 
measures to contain the virus already led to a collapse in economic activity within just a few months of the 
outbreak. Fitch Ratings forecasts a global recession and a 1.9 per cent drop in GDP in 2020 (FitchRatings, 
2020). The reduction in overall economic demand resulting from the measures is hitting MSMEs particularly 
hard, as they often have fewer reserves than large companies. If they are then unable to repay their loans, 
their cash flow problems are passed on to the FIs, whose portfolio risk shoots up. Given their relatively high 
share of official capital, in this situation structured funds can guarantee stability and use the risk buffer to 
offer private investors incentives to invest in markets considered risky even in times of crisis. 
There is also scope for further development among financial products used and FIs financed. Of the 
evaluated funds, SANAD is the first to provide not only debt, but also equity. This involves investing amongst 
other things in greenfield projects and in early stages of business model development. This is especially 
important for developing and establishing the local financial market. Moreover, equity creates more options 
for influencing institutions with respect to development objectives. The newly-established AfricaGrow Fund, 
for instance, also covers equity financing.  
Trends are also emerging regarding which institutions the funds will approach as FIs. So far this has mainly 
included banks, microfinance banks and non-bank actors. A few funds already support leasing companies, 
and it is conceivable that the scope could be widened to include other actors such as cooperatives. Equally, 
typical FIs that invest in innovative sectors or are interested in introducing products of particular value for 
development should also be included here. 
Finally, scope for further development is also becoming evident in the structure of the funds. Some of the 
evaluated funds have already reduced their complexity by offering investment in just two share categories 
from the start, or by at least reducing the mezzanine tranche. Furthermore, talks are already under way as 
 
 
73  See https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/solutions/products+and+services/blended-
finance/5_what+is+concessionality+and+how+is+it+calculated?wcmitemid=72f67569-49cb-4233-927d-
ac441a35767b&WCM_Page.ResetAll=TRUE&CACHE=NONE&CONTENTCACHE=NONE&CONNECTORCACHE=NONE&SRV=Page;7 February 2020. 
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to how additional C shares for particular countries or regions might be reduced at least on the liabilities side 
of the funds.  
The long-term goal of the funds is to manage without official capital and become gradually more self-
sustaining through financing from institutional investors. How quickly this goal can be reached depends 
very much on the region in which the funds invest. Corresponding recommendations are made above, though 
further steps such as the introduction of ESG ratings for the funds are conceivable. At least for funds 
operating in the environment and climate change sector, this could facilitate investment decision-making by 
private investors. All in all, there are clearly many options for further developing the funds that should be 
considered as work continues. These will also need to be aligned with the envisaged prioritisation of partner 
countries and core areas as part of the BMZ 2030 reform process. 
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9.1 Debt funds of German FC 
Table 8 Debt funds of German FC 
 Fund Country of 
domicile 
1 Africa Agriculture and Trade Investment Fund (AATIF) LUX 
2 Regional Education Finance Fund for Africa (REFFA) LUX 
3 Green for Growth Fund Southeast Europe (GGF) LUX 
4 Eco-Business Fund LUX 
5 Municipal Infrastructure Development Fund (MIDF) LUX 
6 Microfinance Enhancement Facility (MEF) LUX 
7 Microfinance Initiative for Asia (MIFA) Debt Fund. LUX 
8 European Fund for Southeast Europe (EFSE) LUX 
9 SANAD Fund for MSME (SANAD) LUX 
10 Regional MSME Investment Fund for Sub-Saharan Africa (REGMIFA) LUX 
11 Global Climate Partnership Fund (GCPF) LUX 
12 Rural Impulse Fund LUX 
13 Fairtrade Access Fund LUX 
14 Africa Local Currency Bond Fund (ALCB) MUS 
15 Lending for African Farming Company LAFCO MUS 
16 Higher Education Finance Fund, L.P. (HEFF) USA 
17 Wholesale Microfinance Facility (Ghana) Ltd. GHA 
18 JAIDA S.A. MAR 
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9.2 Findings of the contribution analysis 
Table 9 lists the respective assumptions and risks that underlie a causal link. The column on the right summarises the evidence regarding the causal link (includes 
the evidence on all assumptions and risks for the link), the elements, and the individual assumptions and risks. 
The symbols have the following meanings: 
?: no evidence; - : not corroborated by evidence; + : corroborated by evidence; +/- : evidence mixed; (+) : corroborated by weak evidence 
Table 9 Summary of the evidence on assumptions, risks and elements of the ToC 
Output level 1 
Causal link TA ->  FIs are supported in their management. FIs are supported in reaching target groups. + 
Elements FIs are supported in their management. + 
FIs are supported in reaching target groups. + 
Assumptions The FIs (interventions) with development potential are selected. +/- 
The recommendations of the TA are implemented. + 
Risks The FIs are selected not primarily on the basis of development criteria, but in order to reduce the risk of a payment default. (+) 
The recommendations of the TA are not implemented by the FIs. (+) 
Output level 2 
Causal link FIs are supported in their management. -> FIs offer financial products on more favourable terms. + 
Assumption As a result of the management support the FIs have access to additional financing. + 




Causal link Capital ->  
 
FIs offer financial products on more favourable terms. 
Financial products offered are focused more closely on target groups of the structured fund. 
(+) 
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Assumptions The investment volume of the FIs increases as a result of the additional capital. + 
When selecting and monitoring the FIs the fund applies development criteria that go beyond the customary due diligence 
process. 
+/- 
The fund selects FIs and countries mainly on the basis of their development potential +/- 
Risks The FIs do not use the capital provided by the structured fund to increase their investment volume. - 
Losses arise as a result of poor fund management and not as a result of riskier investments. (+) 
The additional financing raises the financial intermediaries' transaction costs. (+) 
 
Causal link Capital -> FIs offer financial products on more favourable terms. (+) 
Element FIs offer financial products on more favourable terms. - 
Assumptions FIs have access to better financing terms. +/- 
Difficult financing terms or a lack of financial resources prevent the FIs from offering their clients better terms. + 
Through its signalling effect, the capital provided leads to investment by other investors. (+) 
The investment volume of the FIs increases as a result of the additional capital. + 
Risks The financings reach FIs that do not have any difficulty in obtaining financing. + 
Savings resulting from improved financing terms and additional capital are used by the FIs for other purposes, such as to 
increase profit. 
- 
The additional financing raises the financial intermediaries' transaction costs. (+) 
 
Causal link Capital -> Financial products offered are focused more closely on the target groups of the structured fund. (+) 
Element Financial products offered are focused more closely on the target groups of the structured fund. +/- 
Assumptions The financed FIs reach the funds' target groups. +/- 
One obstacle in focusing on the target groups is the lack of financing and/or poor financing terms. ? 
Risks FIs are not interested in adapting their financial products to better suit the target groups. +/- 
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Induced output level 
Causal link FIs offer financial products on more favourable terms -> access to financial products is simplified.  
Assumption Poor terms (such as high interest rates) make it more difficult for the fund's target groups to access financial products. ? 
Risk The more favourable terms lead to other FIs being crowded out, as a result of which the overall supply shrinks, or the terms 
deteriorate in the long term due to the lack of competition. 
* 
 
Causal link Financial products are focused more closely on the target groups -> access to financial products is simplified.  
Assumptions There is a lack of target-group-orientation, making it more difficult for the target groups to access financial products. + 
Risk Factors other than the lack of target-group-focus prevent the target group from obtaining financial products. + 
 
Element Access to financial products is simplified. - 
* There is little evidence of more favourable terms, hence the risk is not relevant.  
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9.3 Objectives of the funds 
Table 10 Fund objectives 
Fund Sector Target group Mission 
EFSE  MSEs MSEs, low-income private 
households with limited 
access to financial 
services 
• Promote economic development and prosperity through sustainable, additional 
development finance.  
• Generate income and create jobs by supporting MSEs. 
• Satisfy the basic need for appropriate housing through housing modernisation measures.  
• Strengthen local financial markets. 
SANAD  MSMEs MSMEs • Protect and create jobs, especially for young people. 
• Reduce poverty by supporting the self-employed.  
• Create inclusive financial systems. 
• Increase access to finance for housing, promote agriculture and financial  innovation. 
MEF  Microfinance SEs and MFIs • Promote growth, create jobs and reduce poverty through microfinance in emerging 
markets. 
AATIF  Agriculture Commercial agricultural 
enterprises, cooperatives 
and small farmers 
• Promote investment along the entire agricultural value chain. 
• Food and nutrition security  
• Create jobs. 
• Increase local income. 
MIFA  Microfinance MSEs Effects on private households:  
• Improve lives by reducing health risks. 
• Reduce workloads. 
• Increase income. 
GGF  Renewable 
energy (RE) 
MSMEs and private 
households 
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Fund Sector Target group Mission 
REFFA  Education Private education 
providers 
• Address the growing demand for primary, secondary and post-secondary education.  
• Overcome obstacles such as high student-teacher ratio. 
• poor educational infrastructure 
• lack of practical experience among teachers 
• outdated curricula  
• graduate skills sets that do not match labour-market requirements  
EBF  Nature 
conservation 
Enterprises and private 
households 
• Preserve biodiversity, manage natural resources sustainably, mitigate climate change and 
adapt to its impacts. 
• Sectors: agriculture and agricultural processing, fishery and aquaculture, forestry, tourism 
REGMIFA  Microfinance MSMEs • Strategy: Eliminate obstacles for MSMEs (limited access to financial services) in order to 
unlock the potential of local capital markets. 
• Overarching objectives: Promote economic development and prosperity, create jobs, 
generate income and reduce poverty. 
MIDF  Infrastructure Municipal utility 
companies as well as 
small and medium-sized 
municipalities 
• Develop and maintain public infrastructure. 
• Finance infrastructure projects in cooperation with local banks. 
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9.4 Selection of the funds and countries for the analysis 















































































































































































European Fund for Southeast Europe (EFSE)        5 
SANAD Fund for MSME (SANAD)        7 
Microfinance Enhancement Facility (MEF)        4 
Africa Agriculture and Trade Investment Fund (AATIF)        4 
Regional MSME Investment Fund for Sub-Saharan Africa 
(REGMIFA) 
       7 
Microfinance Initiative for Asia (MIFA) Debt Fund.        6 
Green for Growth Fund Southeast Europe (GGF)        4 
Eco-Business Fund        2 
Regional Education Finance Fund for Africa (REFFA)        3 
Municipal Infrastructure Development Fund (MIDF)        2 
N.B.: *Defined characteristics of the target group and maximum loan size are included as indicators in the KfW results matrix.  
 indicates that jobs are not just a formulated objective of the fund, but also an explicit objectives indicator of the KfW results matrix. 
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Table 12 Criteria for selecting countries for the causal analysis 
Category Selection criterion Objective Ranking 
Fund-specific 
criteria  
Number and types of 
refinanced FIs 
Typicity with respect to types 
of FIs; most likely with respect 
to number of FIs (> 4)  
1 
Portfolio shares of the fund in 
the country 




Bank branches per 100,000 
inhabitants (WB data, 2014) 
Most likely (as low as possible, 
but no outliers at fund level)  
2 
Domestic lending by the 
financial sector (% of GDP) (WB 
data, 2014) 
Most likely (as low as possible, 
but no outliers at fund level) 
Coverage by credit institutions 
(% of adults) (ease of doing 
business index)  
Most likely (as low as possible, 
but no outliers at fund level) 
Percentage of MSMEs (5-99 
employees) with outstanding 
loans or credit line (G20 
Financial Inclusion Indicators, 
most current year, 2011-2017, 
usually 2013) 
Most likely (as low as possible, 
but no outliers at fund level)  
Socio-economic 
criteria 
Human Development Index 
(HDI) 
Typicity at fund level  3 
Income group according to 
World Bank 
Typicity and diversity across 
funds 
Unemployment rate (WB data) Most likely (as high as 
possible, but no outliers at 
fund level)  
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9.5 Selected BMZ strategies 
Table 13 BMZ strategies linked thematically or geographically to SFs 
Nr. BMZ strategies linked thematically or geographically to SFs 
1. Africa and Europe – A new partnership for development, peace and a better future. Cornerstones 
of a Marshall Plan with Africa 
2. Agricultural finance 
3. BMZ Education Strategy – Creating equitable opportunities for quality education 
4. BMZ Position Paper – Financial systems development for green finance 
5. The world needs forests. Germany's forest action plan for sustainable development 
6. Development policy 2030. New challenges – new solutions. BMZ Strategy Paper 
7. Promoting sustainable agriculture. A development policy strategy  
8. Focus on Europe. Overcoming crises and divides, driving forward regional and European integration 
9. G20 Africa Partnership 
10. Good Financial Governance in German Development Cooperation. Promoting good governance in 
public finance. BMZ Sector Strategy Paper 
11. Developing markets, creating wealth, reducing poverty, taking responsibility – The private sector as 
a partner of development policy. Policy paper on cooperation with the private sector 
12. Marine Conservation and Sustainable Fisheries. Ten-point Plan of Action 
13. Human Rights in German Development Policy. Strategy 
14. Shaping the future with shared values and interests – The BMZ's new Latin America policy 
15. Sector strategy on private sector promotion 
16. Sector strategy on financial systems development 
9.6 Diversification of the funds 
Figure 30  Portfolio quality of the FIs for each fund (PAR > 90 days) 
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Figure 31 Assets of the FIs for each fund 
Source: MIX Market 
9.7 Composition of income from FI loans 
Figure 32  Composition of income from loans, broken down by costs and profit 





















































Operating costs Financing cost Losses from loans Profit
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9.8 BMZ partner countries 
Figure 33  Distribution of BMZ partner countries (A/B) for each fund 
Source: BMZ. 
9.9 Regression findings and indicators 
Table 14 Indicators of regression 



















Countries with a GNI per capita above 12,375 US dollars World Bank 
Least developed 
countries 
47 countries with the lowest values for the following indicators: 
Gross National Income per capita, the Human Assets Index (HAI) 
and the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) . 
(UN-OHRLLs, 
2020) 





This indicator rates a country's  ability to repay. Moody's ratings 
range from AAA (top rating) to C (bottom rating). Ratings 
between AAA and Baa3 are classified as investment grade. 














Fund 1 Fund 2 Fund 3 Fund 4 Fund 5 Fund 6 Fund 7 Fund 8 Fund 9
A country B country Neither A nor B country
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Name of indicator Definition Source 
Ease of doing 
business score 
The ease of doing business score is a World Bank index 
published annually that rates business friendliness and the 
regulatory environment in national economies. 
World Bank 
FI indicators 
Assets Total value of resources managed by the FI MIX Market 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
(GLP) 
All outstanding principal amounts for all outstanding customer 
loans. This includes current, overdue and renegotiated loans, 
but not loans already written off. 
MIX Market 
Percentage of female 
sub-borrowers 
Loans issued to women over the last years as a percentage of 
total loans 
MIX Market 
Debt Equity Ratio 
(DER) 
Ratio of all liabilities to equity MIX Market 
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio (CAR) 
Ratio of equity to assets MIX Market 
Portfolio at Risk 
30/90 (PAR30/90) 
Loans overdue by more than 30 days as a percentage of the 
gross loan portfolio 
MIX Market 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Net income (after tax) as a percentage of average assets MIX Market 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
Net income (after tax) as a percentage of average equity MIX Market 
Yield on gross 
portfolio, nominal 
Income from loans as a percentage of average gross loan 
portfolio 
MIX Market 
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Table 15 Logistic regression for country selection 
























BMZ A country 2.411*** 
06:22 
Moody‘s rating 0.0242 
01:08 




Constant -2.944*** -0.411* -1.171*** -0.913** -0.0117
(-5.74) (-2.41) (-6.47) (-2.60) (-0.02) 
N 218 189 218 216 188 
t-statistic in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 16 Logistic regression for country selection, controlling for the region 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Least developed countries -0.165 -1.807**
(-0.36) (-2.61) 
High-income countries 0 
(.) 










BMZ A country 2.475*** 
(5.80) 
Moody‘s rating 0.00292 
(0.11) 
Ease of doing business score 0.00908 
(0.59) 
Region YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -0.969* -4.721*** -1.799*** -1.363* -1.567
(-2.26) (-4.91) (-3.99) (-2.54) (-1.41) 
N 187 187 215 213 186 
t-statistic in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 17 Logistic regression for FI selection 

























Country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.412 -1.759 0.416 0.544 0.463 0.398 0.408 0.235 -
5.361**
* 
(0.64) (-1.66) (0.64) (0.83) (0.71) (0.62) (0.63) (0.34) (-3.66) 
N 573 245 429 568 327 357 357 325 572 
t-statistic in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
74  Since the distribution for this indicator is highly positively skewed, the natural logarithm was used as independent variable for the analyses.  
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Table 18 Findings of the DiD analysis 




Women as a 
percentage of 
sub-borrowers (%) 
Time 1.733*** 1.884*** -0.150** 0.0103 
(11.50) (11.45) (-2.61) (0.42) 
Fund financing 1.633*** 1.661*** 0.106 0.00281 
(8.73) (7.87) (1.45) (0.07) 
Interaction between 
time and fund financing 
-0.132 0.0187 -0.0653 -0.0352
(-0.44) (0.06) (-0.43) (-0.61)
Constant 14.79*** 14.40*** -1.288*** 0.664*** 
(164.46) (146.01) (-36.14) (42.84) 
N 1124 1031 796 713 
t-statistic in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
9.10 Fund websites 










MIDF No website 
REGMIFA https://www.regmifa.com/ 
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9.11 Interviewees 
Table 20 Interviewees 
Fund managers 
Number of interviewees Institution 
7 BlueOrchard 
1 Deutsche Bank 
1 Innpact 










Number of interviewees Institution 
9 BMZ 
24 KfW 
6 European Commission 
1 IADB 
2 OeEB 
Pilot case study Tunisia 
Number of interviewees Institution 
6 Enda Tamweel 
4 Client of Enda Tamweel 
Case Egypt 
Number of interviewees Institution 
1 Global Leasing Company 
1 Sandah 
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Case study Cambodia 
Number of interviewees Institution 
5 HKL 
6 LOLC 
1 Kredit (MFI) 
1 Credit bureau Cambodia 
4 Client of HKL 
4 Client of LOLC 
Case study Nigeria 
Number of interviewees Institution 
5 Advans LaFayette 
2 IFC 
1 Fina Trust 
1 GIZ 
1 Boctrust 
1 Purple Money 
1 Pan-Atlantic University, Nigeria 
6 Client of Advans 
Case study Serbia 
Number of interviewees Institution 
3 AgroInvest 
3 Opportunity Bank (OBS) 
1 Association of Serbian Banks 
1 Chamber of Commerce and Industry Serbia 
1 OBB (MFI) 
1 Sefini (MFI) 
1 Consultant 
1 National Bank of Serbia 
1 Regional Agency for Development Serbia 
1 GIZ Serbia 
1 OBS Branch 
1 USAID 
1 BMZ 
3 Client of OBS 
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9.12 Timeline 
Time frame Tasks 
07/2018 Reference group meeting to discuss concept note 
08/2018 – 11/2018 Inception report prepared 
11/2018 Reference group meeting to discuss inception report 
11/2018 Pilot case study in Tunisia carried out 
12/2018 – 05/2019 Data collected in Germany 
05/2019 Case study in Cambodia carried out 
06/2019 Case study in Nigeria carried out 
07/2019 Case study in Serbia carried out 
08/2019 – 11/2019 Synthesis of the findings 
11/2019 Reference group meeting to discuss the findings 
12/2019 – 03/2020 Evaluation report written 
03/2020 Reference group meeting to discuss the conclusions and 
recommendations 
06/2020 Final report submitted to BMZ 
06/2020 Completion of evaluation after layout and print 
9.13 The team 
Last name First name Position 
Orth Magdalena Senior Evaluator, Team Leader 
Habbel Valerie Evaluator 
Richter Johanna Evaluator 
Roggemann Hanne Evaluator 
Bornemann Amelie Project Administrator (until December 
2019) 
Maicher Rebecca Project Administrator (since January 2020) 
Bühler Joshua Student Assistant 
Hügle Joscha Intern 
Langenberg Joscha Intern 
Neu Aurelia Intern 
Wirtz David Paul Intern 
Responsible 
Harten Sven Head of Department 
